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PREFACE
This issue of the Denver University Law Review includes profiles of the
seven justices of the Colorado Supreme Court. To our knowledge, this
is the first time all seven justices have been profiled in one publication.
Special thanks is due Richard Westfall, General Editor, 1984-85, for suggesting that the Review profile the justices and for then locating authors
for each of the profiles. The Review would also like to extend its deep
appreciation to the authors for their work in writing the profiles; the
quality of each profile is witness to the substantial time and effort expended by each.
We believe the profiles offer rare glimpses into the backgrounds
and some of the special experiences of each of the justices. We hope
you find them good reading.
Board of Editors,
Denver University Law Review

COLORADO SUPREME COURT-JUDICIAL PROFILES
JOSEPH
SUSAN

L.

FOREMAN*

R.

QUINN

AND LEE D. FOREMAN**

Joseph R. Quinn has enjoyed few vacation days since his appointment to the Colorado Supreme Court in 1980 and his selection as Chief
Justice of that court in 1985. He runs twenty miles a week, is raising five
children with his wife Olga, and reads philosophy in his "leisure" time.
With such findings of fact, the conclusion that this is a tireless man
seems unlikely to be set aside upon review. Quinn's energy, dedication,
and fair and scholarly approach to the resolution of legal issues makes
him an ideal member of the judiciary.
Born on November 18, 1932, Joe Quinn grew up in the
Kreighyhead neighborhood of the industrial town of Elizabeth, New
Jersey. His father was a postal inspector, and his mother a homemaker.
He is the eldest of three sons; his brothers teach school and work in
construction. At his father's urging he attended parochial school at St.
Peter's Preparatory. By the time of his graduation, he had all but abandoned his boyhood dream of a career as a major league baseball player
for more academic aspirations. His present work ethic definitely reflects
his "no-nonsense" Jesuit education and training.
ChiefJustice Quinn's college education was interrupted by his service with the Marine Corps during the Korean war. Following his military service, he resumed his liberal arts studies at St. Peter's College,
graduating with honors in 1957. He then entered Rutgers Law School
and completed his distinguished student career with an LL.B. degree in
1961.
Escaping New Jersey, Quinn came to Colorado and clerked for
Supreme Court Justice Leonard v.B. Sutton. Finding the Great West to
his liking, Quinn stayed on to pursue a career in litigation. From January, 1963, to February, 1966, he worked with an insurance defense firm
and engaged extensively in civil litigation.
In the mid-1960's, the birth of public defender programs in Colorado provided a new outlet for his energy. Between February. 1966 and
December, 1969, Quinn worked as a Denver Public Defender. The understaffed office of which he was a part handled all the misdemeanor,
juvenile, and felony cases arising in the Denver courts, plus any appeals
taken in those cases. Despite the sixteen-hour days, he loved the job,
and his devotion to his work became an inspiration to a generation of
*

University of Wisconsin (B.A., 1971); Loyola of Chicago (J.D., 1974): formerly of

Allen, Foreman & Mueller.
**
Stanford University (A.B., 1968; J.D., 1972); Shareholder, Haddon, Moirgan &
Foreman, P.C.
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young attorneys working on behalf of the criminally accused. Implementing such newly decided cases as Mapp, Wade, and Miranda, Quinn
had the sense that his work was on the cutting edge of the most important legal developments of the time. He remembers that part of his career as especially exciting and fulfilling.
In January, 1970, the State Public Defender's Office was created by
statute, and Rollie R. Rogers named Quinn as his first Chief Trial Deputy. In that role he spent a year selecting staff, establishing legal procedures for providing assistance of counsel from time of arrest through
appeal, and establishing administrative procedures for accurate record
keeping with respect to case loads and dispositions. As Chief Trial Deputy he had the responsibility for the Boulder, Brighton, Golden, and
Littleton offices and tried several of the more serious cases in those areas. Those who observed Quinn during this period recall him as a
forceful advocate who used his considerable understanding of the developing law to great advantage on behalf of his clients.
He returned to private practice in January of 1971, when he became
a partner in the law firm of Sherman, Quinn and Sherman. There he
continued to litigate until his appointment to the Denver District Court
bench in January, 1973.
As a district court judge, Quinn served in all divisions: criminal,
civil, roving, and domestic. He also presided over a regular grand jury
for a period of time. Additional contributions to the legal community
included service on the Colorado Judicial Planning Committee and the
Standing Committees on Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Criminal
Procedure. He taught criminal procedure at the University of Denver
College of Law for several years and still participates on occasion in programs sponsored by the National Institute of Trial Advocacy.
During his years on the trial bench, Quinn developed a reputation
as being brilliant, fair, and, at times, a bit of a task master. He expected
those around him to exhibit the same dedication and professionalism
that he demanded of himself. Although occasionally exhausted by the
pace he set, those who have worked with him or before him believe
themselves better lawyers for the experience, and remember with fondness the Friday afternoons when official business was concluded, and
conversation turned to past cases, sports, and Thomas Mann.
As a judge, Joseph Quinn has never been one to avoid controversy
by ducking important issues presented in a given case. Although he
considers no one decision of his more significant than another, he acknowledges that his district court decision in Lujan v. Colorado State Board
of Education received the most public attention. In the Lujan case, Judge
Quinn ruled that Colorado's system of financing public education, in
which almost half of the operating income comes from greatly varying
local property taxes, was unconstitutional. He held that the financing
system violated the equal protection provisions of the United States and
Colorado Constitutions and the Colorado constitutional mandate contained in article IX, section 2 that a "thorough and uniform" system of
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public schools be provided. Subsequently, the decision was reversed by
the Colorado Supreme Court in Lujan v. Colorado State Board of
Education.I
In the interim, Governor Lamm had appointed Quinn to that same
court. Although this appointment was applauded by the legal community, the supreme court was picketed the day of Quinn's swearing in.
His ruling as a trial judge in the murder case People v. Lowe had generated significant criticism from the general public. In the highly-publicized case, Lowe had been accused of murdering an eleven-year-old girl
at Denver's Pinehurst Country Club. Judge Quinn granted Lowe's motion to suppress statements and certain physical evidence, finding that
"Do you know why you're here?" constituted interrogation under Miranda, and that a subsequent reading of rights to Lowe did not purge the
taint of the initial illegal questioning. This controversial ruling was up2
held without dissent by the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Lowe.
Undaunted by such public criticism, Quinn simply states that he
strives to meet his own standards of quality and does not worry about
his popularity or being reversed. His goal as a judge, a role which he
enjoys, is to make a contribution to the administration ofjustice through
the objective resolution of legal issues.
Quinn's independent thinking is often revealed in his written opinions. For example, in People v. Sporleder,3 the court considered the issue
of whether governmental use of pen registers to record the telephone
numbers dialed by an individual from her home constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. Contrary to Smith v. Maryland,4 Quinn
found that a telephone subscriber has a legitimate expectation that the
dialing of telephone numbers from a home phone will be free from governmental intrusion. Stating that the court was not bound by the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment when
determining the scope of state constitutional protections, Quinn's opinion concludes that the use of pen registers without a warrant constitutes
an unreasonable search and seizure.
Continuing in the mode of his law review days, Chief Justice
Quinn's opinions are expansive and scholarly. He holds fast to his belief

that the court has a greater responsibility than simply disposing of cases;
it must also provide the litigants, members of the bar, and the general
public with a full and principled analysis of all significant issues
presented by the case.
Chief Justice Quinn's independence, and his lack of concern that a
given decision will be popular, should not be construed as an indifference toward the public. To the contrary, he voices concern that the
public knows that the court exists for its benefits. He believes it important that the citizenry see its judges as absolutely objective in their deci1.
2.
3.
4.

649
200
666
442

P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
Colo. 470, 616 P.2d 118 (1980).
P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983).
U.S. 735 (1979).
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sions. Because the present demands of the court place severe
restrictions on outside activities, Quinn spends less time on committee
work and other projects than in the past.
Often consumed by his work, Chief Justice Quinn is not an easy
man to get to know. However, those fortunate enough to catch a
glimpse of the man behind the impressive work product have seen, at
the least, a very likeable, decent person. It is axiomatic that Joseph
Quinn has been and will continue to be an important jurist. Baseball's
loss has been the judiciary's gain.

JEAN EBERHART DUBOFSKY
LAWRENCE G. WEISS*

On the 4:45 P.M. express bus from Denver to Boulder on almost
any weekday evening, a slender, youthful woman with large glasses sits
by the window with a pile of legal documents in her lap. There is a look
of intense concentration on her face as she reads her way through legal
arguments and writes down her reactions in small precise notes. It is
Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, the youngest member of the Colorado
Supreme Court, making every moment count in the ceaseless struggle to
balance her duties on the court in Denver with her interests and responsibilities as a wife and mother of two young sons in Boulder.
Since her appointment to the court in 1979, Justice Dubofsky has
been successful in this balancing act partly because of the special emphasis she places on efficiency. She organizes her time carefully. By
focusing on what has to be done and putting aside the non-essential, she
makes the most of her worktime, even in the midst of RTD hubbub.
Like other professionals who have had to deal with the competing
demands of a high professional position and a private life, Justice
Dubosfsky is practical and down to earth. Critics complained about her
liberal views at the time she took her seat on the high bench, but Justice
Dubofsky has not focused on any ideology-liberal or otherwise-in her
work on the court. Her focus has been on the facts and the law in each
case. The function of the court, she believes, is not to build ideological
edifices, but to decide cases in a pragmatic way. She believes that the
justices should deal only with the issues that are necessary to decide
each case, that decisions should be narrow in scope, that the justices
should not indulge themselves in expressions of personal philosophy,
and that the court should not have to take every case and decide every
issue. She believes in efficiency in the use of judicial time and court
resources.
Jean Dubofsky was born in Topeka, Kansas, forty-three years ago
into a family that placed a high value on education. Her father was a
mathematics professor and her mother a librarian. Justice Dubofsky understood from her early years that she would not only go to college, but
would also go on to graduate or professional school. She was successful
in high school as a student, a debator, an editor and a school leader, and
she was admitted to Stanford University in 1960.
At Stanford, as at other universities in the early 1960's, the stirrings
of a new idealism among educated young people were beginning to
gather force. Justice Dubofsky came to share in the campus concerns for
* Former Director of Public Affairs for the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations
and former editorial writer for The Denver Post.
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civil rights, women's rights and human rights in general. She began to
see in law and government the opportunity to relieve suffering and oppression and to build a better society. When Justice Dubofsky graduated from Stanford in 1964, with high grades and good
recommendations, she faced a choice between going on to graduate
school to get an advanced degree in history or going to law school. A
career as a lawyer seemed to her to offer both a better chance to make a
difference in society and a better opportunity to find work and earn a
good living at the same time. She applied to, and was accepted at,
Harvard and arrived in Cambridge in the fall of 1964.
In many ways, Justice Dubofsky was not happy at Harvard Law
School. Some of the professors seemed to be prejudiced against the few
women law students. One in particular, who may have been the model
for Professor Kingsfield in "The Paper Chase," announced in class that
women would not be called upon except on the single "Ladies Day"
when the class would be discussing less important subjects. Also, women were not to volunteer.
The law courses at that time appeared to her to focus too much on
the legal problems and financial transactions of businesses, and not
enough on the areas of public law which seemed to her to offer the best
opportunity to bring about reforms in government.
She enjoyed
courses in labor law and local government law, but she was generally an
unenthused law student who did her work, passed her courses and
waited for the time of graduation.
As graduation approached, she decided not to seek a job in a law
firm, but to pursue her interest in public law by finding a place in Washington. The job she found was as legislative assistant to Senator Walter
F. Mondale of Minnesota, seventeen years before Mondale became the
Democratic nominee for President of the United States. During the job
interview she told the Senator she disagreed with some of his views on
foreign policy; he hired her anyway, and they became good friends.
The job in Washington was exciting and fulfilling. Justice Dubofsky
wrote speeches, researched legislative issues and helped the Senator
prepare for hearings. She prepared the major draft of Mondale's EastWest Trade Bill, which took effect in 1969 and relaxed restrictions on
United States' trade with communist countries. She was also responsible for the staff work on an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1968
which outlawed racial discrimination in housing sales and rentals.
Among the events in her new life in Washington was her marriage
in 1968 to Frank N. Dubofsky, who had just graduated from Georgetown
University Law School and passed the District of Columbia bar. They
had known each other when they were both students at Stanford. In an
exciting era, when the Great Society was beginning to take shape and
the agony of the Viet Nam War was beginning to divide the nation, the
Dubofskys felt at the center of things in Washington.
Frank Dubofsky worked for the D.C. public defender's program,
while Justice Dubofsky worked for the Senator. Although they had
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hoped to make a difference and work for some of the reforms they had
talked about at Stanford, the Great Society had fallen into neglect. The
Viet Nam War was poisoning the atmosphere, and Richard Nixon was
elected to the presidency in 1968. After the election there was a turnover in government jobs and a change in the government's mood. The
Dubofksys began to feel that Washington was neither a very stable nor a
very hopeful place.
Justice Dubofsky and her husband wanted to become part of a stable community, where they could settle down and raise children free of
the turmoil of the capitol. Friends told them of Boulder, Colorado, and
about jobs that were suitable for both of them. They came to Boulder in
1969, he as a staff attorney with the Legal Aid and Defender Program at
the University of Colorado Law School, and she as an attorney for Public
Rural Legal Services in Boulder.
In her legal services job in Boulder, Justice Dubofsky had an opportunity to pursue her conviction that law and government could be used
to ease the plight of the poor and to bring about reform. She handled
few individual clients, but organized the resources of the legal services
program to prepare class action suits, to secure rights and benefits
under the law, and to pass new laws. She was one of the attorneys who,
in Euresti v. Stenner,I won a decision that the Hill-Burton Act required
that free or below-cost hospital services be provided to people in lower
income groups. She drafted bills, lobbied in the Colorado Legislature
and contributed in one way or another to the passage of about thirty
new laws benefiting poor people.
She became an attorney for the Legal Aid Society of Metropolitan
Denver in 1972 and a year later decided to try her hand at private practice as a partner in the firm of Kelly, Dubofsky, Haglund & Garnsey.
The firm spent a considerable amount of time on pro bono work, civil
rights cases, cases for the American Civil Liberties Union and lobbying
for social legislation-the kind of work in which Jean Dubofsky was most
interested.
In 1975, a new attorney general, J. D. MacFarland, invited Justice
Dubofsky to become a deputy attorney general. She spent the next two
and one-half years handling the administrative, budgetary and lobbying
work for an office of more than 100 attorneys, as well as participating in
the shaping of legal policy and the preparation of major lawsuits. At the
statehouse, she enjoyed working with legislators of both parties. She
liked the legislators and made friends among Republicans as well as
Democrats. She worked to improve the morale and cohesiveness of the
Attorney General's Office and the relations between the attorney general and the governor.
Her first son, Joshua, was born in May, 1975, shortly after she began working for the attorney general. Her second son, Matthew, was
ready to enter his appearance in the fall of 1977 when Justice Dubofsky
I. 327 F. Supp. 111 (1). Colo. 1971).
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resigned as Deputy Attorney General in order to devote her attention to
both children. But she also became of counsel to her old firm-now
Kelly, Haglund, Garnsey & Kahn-and she began to practice law again
on a part-time basis a few months after the baby was born.
In 1979, ChiefJustice Edward E. Pringle retired from the Colorado
Supreme Court, leaving a vacancy which brought applications from
many Colorado lawyers to the Supreme Court Judicial Nominating
Commission. Justice Dubofsky was one of the applicants, and hers was
one of the three names sent to Governor Richard D. Lamm after the
Commission examined all of the applications, read the letters of recommendation and interviewed many of the applicants. The Governor appointed Jean Dubofsky to the Supreme Court bench as of July 16, 1979.
Justice Dubofsky and Governor Lamm knew each other when he
was a legislator and she was a lobbyist, and, as Governor, he had occasion to confer with her and observe her work as Deputy Attorney General. She was known at the statehouse as an intelligent, well-educated
lawyer with a good grasp of public issues, the capacity to get along with
people and a good sense of balance in dealing with problems. Since her
appointment, however, the Justice and the Governor have rarely seen
each other. When they meet, mostly at large social affairs, they do not
discuss the Justice's judicial philosophy or her opinions on the bench.
She suspects the Governor doesn't always agree with her opinions, but
he hasn't told her that.
Where does Justice Dubofsky stand as a Supreme Court Justice and
in relation to her colleagues on the court? If there is a satisfactory answer to that question, it cannot be expressed in terms of a political polarity; rather, it must be expressed in terms of a political spectrum. The
adjudication of legal and constitutional issues by a high court is not a
political process or an exercise in political philosophy. The justices respond to the facts, the law, the evolving doctrines of the United States
Supreme Court, and, in some cases, to the changing realities of American life. Moreover, the problems in many supreme court decisions do
not lend themselves to approaches that can be called liberal or conservative. The court deals with many problems on which there is no clear
liberal or conservative line to apply.
An example of this is the case of People v. Deitchman.2 In that case, a
major question was whether evidence that had been seized by police on
the authority of a search warrant that did not correctly describe the
place to be searched should be excluded under the fourth amendment
to the federal Constitution. The affidavit on which the warrant was
based listed the wrong address and did not link the defendant to the
place to be searched. All of the justices agreed in a per curiam opinion
that the evidence should not be excluded. They then set forth their separate views of the matter in four concurring opinions.
Chief Justice William H. Erickson argued that the address defect in
2.

695 P.2d 1146 (Colo. 1985).
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the affidavit was a technical violation committed in good faith by police
and was covered by a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule authorized in some warrant cases by the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Joseph Quinn argued that the United States Supreme Court had
specifically refused to apply the good faith exception to "an affidavit so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Although he thought the Dietchman affidavit fit that description, he voted to uphold the conviction because he
believed the defendant would have been convicted even without the
challenged evidence.
Justice Dubofsky, unable to accept either position in full, focused on
the fourth amendment's requirement that a search warrant must be
based on probable cause. She did not agree with Justice Quinn that
there was no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant in this case.
But she believed ChiefJustice Erickson was applying the good faith exception more broadly than necessary to decide the case at hand and in a
way that might invite violation of the fourth amendment. She argued
that a good faith exception should be allowed in Colorado only in cases
in which the police had probable cause to make the search. She wrote:
I would confine our analysis to the narrow facts of this case,
and hold that the underlying rationale of the exclusionary rule
permits the introduction of the challenged evidence here solely
because the objective circumstances of this case demonstrate
unequivocally that the police officer possessed probable cause
at the time of the search, and that his failure to supply such
information 3 in the search warrant application was truly
inadvertent.
Throughout her public career, Justice Dubofsky has had an instinct
for the middle ground, for bringing people with differing views together
and for working out compromises. But she remains a private person.
She does not like to argue with her colleagues, and often communicates
her disagreements in writing. She enjoys time spent alone, and the solitude of a Supreme Court Justice's life suits her well. When she is not
doing the work of the court in Denver, in Boulder, or on the bus, she
enjoys reading and gardening, but the court and her family takes up
almost all of her time.

3. Id. at 1157 (Dubofsky,

J.,

concurring).

WILLIAM
TIMOTHY

H.
M.

ERICKSON

TYMKOVICH*

Justice William H. Erickson joined the Colorado Supreme Court in
1971. His appointment to the court as Governor John A. Love's third
merit appointee followed a colorful and vigorous twenty years of trial
practice and service to the legal profession. Known for his ability as a
trial lawyer to extract defensible positions from sometimes indefensible
clients,Justice Erickson has demonstrated exemplary service and loyalty
to the public and his profession through his tenure as Supreme Court
Justice and his leadership in local and national bar associations.
For twenty years, Justice Erickson combined an illustrious trial practice with generous service to the legal profession. He defended some of
Colorado's most infamous criminals-Joseph Corbett, convicted of murdering Adolph Coors III, and Eugene "Checkers" Smaldone, alleged
Denver kingpin and organized crime figure; he defended a bitter takeover attempt of The Denver Post by newspaper magnate S.I. Newhouse;
he represented personal injury claimants and insurance companies
under then-nascent product liability theories; and he represented district court judges whose salaries had been wrongfully frozen by recalcitrant county administrators.
Justice Erickson's heterogenous trial practice was balanced by service to the bar. He was president of the Denver Bar Association in 196869; he represented Colorado in the American Bar Association as a member of the ABA's governing body, the House of Delegates; and he
chaired the ABA's council of the Section on CriminalJustice in 1971 and
1972. After joining the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Erickson was
elected to the Council of the American Law Institute and to the Fellows
of the American Bar Foundation, on both of which he continues to
serve.
Following his appointment to the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice
Erickson was named by President Richard M. Nixon to chair the President's National Committee for Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance. I Erickson's familiarity
with "bugging" did not begin with the Wiretap Commission. In 1973.
he was one of four finalists for the position of Special Prosecutor for the
Watergate investigation. Archibald Cox was subsequently named to
2
serve in that capacity.
*
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PRIVATE PRACTICE

Professional Background

Justice Erickson, a Denver native, graduated from the Colorado
School of Mines in 1947 with a degree in petroleum engineering. His
father, A.X. Erickson, had a successful trial practice in Denver and Justice Erickson chose to follow in those paternal footsteps. Justice Erickson attended the University of Virginia School of Law, obtaining his
LL.B. in 1950. He joined his father's small Denver law office immediately upon graduation.
Intent on developing his litigation skills, the young Erickson
haunted the federal courthouses in search of pro bono appointments in
criminal matters. In 1951, federal appointments were unpaid; unsurprisingly, Erickson obtained as many cases as he could handle. Despite
his precocity, Erickson's tender age and lack of experience resulted in
many a "trial by ordeal." Nevertheless, that courtroom wisdom or sixth
sense which may be acquired only through experience was developed
early in the young litigator. Indeed, the federal judges, grateful for Erickson's willingness to take pro bono cases, were generous in critiquing
Erickson's trial work and offering advice. It did not take long for Erickson to gain a reputation for his skills as a trial lawyer.
Justice Erickson founded his own firm in 1958. Along with two tax
specialists, Hayes R. Hindry and Milton E. Meyer, Jr., Erickson created
Hindry, Erickson & Meyer. The senior Erickson became of counsel to
the firm. The firm grew to twenty-two attorneys by 1969 and included
Denver-area practitioners Kerwin H. Fulton, Charles F. Brega, C. Henry
Roath, Jay L. Gueck, and James J. Morrato.
Justice Erickson left Hindry, Erickson & Meyer in 1969 and formed
an insurance defense practice with Duane 0. Littell. That partnership
ended after a brief period. Erickson then practiced under his own name
until he was appointed to the Colorado Supreme Court in 1971.
B.

Significant Cases

Justice Erickson practiced law with and against some of the nation's
legendary trial lawyers. In addition to some of Colorado's masters,
Erickson tried cases with Louis Nizer, Arthur Goldberg, Edward Bennett
Williams, and John W. Davis. These formidable friends and foes highlight a variegated criminal and civil practice.
1.

3
Corbett v. People

On February 9, 1960, Joseph Corbett, Jr. kidnapped and murdered
Adolph Coors III. Coors, scion of the well-known Golden, Colorado
brewing family and officer in the Adolph Coors Brewing Company, disand retired Federal Judge David Peck. All four were unable to sacrilice their independence as prosecutors to the conditions set forth by Attorney General Elliot Richardson.
3. 153 Colo. 457, 387 P.2d 409 (1963), rert. demted, 377 U.S. 939 (1964).

1985]

JUDICIAL PROFILES-ERICKSON

appeared on his way to work; a pool of blood lay next to his car nearby
his mountain home. After a nationwide manhunt, Joseph Corbett was
identified as the prime suspect and arrested in Vancouver, British Columbia on October 29, 1960.
Corbett's father sought to retain Justice Erickson for the younger
Corbett's defense. Many of Erickson's clients, however, were close
friends of the Coors family; he therefore declined to take the case. The
defense counsel subsequently retained by Corbett lacked the time and
funds to prepare an adequate defense. The trial court, on the defense
attorney's recommendation, subsequently appointed Justice Erickson to
assist in the case.
The case garnered extraordinary publicity. The news media voted
the disappearance of Coors and Corbett's subsequent arrest as the first
and second most newsworthy stories of 1960. Corbett was convicted
and sentenced to life imprisonment. Later appeals centered on the substantial prejudice generated by the notoriety and infamy of the case, the
inappropriateness of venue in the county where the Coors brewery was
located, and the insufficiency of circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution. Nonetheless, both the Colorado Supreme Court 4 and,
on a writ of habeas corpus, the federal district court for Colorado 5 affirmed the conviction.
2.

Caroll v. United States

6

In some cases, the trial lawyer has bad facts-in others, bad law.
When the lawyer has both, and the trial judge also doffs his robes of
impartiality to assist actively in the prosecution of the defendant, the
criminal defense lawyer and his client face insurmountable odds. Justice
Erickson faced each of these tribulations in United States v. Carroll.
Howard Carroll was a Colorado businessman who violated the federal securities law by artificially inflating the value of his company's stock
and then selling his shares in the company. Justice Erickson was retained to defend Carroll in federal district court in California. Unfortunately, the evidence of Carroll's guilt was overwhelming and the trial
appeared to be only an exercise in damage control.
The day prior to trial, one of Carroll's former business associates
told Carroll that he would offer favorable testimony in Caroll's behalf
for $5,000. Erickson advised Carroll to purchase a small tape recorder
and record the offer of perjured testimony. After the evidence was obtained, the FBI was informed and agents subsequently arrested the prospective perjurer when the money was exchanged.
Howard Carroll's cooperation was unrewarded. At trial, the federal
district judge transgressed the bounds of courtroom neutrality by his
active and overtly biased questioning of witnesses and assistance to the
4. Corbet v. People. 153 Colo. 457, 387 13.2d 409 (1963).
5. CorbcI v. Pattcrson, 272 F. Supp. 602 (1). Colo. 1967).
6. 326 F.2d 72 ((ih Cir. 1963).
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inexperienced federal prosecutor assigned to the case. The judge assisted the prosecutor in laying a foundation for the admission of key
exhibits and in cross-examining important witnesses for the government. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, while upholding Carroll's conviction due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt,
7
harshly criticized the conduct of the trial judge.
II.

THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT

William H. Erickson was appointed as an Associate Justice to the
Colorado Supreme Court in 1971 by GovernorJohn A. Love. Erickson
replaced Chief Justice Robert H. McWilliams, who resigned to join the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Erickson served
as ChiefJustice during the 1983-85 terms. He is now the senior member
of the supreme court.
A.

Significant Opinions
1.

Criminal and Constitutional Law

Justice Erickson's opinions in the field of criminal law seek to strike
a balance between the rights of prosecution and the rights of the defendant. Erickson has authored opinions which enhance judicial protections for the criminal defendant, and others which expand the powers of
the police and prosecution. 8 Typically, his opinions reflect the court's
consensus on an issue and therefore gather unanimous support. Even in
years when the court split on a number of issues-the late 1970s and
early 1980s-Justice Erickson was often able to find a middle ground
agreeable to each member of the court.
Justice Erickson has advocated the adoption of a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, but has labored faithfully within the
confines of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence which, until
1984, apparently limited the use of such an exception. In People v. Deitchman,' J for example, Justice Erickson argued that the purposes of the exclusionary rule-to deter unlawful police behavior and to vindicate the
goals of the fourth amendment-are not met where police behavior is
unaffected by application of the rule. Similarly, in People v. Sporleder,"°
Erickson noted the inconsistency in using the exclusionary rule where
the court adopted a new privacy standard at variance with the standard
set forth in a directly applicable United States Supreme Court precedent. The majority in Sporleder held that the use of pen registers by police investigators to record telephone numbers dialed on private
telephones was an illegal invasion of privacy rights under the Colorado
7. SeeJ.

GOUIDEN, TiFE BENCIIWARMERS (1974).
8. Compare People v. Bothamn, 629 P.2d 589 (Colo. 1981) (reversing murder convicLion due to extensive pretrial publicity) with People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo.
1983) (dissenting on issues relating to the suppression of pen register records) and People
v. Clement, 661 P.2d 267 (Colo. 1983) (upholding police search of automobile trunk).
9. 695 l'.2d 1146 (Colo. 1985).
10. 666 1'.2d1 135 (Colo. 1983).
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Constitution unless the police first obtained a warrant supported by
probable cause. Justice Erickson dissented in Sporleder, asserting that the
use of a pen register by police investigators did not transgress legitimate
privacy interests, and, in any event, the evidence should not be suppressed based on the court's new rule. Instead, Erickson would have
applied the reasoning employed by the United States Supreme Court
when it analyzed the identical issue in Smith v. Maryland. II
Sporleder provides an insight into Justice Erickson's cautious approach to the interpretation of the Colorado Constitution in the criminal procedure area. While recognizing the plenary and independent
authority of state supreme courts to interpret state constitutions, Erickson noted the institutional risks to courts-to their legitimacy, consistency, and authority-which may accompany activist use of a state
constitution to avoid United States Supreme Court precedent.
Justice Erickson's dissent in Sporleder is balanced by his dissent in
People v. Spies. 12 In Spies, he and Justice Quinn urged the court to adopt
an automatic standing rule in cases where, without a search warrant, the
police obtain evidence from third parties or where the criminal defendant does not have a possessory interest in the property that is searched.
The majority adopted the rationale of United States v. Salvucci, 13 holding
that standing was not automatic; instead, the criminal defendant must
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the property searched.
Justice Erickson sought sensible limits to the standing doctrine in
non-criminal cases. In Conrad v. City and County of Denver, 14 the four to
three majority opinion held, over Erickson's dissent, that non-resident
citizens (and one resident) who paid taxes in Denver had standing to
challenge the City of Denver's nativity scene erected on the steps of the
City and County Building. Erickson argued that the controversial issue
asserted by these plaintiffs, based primarily on subjective injuries, was
better left to the political process and should not be resolved by the
courts.
Justice Erickson's position as a swing vote sometimes left him alone
in the middle. In Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 15 the court
reviewed the constitutionality of Colorado's school financing system.
The court split three-one-two; Justice Erickson's concurrence provided
the fourth vote necessary to uphold the constitutionality of the legislative scheme. His concurrence, however, emphasized the slim margin by
which the financing system passed constitutional muster and the clear
need for legislative reform.
2.

Free Speech and Libel

Justice Erickson has varied most dramatically from the majority of
I1.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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649

U.S. 735 (1979).
Colo. 434, 615 P.2d 710 (1980).
U.S. 83 (1980).
P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982).
P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
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the court in the area of free speech and libel law. In Walker v. Colorado
Springs Sun, Inc., 16 the court adopted a libel standard more solicitous to
the media than that in almost any other state. The court held that, when
publishing false and defamatory statements, but where the matter involved is of "public and general concern," the media are subject to a
"reckless disregard for the truth" standard of review. Justice Erickson,
in a lone dissent, urged instead that the proper standard should be
"simple negligence." Erickson stated that the problematic opportunity
for a libel plaintiff "to vindicate and protect his sullied reputation" mandated a standard that strikes a "reasonable balance between the right of
the news media under the First Amendment and the right of the private
citizen" under tort law. In Justice Erickson's view, a negligence standard provided that balance.
A number of other state courts, in analyzing the Walker libel issues
for the first time, have adopted Justice Erickson's reasoning. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the standard promulgated by the
Walker majority as "not achieving a balance or accommodation" with the
conflicting values of news media rights and privacy rights. 17 The
Oklahoma Court instead adopted the negligence standard suggested by
Justice Erickson. The Hawaii Supreme Court likewise criticized the
Walker majority for basing its decision on unverified speculation about
the need to insulate the media from its own excesses by a reckless disre8
gard standard.'
Justice Erickson also dissented in Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 19° on the grounds that he expressed in Walker. Erickson
reiterated his view that private citizens are effectively precluded from
libel relief by Walker and that Colorado's standard of review encouraged
"irresponsible, inaccurate and unreliable journalism."
Surprisingly, in a 1983 decision in the libel area, Burns v. McGrawHill BroadcastingCo., Inc. ,20Justice Erickson authored a four to three majority opinion that explored novel issues involving fact and opinion and
their different shades of meaning in modern reporting. The court held
that "opinions which imply the existence of an undisclosed defamatory
factual predicate may support a cause of action in defamation" if "a listener cannot evaluate the alleged defamatory language because no basis
for the statement has been disclosed."
3.

Water Law

The Colorado Supreme Court has few peers in the area of prior
appropriation law. A major contribution by the court to the resolution
of federal-state water management problems in United States v. City and
16. 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975).
17. Martin v. Griffin Television Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla. 1976).
18. Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park, 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975).
19. 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982).
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County of Denver.2 1 This case was the culmination of fifteen years of litigation in state and federal courts involving the rights of private appropriators, the State of Colorado, and the federal government to allocate
Colorado's water. The court, through Justice Erickson, unanimously
upheld the applicability of the prior appropriation doctrine to federal
lands and acknowledged the traditional relationship between Colorado
law and federal reserved water rights.
4.

Torts

Justice Erickson has authored a number of opinions which explore
the increasingly ambiguous law of torts. Traditional common law policymaking in this area has been challenged by intensive legislative activity
regulating conflicts between injured plaintiffs and insured defendants.
In Martinez v. Stefanich,2 2 a unanimous court, through Justice Erickson,
held that joint and several liability applies in a comparative negligence
setting. Erickson reaffirmed that policy in Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v.
Giford,2 3 which explored the issue in the context of multiple defendants.
Justice Erickson has also been active in the products liability field.
The Colorado Supreme Court has split on a number of difficult product
liability issues. For example, in Kysor Industrial Corp. v. Frazier,2 4 Justice
Erickson's four to three majority opinion held that a plaintiffs mishandling or misuse of a product can abrogate a duty to warn or instruct by
the manufacturer. The court split again in Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co.,25
where the majority affirmed a substantial punitive damages award
against a manufacturer of contraceptives. In dissent, Justice Erickson
discussed the adverse policy ramifications of punitive damages in mass
tort litigation. He has consistently called for creative intervention by the
General Assembly in areas where the judiciary is unable to provide comprehensive reform.
CONCLUSION

In his diverse career, Justice Erickson has made a substantial contribution to the trial bar, the public, and Colorado jurisprudence. He is by
temperament a lawyer: devoted to the profession and energetic in his
approach to public and private duties. Justice Erickson's judicial philosophy draws on principles of balance and consensus; he demonstrates a
constant search for workable and principled standards. He draws from
his experience as a lawyer and an administrator, never losing sight of the
needs of both the practicing bar and the public for fair, economical, and
expeditious delivery of legal services.

21.

656 P.2d I (Colo. 1982).

22. 195 Colo. 341, 577 P.2d 1099 (1978).
23. 660 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1983).
24. 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982).
25. 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).

HOWARD M. KIRSHBAUM
EDWIN

S.

KAHN*

The Italian mathematician Fibonacci established that there is a substantial correlation between the world of mathematics and the universe
of music. Howard Kirshbaum has established that there is a substantial
correlation between the harmony of the string quartet and the collegiality of an appellate court. He has also demonstrated that a multifaceted
and diverse legal career is exceptionally good grounding for a trial and
appellate judge.
I first met Howard Kirshbaum when we were both students at
Harvard Law School, class of 1965. In our second year, we both worked
with the Harvard Civil Liberties-Civil Rights Research Bureau. In a
time of great social concern, with the 1964 Civil Rights Act then pending before Congress and great ferment in the Nation, many law students
regarded their duties to the community as co-extensive with their attempts to master the intricacies of the Uniform Commercial Code or the
Internal Revenue Code. These community-related efforts made courses
such as constitutional law and civil procedure come alive in a way that
was more meaningful and less threatening than the Socratic method so
in vogue at Harvard.
I remember that in 1965, Howard and I were due to take the bar
exam together. That was the summer of the great South Platte Flood in
Denver, and Howard spent a day or two at my apartment downtown
before being able to return to Golden. That was probably the only time
he has been deflected, even temporarily, from his course.
I don't know where Howard clerked that summer, but after graduation in 1965, he worked for the United States Office of Education, and
then came to Denver and clerked for Federal District (now Tenth Circuit) Judge William E. Doyle. Judge Doyle has always combined intellect
with compassion and has a natural understanding of human nature.
During the year 1965-1966, Howard Kirshbaum worked with Judge
Doyle on a great variety of cases, and also observed many leading trial
lawyers in that court. Judge Doyle describes Kirshbaum as extremely
conscientious and a perfectionist.
Howard joined a small firm, Tweedy, Mosely, Aley & Young, and
thereafter joined Anthony Zarlengo, a noted trial lawyer, in practice. He
concentrated on general civil litigation. In his private civil practice,
Howard handled constitutional cases, including one which challenged
the constitutionality of the Colorado annexation statute. He also partici*

University of Colorado (B.A., 1958); Harvard University (LI.B., 1965); Partner.
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pated in cases with such notables as George Creamer, Fred Winner and
John Kane.
Sometime in the late 1960's, I discovered that Howard was a firstclass musician, and that his brother, Ralph, is a world-class cellist. I still
remember hearing Ralph perform in Denver, with Howard as concertmaster, for the Community Arts Symphony. Music has always played an
important role in Howard's life. He and his charming wife, Priscilla,
built a music room onto their home and their children are extensively
involved in music. They are so devoted to music that they even named
their springer spaniels "Fiddler" and "Roundeaux."
Howard joined the Denver District Court bench in 1975, where he
handled criminal, domestic, and civil litigation. His trial court work was
highly regarded by all who appeared before him. In 1980 he was appointed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, and in 1983 he was appointed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Howard views the work of the Colorado Supreme Court as really
very different from that of the Colorado Court of Appeals. First, there is
a substantially different mix of cases. More than sixty percent of the
docket in the Colorado Supreme Court involves criminal cases, while the
percentage in the court of appeals is much lower. Second, it is different
writing for six rather than two colleagues. Third, there is a large quantity of administrative work regarding policy decisions affecting the justice system.
In addition to scheduled meetings, there often are
unscheduled items which must be addressed. Thus, the institutional aspects of the Colorado Supreme Court require a different mix of skills.
In spite of the demands of a law practice or judgeship, Howard
Kirshbaum has perenially taught courses at various local institutions,
from Metropolitan State college to the University of Denver Law School.
His courses have generally focused on the operation of the adversary
system and decision-making, with careful scrutiny given to how lawyers
and judges operate in practice, and equally important, how they ought
to perform. The "ought" is constantly held by Howard as an ideal
against which we all must be measured. He is always ready to challenge
existing assumptions about the legal system and has an extremely high
standard of expected performance, both for himself and for others.
Howard Kirshbaum has actively worked toward making legal services accessible to a wider range of people, especially those of moderate
means. He has been quite active in the Colorado Judicial Institute and
in launching prepaid legal services in Colorado. Much of his time has
been given to assisting the Colorado Bar Association's Committee on
Alternatives to Dispute Resolution.
Howard has been active in this community and has served on the
boards of several public and legal organizations. Additionally, he has a
special interest in educating public school children about our legal system. Howard sometimes tells the story of a high school class visiting his
Denver District Court classroom, and one of the students asking
whether it was true that judges wore nothing under their robes. In a
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sense, much of his career has been devoted to exploring what is and
ought to be the "soul behind the uniform."
The cases heard by Judge Kirshbaum while on the Colorado Court
of Appeals were as diverse as Colorado's economic and legal systems.
In Kniffin v. Colorado Western Development Co.,' a developer had promised
more than he ultimately could deliver-a common disease among recreational developers. The controlling issue in the case was the measure of
damages. The trial court held that the developer must pay to a suing
land owner the cost of the promised developments, which included
three lakes stocked for fishing and capable of supporting sailing and
water skiing activities, a road system and other recreational facilities.
The trial court awarded $1.3 million against the developer, which the
court of appeals reversed. Judge Kirshbaum noted that the purpose of
damages in contract cases is to place the non-defaulting party in the position the party would have enjoyed had the breach not occurred-not
to punish the breaching party. Although Colorado had not previously
determined the measure of damages for failure to construct off-site improvements, the court held that the measure of damages was the "diminution in value of the property purchases"-the sum of $11,000 rather
than the much larger sum awarded by the trial court. Had the trial
court's decision been affirmed, it undoubtedly would have had an in terrorem effect on other developers and impeded economic development in
Colorado. The decision also demonstrated Howard's sensitivity in handling class action cases, as well as statutes of limitation issues.
Less than a year later, Judge Kirshbaum turned his attention to such
varied subjects as the priority of mining claims near Central City, Couch
v. Clifton, 2 and creditors' remedies against secured personal property,
Wiley v. Bank of Fountain Valley. 3 In Wiley, the judgment of the trial court
was reversed because the trial judge had failed to submit to the jury the
question of whether the debtor had received notice of the proposed
public sale of a note pledged to secure a debt. Thus, the issue of
whether a deficiency was appropriate upon the completion of the sale
was unresolved. In resolving the interplay of various sections of Colorado Uniform Commercial Code, Judge Kirshbaum showed either that
he clearly remembered what he learned in law school in 1964, or that he
was able to effectively teach himself the Code seventeen years later.
His broad range of cases continued with two notable tort decisions
in late 1981 and 1982. In Van Hoose v. Blueflame Gas, Inc., 4 the court held
that liquified propane gas supplied to a home was an exceptionally dangerous instrumentality, entitling the plaintiffs to an instruction that special care, rather than merely reasonable conduct, was required by the
supplier. In addition, the court ruled that plaintiffs should have been
1. 622 P.2d 586 (Colo. App. 1980).
2. 626 P.2d 731 (Colo. App. 1981).
3. 632 P.2d 282 (Colo. App. 1981).
4.

642 P.2d 36 (Colo. App. 1981), aff'd, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984).
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granted leave to amend their complaint to include a strict liability claim,
even though notice of that claim was given only shortly before the trial.
In Greenwell v. Gill,5 Judge Kirshbaum wrote an opinion which held
that an expert witness need not be listed by a plaintiff for a medical malpractice case to go forward. The issues involved in this particular case
were lack of informed consent, res ipsa loquitur, and negligence generally. Judge Kirshbaum pointed out that the plaintiff could call defendant
to the stand and establish her claim in that fashion, thus obviating any
need to list her own expert in the first instance. The opinion also
pointed out that lack of informed consent typically is an issue which may
not require medical testimony.
Although Judge Kirshbaum's more notable opinions, like those of
most appellate judges, are reversals of the trial court rather than affirmances, his record of affirmances is extensive. A fairly typical case is
Dupuis v. Charnes,6 in which the court upheld a statute permitting the
revocation of a driver's license after a driver refuses to take a test to
determine the alcohol content of his breath or blood. In this case, the
driver challenged the statute because it did not require an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of his alleged refusal to submit to the test. Judge
Kirshbaum found that the plaintiff had been accorded due process: the
statute contemplated both an allegation by the officer of refusal, and the
opportunity to contest the issue before the hearing officer, and in this
case, a hearing officer had specifically found a refusal by the driver. In
another case involving more complex statutory construction, 7 the court
held, in an opinion written by Justice Kirshbaum, that the vehicular
homicide statute was sufficiently intelligible as to not be vague under the
federal Constitution. He also noted that the definition of a strict liability
offense in Colorado is not characterized by the absence of any mental
state but requires a voluntary act or omission, thus providing a statutory
reconciliation of definitions with well-known criminal law principles.
The court also upheld proximate cause as an appropriate standard for
the determination of criminal responsibility under the vehicular homicide statute.
In a late 1984 case, People v. Rubanowitz,8 Justice Kirshbaum authored an opinion in which a forgery conviction was reversed because
the documents issued and circulated by the defendant were true. Thus,
the court resisted an effort to broaden the forgery statute to include
what might have been charged as theft by deception. On the other
hand, the court affirmed the conviction on other counts and rejected
claims that the information was not specific enough, that an instruction
on child abuse was erroneous, and that the jury had not been properly
selected to be representative of the community.
Another case demonstrating Justice Kirshbaum's versatility was
5.
6.
7.
8.
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Great Western Sugar Co. v. Jackson Lake Reservoir and IrrigationCo. ,9 in which
he ruled on the complicated interplay between water rights claims, augmentation plans and the rights of stockholders in mutual ditch companies. If still water runs deep, judicial knowledge must run deeper still.
Justice Kirshbaum's judicial opinions demonstrate an openness to
new ideas and thoughtful consideration which we all seek in a judge.
Combined with his calm temperament and quiet reserve, Justice
Kirshbaum is a powerful figure in whatever he is engaged in, including
the Colorado Supreme Court.

9. 681 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1984).

I

GEORGE E. LOHR
CLYDE 0.

MARTZ*

Justice George E. Lohr is ideally suited for judicial office and
uniquely qualified for the appellate bench. He is a quiet, reserved and
an objective legal scholar without any professed political or social ideology. He pursues the rule of law with a perceptive case-by-case concern
for equity and justice in an abstract sense, being little influenced, he
confesses, by any perceived impact his decisions may have on the litigants or society. He declares that most legal issues he has encountered
as a lawyer, trial judge, or in his present appellate court role fall into a
gray area, being neither black nor white. He sees merit generally in the
positions advanced by each adverse party. Although Justice Lohr suggests his impartiality and indecision may be a weakness, those who have
critiqued his performance on the bench uniformly point to them as
strengths. These qualities have made Justice Lohr a good listener, a
careful analyst, and an articulate opinion writer.
With a measure of humility, he characterizes himself as a small-town
personality, pointing with pride to his birth and youth in Gary, South
Dakota, finding satisfaction in the development of his personal qualities,
and judging himself critically on the professional character of his performance. He denies personal ambition and is inclined to be critical of
his limitations. He perceives that nothing has come to him, even his
judicial appointments, by reason of any personal drive for advancement.
He gains more satisfaction out of the activities he pursues than the recognition and commendation received from others.
When asked to identify those opinions and decisions in trial and
appellate roles in which he takes pride, Justice Lohr says he views them
all alike. The fact that some have involved issues of wide public interest
does not make them more important in his eyes. A small case or a personal grievance is every bit as important to him as a case with media and
wide professional interest.
Notwithstanding his critical self-evaluation, success has pursued
him throughout his career as has the admiration and affection of all who
have practiced with him or before him in his successive roles of lawyer
and judge. Justice Lohr received a B.S. degree in Civil Engineering
from South Dakota State University in 1953 and a J.D. Degree from the
University of Michigan in 1958. Hejoined the Denver law firm of Davis,
Graham & Stubbs in 1958, where he practiced as an associate and later
as a partner for ten years in the real estate and natural resources departments, doing extensive work on oil and gas, mining and real estate title
and transactional matters. He was a superb craftsman, a grammatical
*
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purist and an organizational zealot; a tireless and imaginative worker
with unparalleled analytical depths and practical creativity. Upon the
completion of the organizational work for the Snowmass area in 1968,
he was offered, and he accepted, a position as corporate counsel for the
Janss Corporation, the developer of Snowmass. He thereafter moved to
Snowmass when the Corporation acquired the Snowmass Project.
When an opening arose on the District Court bench of the Ninth
Judicial District in 1971, Justice Lohr filed his name as an applicant in a
form he describes as a notice of availability without an expectation of
appointment. He made that move as a matter of intellectual curiosity;
he suggests that many attorneys wonder what it is like behind the bench.
To his surprise he was appointed to the bench in 1972, and served as
District Judge, Chief Judge, and Water Judge for what he describes as
eight exciting years. During that period he sat on a wide variety of domestic relations, civil and criminal cases, gaining state and national notoriety for his judicial role in the trial of Claudine Longet, and his
sentence of Longet to thirty days in jail for criminally negligent homicide in the death of skier Spider Sabich. He also sat on the murder trial
of Theodore Bundy, finding on the motion of Bundy that the Colorado
capital punishment statute was unconstitutional, a decision later affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court. True to his personality and
objectivity, he made his decision in each case without regard to public
reaction or personal censure, pursuing the rule of law as applied to the
facts presented to his court.
While serving as a trial judge in the Ninth Judicial District, a
number of Justice Lohr's cases were appealed to the court of appeals
and to the supreme court. He was affirmed in most cases and reversed
in but a few. Justice Lohr reports that he was never disturbed by a reversal as long as it was not based upon an error in procedure or judgment
for which he felt personal accountability. When the supreme court
reverses a trial court on the basis of a difference in opinion on the law or
a development in the law, he views the reversal as part of the judicial
process and not in any way critical of the decision-making procedures of
the lower court.
In 1979, when Justice James Carrigan accepted an appointment to
the federal district court, Justice Lohr once more submitted an application for appointment, more as a notice of availability than a calculated
solicitation of office. To his surprise and great pleasure, Governor
Lamm appointed him to the supreme court and brought him to Denver.
In his seven years on the Colorado Supreme Court bench, Justice
Lohr has written approximately 210 opinions, plus a modest number of
concurring and dissenting opinions. This profile author read thirty-five
opinions in full, and the headnotes of another sixty-eight opinions, all
for the purpose of understanding Justice Lohr's style, searching for his
judicial philosophy, and trying to understand the regimen of his decision process. It was an experience I recommend to all. Justice Lohr's
opinions are good reading. They follow a formalized style, which he
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attributes to judicial opinions generally, beginning with a precise statement of the character of appeal, a brief statement of facts, a statement of
each issue to be addressed and his judicial response thereto, concluding
with the decision and mandate.
The opinions are carefully reasoned and noticeably free of dictum.
Justice Lohr is critical of the use of dictum as a guideline for future action, believing that decisions should rest on particular facts and the case
or controversy between particular parties. In response to the suggestion
that dictum might guide private conduct in ways to avoid litigation and,
on remand, avoid unnecessary costs of further appeals, Justice Lohr reaffirmed to this author that he addresses the issue for decision and pays
little attention to the costs of litigation or the impact of any particular
case on the course of future litigation.
Justice Lohr's cases rarely engender dissenting opinions. The justice explains that draft opinions are circulated to the court and comments and sometimes dissenting opinions are prepared and further
circulated. In his experience, dissenting opinions sometimes either become, or are incorporated into, majority opinions through a re-examination of all points of view. Rarely, he says, has he been 100 percent
secure in any position he takes.
From 1976 to 1979, Justice Lohr served as Water Judge of Water
Division No. 5 and participated in a number of significant water adjudications involving major western slope conditional decrees. He gained a
reputation as a leader in the water bar and was expected, on appointment to the supreme court, to specialize in water opinions. He has, to
be sure, written a significant number of such opinions, including the
lengthy analysis of nontributary groundwater rights in what has been
popularly known as the Huston case. Justice Lohr denies, however, that
he specializes in water matters, believing that each judge on the court
should take responsibility for a proportionate share of all kinds of cases.
He states that only in that way are we assured that the law is addressed
by seven judges rather than one or more who may be characterized as
specialists in particular fields.
Justice Lohr demeans himself as being less productive than his fellow judges because he has difficulty meeting the forty-opinions-perjudge-per-year target set by the court. He cannot help himself, he says,
from pursuing all lines of argument developed in briefs and oral arguments, even those that appear to be superficial upon first examination.
He generally prefers briefs that are short and to the point, being memoranda of arguments and authorities, with clear statements of issues for
decision. At the same time, he confesses, he gets comfort from extensive briefs in cases where he has decision-writing responsibility. His
comfort comes from the sense that nothing has been overlooked.
Despite his reservations regarding productivity, the consensus is
that Justice Lohr puts in long hours in his professional assignments and
has an unqualified dedication to the excellence of his work product. He
nonetheless prides himself on being a family man and spends all the
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time he can spare with his wife, Paula, his son Scott, and daughters
Karen and Sarah. He loves the mountains, particularly in the
Snowmass-Aspen area where he lived for ten years. He makes four or
five backpack trips a year into the back country and loves fly fishing in
the rivers in the area.
In the eyes of all those who have had any professional association
with him in his years of practice or later in his work on the bench, Justice
Lohr is a remarkable individual and a jurist who will long be
remembered for the quality he has brought to his service on the bench.

WILLIAM D. NEIGHBORS
JERRY

D.

LOCKWOOD*

In 1939, the winds met little resistance when they whistled through
the town and surrounding plains of what is now Longmont, Colorado.
It was a front-range scene vastly different from today's populous, hightech boom area. It was still very much the old west. It was into this
setting that William Donald Neighbors was born on April 21, 1939. The
son of pioneer stock, Bill Neighbors began his life on the farms and
ranches of eastern Colorado.
Neighbors' early enrivonment led to a life-long fascination and respect for the land and its people. Farming and ranching operations particularly caught the eye of this young man. As a youngster, he helped
his family with the jobs and duties associated with their agricultural operation. His early experiences in the 4-H club and other agricultural
organizations still manifest themselves in his activities and interests as
an adult.
In 1957, Bill Neighbors graduated from Longmont High School.
He immediately enrolled in Colorado State University in nearby Fort
Collins and graduated in 1961 with a Bachelor of Science in Farm and
Ranch Management. His appetite for education merely whetted, he
then entered the Graduate School at Colorado State University, and obtained a Master of Science degree in Economics in 1962. Neighbors
subsequently enrolled at the University of Colorado School of Law in
1962, and received his LL.B. in 1965.
As a third year law student, Bill Neighbors clerked in the Boulder
law firm of Williams, Taussig and Trine. As was their custom each year,
the firm contacted Colorado University Law Professor Homer Clark to
discuss promising young lawyers in the graduating class. Professor
Clark's recommendations confirmed their own inclinations and, upon
graduation, Bill Neighbors was hired as an associate.
As a young associate Neighbors quickly became adept at all phases
of trial work, both criminal and civil. The skills he sharpened early in his
career would lay the groundwork for positions yet to come. From 1965
to 1970 he served as an associate in the Boulder law firm and in 1970
was made a partner. It was to be a short-lived partnership.
By 1971, Bill Neighbors' courtroom skills had drawn statewide attention in the legal community. It was his reputation as a trial attorney
that attracted the Colorado State Public Defender's office. Public Defender Rollie A. Rogers had heard of the young lawyer's prowess in the
courtroom and promptly offered Neighbors employment as the Chief
*
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Trial Deputy for the State Public Defender. Enthused by the opportunity to expand upon his criminal law experience, Neighbors accepted
the position.
As Chief Trial Deputy, Neighbors handled the most difficult, timeconsuming cases in the statewide caseload of the Public Defender. Rogers once recalled a first degree murder case filed in Grand Junction, Colorado to which Bill Neighbors was assigned. It was described as a
"helluva killing" by Rogers and it gave rise to a not guilty by reason of
insanity defense. The prosecution of the case hinged upon the testimony of Dr. John M. MacDonald, M.D., a well respected criminal forensic psychiatrist often used by the State of Colorado in such cases. Dr.
MacDonald's reputation was one of expertise, credibility and toughness.
Yet, Neighbors' cross-examination of Dr. MacDonald so impressed Rogers that a transcript of the trial was ordered, and used for years in training and preparing young deputy public defenders in the not guilty by
reason of insanity defense.
Bill Neighbors demonstrated that certain level of cleverness necessary to all good criminal defense lawyers in the case of People ex rel. Fred
Wyse v. District Court.' Using the habeus corpus proceeding in a most
creative fashion, Neighbors and then Boulder Deputy Public Defender
William Gray attempted to show that the then existing marijuana possession statute was unconstitutional. The Colorado Supreme Court
would later frown upon their transparent attempt to "expedite" justice,
particularly since the same identical issue, out of the same district court,
was then pending before the supreme court.
After only two years with the Colorado Public Defender, Bill Neighbors' efforts were rewarded with an appointment to the Boulder County
District Court bench on March 1, 1973 by GovernorJohn Love. Neighbors was initially assigned to the general civil division of the district
court. Justice Neighbors' quickly acquired a reputation as a fair and
thorough judge who exhibited concern for counsel and litigants alike.
Justice Neighbors sat for civil cases ranging from the bizarre to the
pathetic. It was he who did the preliminary work on the litigation arising
from the Vail resort gondola accident in the mid-1970's. One of his
most memorable cases heard while on the district court bench was the
infamous Boulder County Jail peanut butter case.
Through a random draw, Neighbors was assigned to hear a civil suit
stemming from a complaint filed by a detainee in the Boulder County
jail. The defendant had concluded that he could not eat any food that
had been grown in the dark. The only solution, so the defendant alleged in his complaint, was for him to be allowed to eat peanut butter
freshly ground by the county jail. Peanut butter, he felt, solved his nutritional requirements and got around the part about the dark. Counsel
for defendant, now dean of a prestigious eastern law school, dutifully
argued his client's problem and then pitched the peanut butter making
1. 180 Colo. 88, 503 P.2d 154 (1972).
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machine. Alas, fate had dealt counsel and client a poor hand. Not many
jurists in the State of Colorado, much less Boulder, had the agricultural
background of Bill Neighbors. Upon quizzing counsel in the case, it became apparent that neither he nor his client knew the origins of the
common peanut. Neighbors proceeded to explain the nature of the
common peanut and its un-nutlike habit of growing underground, in the
dark, and thus summarily deflated counsel's argument.
In January of 1981, Neighbors was rotated into the criminal and
juvenile division of the Boulder District Court. Shortly after this assignment, he was named the Chief Judge of the Twentieth Judicial District
by ChiefJustice Paul Hodges.
As Chief Judge, Neighbors displayed his latent administrative skills
and managerial capabilities. During his term as ChiefJudge, the judicial
district embarked upon a complete review and modification of the case
assignment and caseflow management program, implemented a comprehensive program of computerization of court records in the county court
clerks' offices and divisions, consolidated the two clerks of court offices
into a single administrative unit, and instituted the highly successful judicial retreat concept. He was immensely respected by support staff and
fellow judges alike for his common sense approach to procedural and
personal problems. He improved the working relationship between the
court and the Boulder County Commissioners, the Colorado Judicial
Department, the local Department of Community Corrections and Probation Services.
Neighbors demonstrated his dedication to a strong bench by serving on the Colorado Judicial Qualifications Commission while he was a
district court judge. Throughout his judicial career he has maintained a
commitment to strengthening the legal profession. As a judge, he has
assisted with many judicial conferences and meetings, and has always
been available to discuss problems with the criminal justice system. He
has had a long standing relationship with the National Institute for Trial
and with the Colorado Trial Lawyers Association. He has taught at the
University of Colorado on many occasions, most recently teaching a
course on Women and the Law.
On September 14, 1982, William Neighbors was appointed to the
Colorado Supreme Court by Governor Richard D. Lamm, replacing the
retiringJustice Robert Lee. His two and one half years on the supreme
court have been highlighted by his scholarly approach to the law and his
commitment to the sound concepts of judicial administration.
Two especially significant cases authored by Justice Neighbors are
People v. Lowe,2 and Pena v. Distmict Court., In the Lowe case, strict construction was applied to the concept ofjudicial discretion in cases where
evidence offered must face the standard test of relevancy. This opinion
2. 660 11.2d 1261 (Colo. 1983).
3. 681 l'.2d 953 (Colo. 1984).
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is often used as one of the standard tests in evidentiary questions of this
nature in Colorado.
Neighbors utilized his experience as a Chief District Judge in writing the opinion in Pena. The case concerned whether a Colorado District Court possessed the inherent authority to issue an order to show
cause to officials of the Denver City Administration regarding the extreme temperature in one of the courtrooms in the Denver City and
County Building. Neighbors clearly delineated the authority of the Colorado Judicial Department to remedy such "sticky" situations and ruled
that the requisite authority rested only with the chiefjudge of the particular judicial district or the ChiefJustice of the Colorado Supreme Court.
As a trial lawyer and as a judge, Neighbors' career has been consistent in two respects. First, he has had an unswerving dedication to the
legal profession, to the practice of law with integrity and competence,
and to the efficient administration ofjustice. Second, Bill Neighbors has
always been, and will always be, a legal scholar dedicated to the improvement of legal skills through academic effort and training.
There is an oft-quoted saying in the Old West about the "drugstore" version of the American cowboy. The drugstore version has all
the trappings and outward appearances of a real cowboy but none of the
background or life experiences. Unlike the drugstore cowboy, Bill
Neighbors is the genuine article - native of Colorado, proven trial lawyer, legal scholar and educator, and experienced jurist. And, like a true
Westerner, Justice Neighbors announced that he was moving on to new
challenges and returning to private practice on February 1, 1986. His
skill, wisdom, and expertise will be missed by the court and by the State
of Colorado.

Luis D. ROVIRA
LAEL

S.

DEMUTH*

Born in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1923,Justice Luis Rovira grew up
in and went to school in the New York City-Northern New Jersey area.
When he graduated from high school, the world was embroiled in
World War II. In 1943, after only six months at the University of Colorado, he was called to active duty and served in the infantry in the European theater of operations from 1944 to 1945. He quickly rose from
buck private to lieutenant. In 1951, he transferred his reserve status to
the Air Force, and in 1975 retired as a major in the Judge Advocate
General Corps of the Air Force.
After the war, Justice Rovira returned to the University of Colorado,
distinguishing himself in scholarly achievements and as student body
president during 1947-1948. Upon graduation from the University of
Colorado Law School in 1950, he entered the practice of law in Denver
with Harry C. Davis, a Dickensian figure who believed in the rigors of
hard work and low pay for his fledgling apprentice.
Following his association with Mr. Davis, Justice Rovira was a sole
practitioner for about a year and a half. He was then asked to join the
firm of Akolt, Campbell, Turnquist and Shepherd, then one of the largest law firms in Denver. At the time, the firm had an unusual policy of
allowing associates to handle cases on "the outside" and retain fees
from that work as long as work for the firm itself was performed as required. Perhaps this policy was adopted because monthly salaries were
in the $200 - $300 range, but the practical benefit was experience with a
variety of cases and problems.
These experiences were further enhanced when Federal District
Judge Jean Breitenstein appointed Justice Rovira to join as defense
counsel in the Smith Act-Communist conspiracy trial which began in late
1954. Although this was pro bono work, newspaper headlines of the day
proclaimed that the "Reds" were getting $100,000 worth of legal talent.
At the time of trial, the United States Attorney was the future Justice
Donald E. Kelley. When Justice Kelley retired from the Colorado
Supreme Court, it wasJustice Rovira who was appointed to the vacancy.
For many years following that trial, lawyers for the defense, the prosecution, and Judge Breitenstein held reunions during Law Week.
By 1959, Justice Rovira was a partner in his firm and had developed
an expertise in the complicated and detailed field of public utilities regulation, representing, among others, Mountain Bell. Earlier, he gained
* Univcrsity ol'Colorado (B.A., 1952); University of Colorado (J.!)., 1955): Partner.
I)eNltth & Kemp (Iormerly Rovira, DeMuth & Eiberger).
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experience in oil and gas law and can still recall numerous hours of wading through voluminous abstracts to render oil and gas opinions.
Justice Rovira has been the recipient of many honors and awards
from his profession and his community. A few may be mentioned: President of the Denver Bar Association (1970-1971); University of Colorado Alumni Recognition Award (1963); Organized Labor's
Outstanding Citizen Award (Denver Area Labor Federation, AFL-CIO)
(1976); Chairman, Colorado State Health Facilities Council (19641976); Governor's Committee on Mental Health and Mental Retardation (1967-1970); State Health Planning Agency (1967-1969); President's Committee on Mental Retardation (1971); and, Chairman of the
County CourtJudicial Nominating Commission for Denver (1970-1971).
In 1976, Justice Rovira was appointed to the Denver District Court
bench. By the time Governor Lamm appointed him to the Colorado
Supreme Court in 1979, Justice Rovira had developed a reputation as a
fair, considerate, knowledgeable and scholarly jurist. Since his arrival
on the high court, he has also been perceived by some to be conservative. A brief discussion of his opinions in two constitutional areas ought
to dispel such easy labeling.
His perceived conservatism no doubt comes from his lone dissent in
the widely publicized People v. Quintero.1 The cased involved the socalled exclusionary rule relating to illegally obtained evidence. Fidel
Quintero had been seen peering into a house across the street from a
women living in southeast Denver. She saw him again about a half-hour
later, sitting at the bus stop in front of her own house. He had a partially concealed television set under his shirt. She called the police who
arrested him and seized the television set and other stolen items. The
Colorado Supreme Court suppressed the evidence and remanded the
case for retrial. The case, along with two others involving the exclusionary rule was accepted by the United States Supreme Court for review,
but before the court could hear it, the defendant died.
In his dissent, Justice Rovira asked, "What would reasonable people
believe under the circumstances?" and concluded that, "making the
arrest in such circumstances is precisely what the community expects the
police officer to do." Consistent with this view, Rovira also dissented in
a more recent pronouncement of the Colorado Supreme Court involv2
ing the exclusionary rule, People v. Oates.
If his views in exclusionary rule cases suffice to categorize Rovira as
conservative, what of his opinions in first amendment cases? Speaking
for the court in Diversified Mlortgage v. Denver Post," he defended and upheld the constitutionally-protected rights of the defendant. When he
believed the court was eroding the broad protections of the first amendment, he dissented in Kuhn v. Tribune Republican.4 He wrote:
I. 657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983).
2.

698 P.2d 811 (Colo. 1985).

3. 653 P.2d 1103 ((olo. 1982).
4. 637 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981).
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The test of whether the publisher acted with actual malice
should not be applied mechanistically or grudgingly, but in a
manner which recognizes that vigorous public debate and scrutiny of public officials is an end to be desired. Application of
the test should recognize the paramount public interest in a
free flow of information to the citizens concerning public officials ....
Freedom of expression must be given the wide latitude it needs to survive regardless of5 the truth, popularity, or
social utility of the statements made.
To justice Rovira, the judicial process represents the highest means
of order in our society. The application of the law to the facts at hand is
for him a question of the practical result, the application of the orderly
process of law, and the protections and precedents of our Constitution
and judicial pronouncements. That philosophy is neither conservative
nor liberal; it is in the highest tradition of our American legal system.

5. Id. at 323 (Rovira, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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INTRODUCTION

For those of us who do not interpret the first amendment as an absolute prohibition on governmental interference with free expression,
the Supreme Court's failure to articulate its underlying values is a
source of great difficulty. We are left to search not only for a pattern in
the case law, but also for those principles that would identify such a pattern.' Such a search necessarily involves suggestions on how the different emerging doctrines about the first amendment may be harmonized.
The Court's treatment of regulations of speech aimed at affecting
*

Assisiam! Profcssor. University of South Dakota School of Law. B.A. 1976. J.).

1979 tniversiiy of Arizona; I.I.M. 1983 Northwestern University.
I. This approach is discussed in Redish. The Iabie qf Jm'e Speech. 130 U. PA. .. R.s
591 (1982)

hcrecinafier cited as Redish. F'e Speech 1.
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behavior has been puzzling. 2 In a series of cases, the Court has considered whether a state may attempt to control behavior by controlling
speech. One effect of such regulation is to discourage the participants
on one side of the debate. Underlying the state's speech regulation may
be a legitimate interest in discouraging harmful or undesirable activity,
such as drinking, prostitution, smoking, wasteful energy use or groundless litigation. At issue here, however, is not the legitimacy of that state
interest, but instead the availability of speech regulation to achieve that
interest, especially when means other than those restricting speech are
available. How far the state may go in regulating speech to affect behavior requires an evaluation of the nature of the regulation and the importance of the state interest to be furthered.
The first part of this two-part inquiry-that of the nature of the regulation-focuses on the basis for regulating speech. Apart from discredited attempts to establish the first amendment as an absolute, 3 the
discussion centers on whether there should be one type of analysis for
all regulations of speech or a variety of analyses keyed to the basis for
the regulation, such as the type of speech, speaker, audience and
method of regulation. There has been a proliferation of tests, suggested
4
distinctions and bases for regulation.
One frequently relied upon distinction is that of content-based regulation and content-neutral regulation. This distinction is premised on
the belief that content-based regulations should be strictly reviewed by
examining the compelling state interest that is purportedly narrowly
served by the regulation, while content-neutral regulations need merely
be reasonable regulations calculated to achieve a nontrivial goal. 5 Thus,
to establish the level of scrutiny to which a particular type of regulation
2. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
3553 (1984); Princess Sea Indus. v. State, 635 P.2d 281 (Nev. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
926 (1982). This article's subject is the regulation of harmful and undesirable speechspeech on which the state has made a substantive value judgment, but which has not been
declared unlawful. For an examination of a state's ability to regulate unlawful speech,
especially when it is also commercial, see Barnes, Unlafutl Commercial Speech: .4 Clear and
Present Danger, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REV. 457.
3. A recurring theme in first amendment theory is that speech should be absolutely
protected. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I
(1971); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245. But even
absolute protection does not prevent speech regulation when it is more than speech. An
example of this regulable speech activity is speech that is, in effect, action. As Justice
Holmes suggested, the shouting of fire in a crowded theater goes beyond speech and can
be regulated. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). More recently, Professor
Farber has suggested that commercial speech has two functions: expression and contract
formation. See Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amiendniewnt Theory', 74 Nw. UL. REXv.372
(1979). Professor Farber suggets that the contract formation of speech should be regulable, while expressions of a commercial nature should be protected like any other category
of speech. Id. at 386-90.
4. See Bork, supra note 3; Redish, The Content Distiictio, in First m.4endment
al.ysivs,34
STAN. .. REV. 113 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Redish, Content Distinction: Stone. Content
Regnlation and the First .imendment. 25 WM. & MARY L. RE'. 189 (1983) 1hereinafter cited as
Stone. Content Regulatioil.
5. See Stone, (:ontent Regulatim. stipra note 4, at 190-97.
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will be subjected, the regulation should first be categorized according to
its basis.
The second part of this inquiry requires the identification, with reasonable certainty, of the interest to be furthered and the determination
of whether that interest is legitimate and effectively furthered by the regulation. 6 It is suggested, however, that this portion of the inquiry is inadequate because the issue of whether the interest can be achieved by
methods that do not infringe freedom of speech is also important. If the
goal can be achieved by methods that do not infringe on freedom of
speech, the state must choose one of those other methods. When the
state seeks to affect behavior, it should not be allowed to prohibit speech
about an undesirable behavior unless the state first declares that behavior unlawful as well as undesirable.
This article argues that the outer limit of the state's power to regulate speech is a function of the existence and strength of the regulation
of the underlying activity. When the underlying activity is prohibited,
the state should be permitted to regulate speech likely to foster the unlawful activity. Conversely, when it is merely the judgment of the legislature, the executive, the courts or an administrative agency that the
activity is harmful or undesirable, albeit lawful, speech regulation intended to discourage that activity should not be permitted. Thus, in a
state where liquor sales are prohibited, commercial speech promoting
the sale of liquor may be properly prohibited. 7 However, if a legislature
decided to curb cigarette smoking by banning all advertising, it would
be an impermissible regulation of speech unless the legislature also prohibited cigarette smoking.
To facilitate an understanding of this article's thesis, it will be necessary to review the significant cases and current theories on speech regulation. From these sources, a two-part test for the application of
heightened scrutiny to state action will be formulated. In the latter half
of this article, this "heightened scrutiny" test will be analyzed to elucidate the reasons for requiring states to address the problems of substantive behavior before permitting them to regulate speech as a means of
discouraging undesirable behavior.
I.

CONTENT REGULATION

The content of speech has been regulated since the beginning of
constitutional history. 8 Despite what many people would like to believe
about the framers' intent as to the first amendment ' the better view is
that first amendment protections were slow to develop. The current
protection of speech is more the result of twentieth century beliefs than
that of libertarian notions universally accepted throughout the nation's
6. See infra notes 226-38 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 263-77 and accompanying text.
8.

L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 10-44 (1966).

9. See Chafee, Freedom of Speech in Iftor Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 954-56, 966-69
(1919).
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history. '1

Although one may legitimately point to the first "clear and present
danger" case decided by the Supreme Court as the progenitor of the
modern concern for free expression, it was probably more of an affirmation of the ease with which a state may regulate content to further an
important interest. '
One could even begin with the first concise and
clear statement by the Court about the need for content neutrality:
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not
to mention the first amendment itself, government may not
grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or
more controversial views. And it may not select which issues
are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is
an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government
must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard
....

Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based

on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone. 12

Exactly when the modern first amendment doctrine, including the
hostility towards content-specific regulations, emerged is a subject of
controversy. 13 The "revisionist" view of the first amendment, rejecting
a libertarian intent by the framers, was best expressed by Professor
Levy's work. 14 Given the political and social setting of the Bill of Rights
and the first amendment's virtual dormancy until the twentieth century,
it is difficult to refute Professor Levy's view of the first amendment as a
statement of political and legal truths of late eighteenth century currency that embodied a less than libertarian view of the freedom of
expression. 15

Contemporary scholars have difficulty examining Schenck v. United
10. See Rabban, The Emergence of the Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CI. L. REV.
1205, 1207-13 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Rabban, Emergence].
11.
12.

See Chafee, supra note 9, at 966-69.
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL

FREEDOM:

THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)).

13. Conpare Chafee, supra note 9, at 944-47 with Rabban, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981). Professor Chafec suggests that justice Holmes' decision in Schenck was libertarian and began the modern judicial sensitivity toward free speech
protection. while Professor Rabban argues that the "clear and present danger" test of
Schenck was, at the time, mere gloss on the widely held restrictive view of free expression
prevalent at the time. Professor Rabban's view is more appealing, especially in light of the
result in Schenck andJustice Holmes' role as a dissenter in later cases where he supported a
more libertarian view. Professor Rabban also provides an excellent analysis of state and
federal decisions as well as scholarly works from the period preceding World War I, showing that deference toward the protection of free speech was the result of an evoltitionary
process not fairly described as libertarian until many years after the point Professor Chafec
suggests. See Rabban, Eniergence, supra note 10, at 1208-12.
14. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARI.Y AMERICAN HIsTORY (1960). For authority on equality of opportunity, the Court turned not to its

earlier decisions, but to Alexander Meiklejohn's monograph. POITICAL FREEDOM:
CONSTTrUTIONAL. POWERS OF TIlE PEOPLE (1960). .Iosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
15. See L. LEVY, snIpr note 14, at 2-4.
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States,' the first content regulation case, without leaping to engage the
first amendment debate. This reaction is the result of conditioning by
exposure to this debate over the past twenty to thirty years. However,
arguments based on freedom of expression were not quite as apparent
to either the Court or the lawyers who argued Schenck and the other Espionage Act cases.17
Unfortunately, the better explanations and criticisms of what constitutes content-differential regulation 18 and why it is suspect have come
from commentators instead of the Court. 19 Statements, such as those in
Police Department v. Mosley, 20 which cited a scholar's writings for support, 2 1 are superficial conclusions without explanation or discussion of
the underlying principles. Mosley suggests that restrictions on content
are intuitively offensive to those who believe that the first amendment
creates a protective shell around thought and expression. 2 2 The clear
statement of Mosley derives from notions of fundamental equality; a requirement that the government deal evenhandedly with all viewpoints,
instead of any overriding or fundamental principle of freedom of
23
expression.
This requirement of equality is, however, inadequate in explaining
why content-differential regulations are subject to heightened scrutiny.
One need look no further than a recent Supreme Court case to see that
complete equality of regulation does not assure a state that its regulation will not be subjected to the stringent "compelling state interest"
test. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,2 4 the Commission attempted to prevent in an arguably evenhanded manner all discussion of controversial issues. The Commission argued that the
regulation was a neutral time, place and manner restriction because it
equally disabled all participants in such discussions. The Court, however, held that the Commission's characterization was an inadequate description of the regulation's basis. 25 The Court noted that although the
scope of the regulation was neutral because it applied to all viewpoints,
16. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
17. See Rabban, Emergence, supra note 10, at 1247-57.
18. This is not to say that I accept the usefulness of the distinction between contentneutral and content-specific regulations. My idea, heavily influenced by Professor Redish,
is that the distinction is difficult to make and problematic in application for the same reasons that the time, place, and manner category is not helpful. See infra notes 120-48 and
accompanying text; see aLso Redish, Contet Distinction, supra note 4, at 128-42. For reasons
that will become apparent, the content distinction can easily be abandoned in favor of tests
that establish the degree of damage caused to equality and non-distortion, values which
underlie the heightened scrutiny applied to content-based regulations.
19. Compare Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4 with Redish, Content Distinction, supra
note 4.

20. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
21. Id. at 96.
22. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM

OF EXPRESSION, 6-20 (1970):
Meiklejohn, supra note 14, at 19-28; Redish, Free Speech, supra note 1: Stone, Content Regulalion, supra note 4.
23. See Moslev, 408 U.S. at 96.

24. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
25. Id. at 537.
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its basis was content-specific because it attempted to delineate those
subjects fit for discussion. 2 6 Because of the absence of a compelling
state interest narrowly served by the regulation, the Court refused to
27
allow the Commission to dictate what subjects were fit for discussion.
Thus, the Court applied the same level of scrutiny as it would have applied if the Commission had attempted to designate the correct view28
point on a particular issue.
Professor Stone has sought to justify content distinction without
oversimplifying the factors determinifng whether the regulation is content-differential. 29 Professor Stone has suggested that government regulation may be broadly classified as content-neutral or content-based. 30
The challenge as he sees it is to choose between the clarity of simplification and the bewilderment of a system complex enough to distinguish
between ambiguous restrictions that may be either content-neutral or
content-based. 3 ' He is willing to impose the stringent "strict scrutiny"
32
test, even to what he terms "modest viewpoint-based restrictions."
These restrictions are triggered by viewpoint, but limit only the time,
place and manner of expression of a viewpoint. 33 An example of such a
restriction is the ordinance in Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro,34 that prohibited the use of "for sale" signs in an attempt to
stop the flight of white landowners out of neighborhoods where integration appeared to be taking place. 3 5 He suggests four possible explanations for applying the stringent content-differential analysis in these
modest viewpoint-based restrictions: equality, communicative impact,
36
distortion of the debate and motivation.
Professor Stone does an admirable job of refocusing the question
on the underlying bases for regulation, instead of perpetuating the rubrics of content-based and time, place and manner restrictions. 3 7 His
purpose, however, is not to suggest a scheme by which all regulations
may be classified to determine what level of scrutiny would be appropriate. Instead, he offers explanations for why content distinctions are particularly suspect and the bases for determining whether an ambiguous
38
regulation raises the same type of concern.
Out of Professor Stone's thorough examination of the origins and
theory of the content/neutrality distinction emerges an analytical struc26. See id. at 535-37.

27. Id. at 537-38.
28. Id. at 540-43.
29.

Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4; Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Con-

tent: The PeculiarCase of Subject-Akatter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L.REV. 81 (1978) 1hereinafter
cited as Stone, Subject-Alatter Restrictions].
30. Stone, Subject-Alatter Restmictions, supra note 29, at 81-82.
31. See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4, at 251-52.
32. Id. at 200-07.
33. Id. at 200.
34. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
35. Id. at 87-88.
36. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4, at 201-33.
37. Id. at 197-233.
38. Id. at 233-51.
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ture that does not suggest any particular substantive result. His framework of analysis furnishes but a starting point for this article's analysis of
speech regulation. The analysis here diverges from Stone's analytical
framework by combining and modifying his four explanations and several bases of regulation into six bases of regulation: (1) content/viewpoint, (2) content/subject matter, (3) identity of speaker,
(4) identity of audience, (5) efficacy of speech, and (6) time, place and
manner. Each basis will be examined to determine what damage, if any,
occurs to those values that are typically injured by content-specific regulations. When damage to such values is found, it will be argued that the
regulation should be scrutinized in a similarly stringent manner.
Initially, an illustration of content regulation will provide the focal
point for an inquiry into why such a basis for regulation is particularly
suspect. After identifying the values damaged by content regulation,
similar inquiries for each of the remaining bases of regulation shall be
conducted. After all the argumentative elements are in place, the analysis will focus on the question of why speech restrictions intended to curb
undesirable conduct should be subject to the "compelling state interest"
test.
Suppose the legislature wishes to curb the drinking of liquor. The
direct route is to prohibit the sale, possession and consumption of liquor (the prohibition route). If this direct regulation is politically unfeasible, is there an indirect route to the goal? If the legislature is satisfied
with fewer drinkers or less liquor being sold, it could launch its own
campaign to discourage use (the reformation route). Finally, if the legislature is satisfied with fewer drinkers and less liquor being sold, but is
unwilling to spend the money for the reformation route, the legislature
can discourage the activity by imposing regulations on the availability of
liquor or on the quality and quantity of advertising and other types of
speech relating to liquor and drinking (the regulation approach).
In this hypothetical, liquor has been identified as a harmful or undesirable product, the use of which the state would like to suppress by
what, in the abstract, would appear to be a legitimate action in the interest of the health and welfare of the general populace. Although the control of liquor sales is paternalistic in character, the Supreme Court has
traditionally deferred to state interests associated with such regulation.3 9 For purposes of the first amendment, liquor control becomes
controversial only when a state chooses a regulatory approach restricting the quality or quantity of speech about liquor sales and
consumption.
Although speech regulation relating to liquor sales and consumption is content-based, such is not the case with other types of speech
regulation. For example, a legislative prohibition on all advertising on
highway billboards is a neutral regulation because it equally affects all
39. See Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 743-45.
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messages and subjects. Such a regulation, however, would be contentbased if it prohibited all promotional advertising of alcoholic beverages.
To understand why content-specific regulations are especially suspect and disfavored, the particular evils associated with these regulations must be examined. Viewpoint-oriented regulations damage
several preferred values, such as equality and freedom from distortion in
the "marketplace of ideas" (nondistortion). 40 When government regulations affect the substance of the debate, some viewpoint will suffer unequal treatment and the audience will receive a distorted version of the
debate. As will be discussed, 4 1 equality is inadequate as a core principle
of first amendment theory. Equality, however, is a useful factor in determining when heightened scrutiny should be applied. The strongest criticism of equality as a useful tool stems from its failure to extend to
regulations that evenhandedly restrict all speech. This criticism may be
negated through the addition of a nondistortion factor and the limitation that this combination be applied only to identify when heightened
scrutiny may be appropriate.
To determine the utility of the factors of equality4 2 and nondistor-

tion, they should be applied to content-based restrictions to determine
whether they adequately explain the intuitive distaste associated with
content-based regulations. If those two factors are explanatory, it remains to be determined whether their use is consistent with those first
principles that underlie the first amendment. As will be discussed, the
question of whether or not equality and nondistortion are perfect protectors of a particular first principle is at present irrelevant because
these factors are not intended as competitive entries in that debate.
Rather, they are intended to explain why some restrictions should be
subjected to heightened scrutiny regardless of which first principle is
adopted. Prior to an analysis of viewpoint restrictions and their differences with the five other suggested bases, a review of the competing first
principles is necessary. It should be remembered that the proposed bases are but supplements to first principles; factors to be used only to test
for heightened scrutiny in the application of any first principle.
II.

COMPETING FIRST PRINCIPLES AND WHY CONTENT REGULATION
VIOLATES THEM

In attempting to delineate the limits of free expression, the Court
has often neglected to set forth the principles underlying its choice of
limitations. Therefore, numerous legal scholars have undertaken the
task of explaining the Court's reasoning. Professor Karst has developed
an analysis of the first amendment doctrine that uses equality as the cen40. See .losley, 408 U.S. at 96.
41. See i'fra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
42. Equality and neutrality will be used interchangably. What they require is unifornity and evenhandness in the regulation of speech. To restrict speakers of one viewpoint in

a manner not suffered by other speakers violates neutrality and treats the speakers as
unequal.
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tral principle. 43 Establishing equality as the central concern has appeal
and is supported by cases such as IMosley. Few would quarrel with the
assertion that a state should not be allowed to treat speakers differently
because of their views. To do so allows the state to foster those views it
deems desirable, while discouraging undesirable views. However, there
has been no explanation of why this should be the rule, even though it
admirably explains many of the Court's decisions.
There are three major competing first amendment models that do
more than simply justify the results in prior cases: the "marketplace of
ideas" model, the "democratic process" model and the "liberty" (selfrealization) model. 4 4 Each model provides a first principle, which in
turn generates rules for application in individual cases. All three models
are dependent on either the free competition of ideas or the abilities of
speakers and their audience to freely communicate to promote either
45
the democratic process or individual self-realization.
In criticizing Professor Karst's narrowing of first amendment principles on equality, Professor Redish, a proponent of the liberty model,
correctly points out that equality would exist in a regulation that prohibited all expression. 4 6 However, such a regulation, no matter how narrowly conceived, would be highly offensive to first amendment
principles. For this reason, concern about equality alone does not explain why content and subject-matter differential regulations are subjected to heightened scrutiny. Although helpful, equality, as now
conceived, seems inadequate to serve as a first principle.
In the "marketplace of ideas" model, the first amendment is a positive statement that truth will eventually defeat falsity. Governmcnt regulation should be permitted only when substantive evil is so clear and
47
imminent that there is no opportunity for the marketplace to work.
Under this view, content regulation distorts the marketplace. Inequality
in regulation is seen as undesirable not because of an independent interest in equality, but because inequality distorts the marketplace.
Those who espouse the democratic process value are also concerned about equality. The model is based on the first principle that an
enlightened and informed citizenry is needed for the proper functioning
of democratic institutions. 48 Therefore, to the extent that free expression does not foster the democratic process, speech may be abridged
with impunit. 41' However, within this more narrow scope of free
speech, any inequality in governmental regulation of speech damages
the first principle because such regulation lessens the probability that
the electorate will be sufficiently and accurately informed to act demo43. Karst, EqualitY as a Central Principle in the First Amendment. 43 U. Ciii. L. RE\'. 20

(1975).
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Redish, Content Distinction, supra note 4, at 136.
Id.
Id. at 136-37.
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis. J.. concurring).
Redish, Content Distinction, supra note 4, at 193-94.
Bork, supra note 3, at 20.
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cratically. 50 Similarly, any distortion of debate would seem to be inimical to the democratic process because it would not be an accurate
reflection of the opinions of the democracy's citizens.
More recently, the "liberty" model has suggested that the first principle is self-realization. 5 1 The model rejects the democratic process
value as too narrow a conception of the first amendment's purpose. The
constitution's protection of free expression is characterized as a concern
for the maturation and fulfillment of the individual, which is derived in
part from the process of decision-making. 52 Although nonpolitical
speech that contributes to individual growth is beneficial because a mature and informed polity is desirable, 53 "[t]here is, however, more to
54
self-realization than private self-government."
Under the "liberty" model, the ultimate value of free speech is that
it fosters self-realization, which is considered to be the instrumental
value of democracy. 5 5 With this broad value underlying the "liberty"
model, any interference through inequality of regulation or distortion of
debate inhibits the realization of each individual's potential. Thus, content regulation is inconsistent with the "liberty" model because the dual
effects of inequality and distortion of debate inhibit self-realization.
In order to avoid reconsidering the merits of these competing models, this article will attempt to establish why content-differential regulation of speech has been viewed by the Court as inimical to first
amendment interests. After identifying the interests damaged by content regulation, the five other bases of regulation will be tested to determine whether regulations bottomed on these other bases damage first
amendment interests in the same way. Thus, the archetype of content
regulation based upon viewpoint will serve as a pattern for establishing
when strict scrutiny should be applied. It will be argued that the equality and nondistortion interests are damaged when the basis of speech
regulation is the subject matter, the identity of the speaker, the identity
of the audience or the efficacy of the speech, but are not damaged by
regulations based on time, place and manner of expression.
It will be unnecessary to choose among competing first principles
because the distillation of the interests damaged by content-specific regulations produces the neutrality and nondistortion interests. It seems
apparent that damage to these interests is inimical to all three first principles, thereby producing a test that does not require the Court to adopt
one of the competing core values before it can coherently and consistently determine whether strict scrutiny should be applied. When the
principles of nondistortion or neutrality are violated, strict scrutiny
should be the standard.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 26-27.
See Redish, Free Speech, supra note 1, at 622-28.
Id. at 605-07.
See id. at 630-45.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 601-05.
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Whichever core value is preferred, government regulation of viewpoint is undesirable and damaging because it damages the political process by distorting debate and preventing the communication of ideas,
both of which are necessary for the maintenance of a democratic society. 5" Content-differential regulations damage the "marketplace of
ideas" model by distorting debate, creating a false market and artificially
dictating the appeal of ideas. Similarly, content regulation is inconsistent with the self-realization value because when viewpoints are dictated,
an individual is not free to communicate restricted views. Thus, intellectual maturity and other types of self-realization are not attainable because there is no possibility for expression that generates agreement or
criticism and little opportunity for the individual to learn from opinions
responding to that individual's views. Therefore, content-specific regu57
lations must be viewed as being particularly odious.
In the following section, the evils present in content regulation that
cause it to be unacceptable will be discussed. The discussion will then
examine the evils in content-neutral regulations to determine whether
such regulations should also be subjected to the "compelling state interest" test, which is applied when a regulation is content-specific.
III.

REGULATIONS MAY BE CATEGORIZED BY THE BASIS
FOR THE RESTRICTION

Regulation of speech may take many forms, although there are a
finite number of bases for these forms. This finite number of bases provides guidelines for determining whether harmful or undesirable speech
is content-neutral or content-based. These bases also are essential to a
coherent analysis of when content-specific regulation may be justified.
One basis of regulation is the content of the message or the viewpoint it communicates. Another basis for regulation is the subject matter of the message. Both of these bases involve the regulation of
content. Other bases may also effectively restrict viewpoint, but do so in
a content-neutral manner, such as regulations that restrict particular
speakers or restrict access to particular audiences. Further, there are
some speech regulations, such as those based on time, place and manner
or the efficacy of the communication, 58 that appear to be content-neu56. Professor Stone applies some of the explanations to various bases for regulation.
such as the identity of the speaker, the identity of the audience, the subject matter and the
communicative impact of the speech. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4, at 234-50. By
examining these ambiguous bases, Professor Stone shows how they may. in some cases,
have a differential effect on content, even when there is no direct relationship to the content. Professor Stone's purpose is to show that there is merit in the content distinction.
but that this distinction should not be oversimplified. Id. at 251-52.
57. Content regulation is not wholly insupportable. There are times when nothing
less than the prevention ofa particular type of communication will insure the preservation
of a competing and compelling value. [he classic example is words that have the effect of
physical action. Falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre was the example given b%
,Justice Holmes. S(helk 71.lUnited States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The state should be able
to preserve the health and safety of its citizens by outlawing this type of speech, even
punishing it with criminal sanctions when it occurs.
58. What I have chosen to call "'elticacy of'the communication" may be what Professor
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tral and can only be classed as content-specific when their interaction
with extrinsic facts produces an incidental, yet effective restriction on
content.
A.

Content Regulation by Restriction Based on Viewpoint

The Espionage Act cases address the issue of the regulation of viewpoint. In Schenck v. United States, 59 the defendant was convicted of
wilfully conspiring to have printed and circulated to draftees a document intended to cause insubordination and the obstruction of the draft
process. 60 In upholding Schenck's conviction, the Supreme Court
stated that the document would not have been sent had it not been intended to have the effect of influencing inductees to obstruct the draft.6 '
Although the Court's characterization of Schenck's rather mild exhortation as "impassioned" is certainly an overstatement, it adds to the
strength of the Court's conclusion that Schenck had violated the Espionage Act.

62

Although Justice Holmes introduced the phrase "clear and present
danger" because of the context of the phrase and the factual setting,
Schenck did not announce a deferential attitude toward first amendment
concerns. 6 3 Schenck's call for obstruction did not specify any time for
action, 64 nor had Schenck any way of gauging his audience's reaction
and fueling any positive response. In this sense there was no immediate
threat, but instead merely an abstract advocacy calling for action at some
indeterminate future time. Justice Holmes recognized this weakness in
the government's case, but remedied it by supplying the Court's conclusion about the intended effect. 65 By inferring the intended effect, the

opinion has much in common with the "bad tendency" test of prior
66
cases and may not fairly be read as deferential toward free expression.
Instead of being a model of clear libertarian thinking, Schenck is
more fairly viewed as a continuation of long-held beliefs that, although
the first amendment did grant substantive rights, important state interests are at least as important as the liberty interest of individuals in free
expression. Schenck manifests an easy acceptance of the state's interest
in perpetuation, especially when threatened in wartime. Thus, circumstance and context are important in determining the protection given
67
freedom of speech.
The mark of a content-based restriction is the failure of the state to
remain neutral. This is the first evil inherent in content-based restricStone rel'ers to as the -communicative impact." Stone, Content Regulalion, suprn note 4, at
234-39.

59. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
60. Id. at 49.
61. It. at 51.
62.

Id. at 51-52.

63. Id. See also Rabban. Etiep'ence, supra note 10, at 1259-60.
64. Schenrk, 249 U.S. at 51.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 51-52. See also Rabban. Emergen'e, supa note 10, at 1259-62.
67. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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tions. A more recent example of such regulation is the "clear and present danger" case of Brandenburgv. Ohio. 68 Brandenburg, the leader of a
Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted under Ohio's criminal syndicalism
statute of advocating violence or terrorism as a means of accomplishing
political reform. 61 Instead of asking whether the threat was clear and
present, the Court asked whether the "advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
70
such action."
The first amendment, its scope established by whatever value is
chosen, is concerned with the protection of an individual's right to communicate a point of view. There is a fine line between advocacy and
incitement. Content-specific or viewpoint-based regulations are particularly offensive 7 ' because they can be used on both sides of the line to
stifle self-realization as well as protect order. Individuals whose intellectual growth depends on the expression of views currently not acceptable
to the government may find themselves punished in the name of ordered liberty.
It has been suggested quite reasonably that it is not merely the
quantity of communication, but also its lack of distortion that furthers
both the "democratic process" and "self-realization" values. 72 The
proposition that a democratic society that stifles any one viewpoint damages the system by reducing the probability of informed democratic
choices is both intuitively appealing and inherently logical. Although
there is no assurance that more information and discussion will result in
"better" decisions, it is generally accepted that limiting participation in
a debate is certain to reduce the probability of receiving all the information needed to make the "best" choice. Similarly, content regulation
limits the probability of self-realization when a part of a person's intellectual growth is dependent upon expressing a prohibited or unpopular
viewpoint.
For these reasons and those previously discussed, content-specific
regulations of speech are disfavored because of their inequality and distortive effects. Prior to Schenck and Professor Chafee's rather loose and
optimistic reading of it, there was little basis for a libertarian view of the
first amendment. The attempts of constitutional scholars to build a coherent theory of freedom of expression have not been based on fundamental principles established by the framers, but rather on their own
68. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 444-45.
70. Id. at 447. At least one commentator has suggested that this is a new test. but the
practical difference between this and "clear and present danger." if any. has vet to he
explicated by the Court. See Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: .1 Speech Tesifin .II Seasons?,
43 U. Cii. L.. RFS. 151, 187-90 (1975).
71. See stpra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
72. As to the self'realization value, Professor Redish has suggested that the marketpla(e-of-ideas concept is deficient becatse there is not assurance that ituth will %in oi .
Nevertheless, without protection for expression of viewpoints that are unpoptlar lh
chance Cbr sell-realization is reduced. See Redish. Fiee Speech. suprct mite 1. at 616-18
(1982).
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opinions, as ad hoc judges, of when the state has gone too far in regulating speech. 73 The "clear and present danger" test was not a practical
application of theory. That is why examples of theory or formulations of
policy stand out in the reading of first amendment cases, such as in the
previously-quoted language of Mosley.7 4 It is no coincidence that as authority for a libertarian conception of the first amendment, the Court in
Mosley did not quote prior cases, but instead quoted a legal scholar attempting to set forth a general theory of freedom of expression. This
libertarian approach disregards the concern for context and the limitation on freedom of speech found in Schenck. 7 5 Mosley replaces these concerns with the assumption that the first amendment is a positive
statement that the state shall not interfere except in certain extraordinary situations and that any interference must be evenhanded and unrelated to viewpoint. 7 6 Thus, what should be sought in examining the
other possible bases for speech regulation is a congruence; a symmetry
as to deleterious effects that should prompt the same reaction. When
regulations affecting time, place and manner damage values inherent in
freedom of expression to the same extent as content regulation, the
Court should be prepared to treat these regulations as equally suspect,
despite traditional judicial and scholarly deference toward them. Conversely, when a regulation focuses on content or viewpoint but is justified by a legitimate state interest as important as that underlying the
"clear and present danger" test, speech regulation should be permitted.
B.

Content Regulation by Restrictions Based on Subject Matter

This classification represents a basis for regulation different from
simple viewpoint regulation. Although it is regulation based on the content of speech, it is not necessarily viewpoint sensitive. 77 Professor
Stone has suggested that there are two categories of subject-matter restrictions.7 8 The first is a restriction directed at broad classes of speech.
An example of this first type is the restriction in Mosley because it restricted all types of speech other than speech about labor relations. 7 '
The second type of subject-matter classification is comprised of restrictions directed at a specific issue or a cluster of issues forming only one
class of speech."" An example of this type of restriction is found in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights8 in which the city sought to prohibit all paid
82
political advertising in the cars of the city's rapid transit system.
Professor Stone does not reach a conclusion as to how these types
73. Id. at 591. Commentators, however. have not adequately considered "first principlCS." Id.
74. See sipia note 12 and accompanying text.
75. Compare Mosl'rv, 408 U.S. at 96 with Scheck, 249 U.S. at 51-52.

76.
77.
78.
79.

.Iose v. 408 U.S. at 96.
Stone, Subjec-.Italfer Restrictio,. supra note 29, at 83.
Id. at 109-13.
Mloa,
408 U.S. at 95.
80. Stolle, S qjeil-.tlJail'r Rest)iriso, stt..iar note 29. at 112.
81. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
82. Id. at 299-300.
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of restrictions should be treated in all cases, but suggests that the second type of restriction be treated in the same manner as a viewpoint
regulation for consistency and ease of administration as well as for the
promotion of a consistent first amendment doctrine. 8 3 It is also suggested that the first category of broader-based subject-matter restric84
tions be treated in the same manner as viewpoint neutral restrictions.
An example of subject-matter regulation is the restriction challenged in ConsolidatedEdison Co. v. Public Service Commission.85 The Commission refused to permit a public interest group to insert in utility bills
a rebuttal to Consolidated Edison's earlier pro-nuclear power insert.
The Commission also adopted a regulation barring utility companies
from including inserts expressing opinions on controversial issues of
public policy. 86

The Commission candidly defended the regulation as acceptable
because it permitted consumers to receive useful information while protecting their "privacy" by prohibiting less useful controversial communication. 8 7 Because the ban applied to all discussion of controversial
issues, the Commission argued that it was a neutral subject-matter regulation instead of a viewpoint sensitive regulation and, therefore, was entitled to judicial deference. 8 8 These arguments were rejected by the
Court because neither justification overcame the first amendment's hostility towards content regulation, which extends not only to restrictions
on particular viewpoints but also to prohibitions of all discussion of a
topic. 8 9 This stance by the Court seems remarkably protective and even

inconsistent with the other cases in which the Court has upheld regulations limiting public debate of particular subjects. 90 The Court recognized that a flat rule prohibiting subject-matter regulation was
inappropriate because of the inadequacy of competing state interests offered to justify such regulations. 9 1 The Court supported its rejection of
a flat prohibition by noting the lesser protection given certain categories
83. Stone, Subject-Mfatter Restrictions, supra note 29, at 113-15.
84. Id. This is a simplification of Professor Stone's views, but in the remainder of this
section his reasoning will be expanded upon as ideas are added. Additional ideas will later
be needed to complete the analysis of harmful speech and the proposed standard of review
in viewpoint sensitive cases.
85. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
86. Id. at 532-33.
87. Id. at 537.

88.

Id.

89. Id. at 537-38.
90. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock. 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Lehman v. Shaker Heights. 418 U.S.
298 (1974).
91. See C(osolidated Edion, 447 U.S. at 538. It is important that the Court establish
with reasonable certainty the state interest being served by the regulation. To fail would
interest served by a regulapermit the state to abridge freedom of spech by positing an
tion, but which is only indirectly or inadequately served by the chosen method of regnlation. This point may be illustrated by comparing the cases of lehman v. Shaker Heights,
4 18 U.S. 298 (1974) aind Meti rouiediai. Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). Ii Le/nu
the restriction on political advertising in transit system cars was the result of solicitous
concern for passengCrS who. as captives for the duration of the ride, were frced to elidt'c
advertising. lehi,,. 418 U.S. at 303-04, 318 (BrennaiJ., dissenting), The city of San
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of speech such as obscenity, fighting words and commercial speech.'92
In rejecting the Commission's claim that Supreme Court precedent
supported subject-matter regulation, the Court cited two cases that are
not within one of the categories of speech that the Court has declared to
have a lower level of protection. Those two cases were Greer v. Spock 113
and Lehman v. Shaker Heights. 94 The Court distinguished them as cases in
which validation of the regulation was dependent upon the government's special interest "in overseeing the use of its property.' '1 5 The
Court then returned to the simple proposition that government regulation of the viewpoint or subject matter of speech may be sustained only
when the regulation is a precise means of serving a compelling state
interest. 9 6 Thus, the Court concluded that the Commission was unable
to show either a compelling state interest or that the regulation was suf7
ficiently narrow

9

Although the Court may be comfortable with its distinction between
the Commission's regulation and the restriction upheld in Lehman and
Diego in Metromedia limited billboard advertising in the interest of aesthetics and highway
safety. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 493.
The two results are inconsistent if one discounts the importance of the Court's concern about the creation of a public forum in Lehman. No first amendment forum was found
to exist by virtue of acceptance of some advertising. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-304. Because the city acted in a propriety capacity, the transit system was free to make reasonable
choices concerning the type of advertisement accepted so long as it did not interfere with
the general public's convenience and safety. Id. In the absence of this concern about the
proprietary nature of the state enterprise and the question of whether a public forum was
created, the result is at odds with Metromedia. Both regulations limited the opportunities
for speech about non-commercial topics. San Diego banned non-commercial billboards,
AMetromedia, 453 U.S. at 493-95, while Shaker Heights banned political advertising, Lehman,
418 U.S. at 300.
The plurality opinion of Metromedia critically examined the proffered state interests of
aesthetics and safety, found them to be legitimate, and recognized that those interests
were damaged by the billboards permitted by the regulation. Because of this inference
that communicative interest and value surpassed the interests in aesthetics and safety, the
state could not legitimately determine acceptability based on content. Once the Court
established that the state's interest in safety and aesthetics did not outweigh the individual's interest in communication in all circumstances, it became apparent that prohibition
of certain billboards was based on the state's value judgment of the worth of the subject
matter, thereby violating first amendment principles. See Aletromedia, 453 U.S. at 519-21.
In contrast, the plurality in Lehman allowed the state to discriminate between advertising despite the concession that the communicative interest of some advertising outweighed the individual's interest in being left alone and unperturbed during the ride.
Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-04; see also id. at 318-20 (Brennan, J..dissenting).
The result of .letr6inedia is more easily justified than that of Lehman. The interest in
Lehman was established as the protection of the sensibilities and privacy of the public. This
should have led to the conclusion that it was impermissible to choose among types of
advertising by eliminating some, but not all, because such discrimination would require a
substantive evaluation of the worth of the advertising and a balancing of that worth against
the interest in not being disturbed. This type of choice is a violation of both the equality
and non-distortion principles because the state judges the value of the speech and enters
the debate to ensure that its selected value is fturthered by prohibiting the communication
ol disfavored subjects or viewpoints.
92. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 538 n.5.
93. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
94. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
95.

Consolidated Ediso,. 447 U.S. at 539-40.

96. Id.at 540.
97. Id.at 540-43.
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Greer, such a distinction does not promote a coherent and consistent theory of speech regulation. This is not to say that the restriction can not
be justified, only that it should be justified on other principles. Such a
justification might proceed along this line. These regulations are fundamentally at odds with the first amendment's concern for free expression
because they distort the public debate by preventing communication of
a viewpoint or by limiting its effect. They also allow the government to
control the debate in an unequal manner by permitting preferred views
to be heard while less favored views are selectively restricted. This pattern of inequality and distortion is inconsistent with both the "marketplace of ideas" and "democratic process" values because both these
values rely on the availability of equal access to participants in debates
about public issues. 98 For those who see the first amendment as furthering self-realization, content-based regulations obstruct the process of intellectual maturation and self-realization. By skewing the debate, these
regulations remove an opportunity for self-growth where it is dependent
upon expression of unpopular or undesirable topics.
Subject-matter restrictions are less obviously destructive of the
equality and nondistortion interests than direct regulation of viewpoints. 99 Although a case may be made that subject-matter restrictions
do not distort the debate because they evenhandedly restrict all speech,
this ignores its greater effect on dissenters. If the group in power in a
democratic society can prevent all debate on issues that may cause a shift
in power, that group will likely be able to maintain its power. Although
subject-matter restrictions do not present the problem of government
distortion by directly hindering the debate, they do indirectly distort the
debate by leaving without a forum those who would seek change in the
restricted subject area. Granted, those wishing to laud the status quo
will also be hindered, yet their substantive view will probably prevail
while those who seek change are dissenters without a voice. Thus, these
restrictions are protective of the status quo and damage both the "marketplace of ideas" and "democratic process" models. If the government's interest is to maintain the status quo, it may further this interest
by using subject-matter restrictions to affect a de facto distortion of the
discussion and discriminate against selected viewpoints.
For those who find a self-realization value at the core of the first
amendment, the distinction between viewpoint and subject-matter re98. Because the democratic process model would limit protection to those issues valuable in making decisions that are part of the democratic process of self-government, the
scope of protection for subject matter may arguably be narrower. Bork. supra note 3. at
20-21. Within this narrower scope. however. inequality and distortion would be as harmful to the protected process.
99. Professor Stone has written that these types of restrictions appear superficially to
be less dangerous and could be reviewed under a test other than the "compelling state
interest" test. Although he does not positively state a rule. his preference appears to be
that, on close examination, the surf ice appeal of the argument for a less rigorous test
should yield to i consistent and iiiore casily administered across-the-board application of

the "'compelling state interest" test in all coiltent-based restrictionis, including subjectmailer regulations. See Stoie., Sl

t)jet-,llla
er Retrictio,

s..upr(i note 29, at 108-14.
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strictions is unacceptable. Both damage a person's efforts to develop
through self-expression. Viewpoint restrictions hinder personal development by preventing a person from expressing a chosen view.
Although the effect of subject-matter restrictions on personal development may be less inimical to a person's integrity, such restrictions are far
more damaging because they remove all opportunities for discussion in
the subject area covered by the prohibition. Trading viewpoint restrictions for subject-matter restrictions is merely the trading of qualitatively
invasive restrictions for quantitatively invasive restrictions.' 0 0 It is
rather like being told: the good news is we no longer prohibit criticism
of governmental policy, the bad news is you are not allowed to discuss it
at all.
Application of these principles to the Court's decision in Consolidated
Edison inexorably leads to the conclusion that the Court was correct in
invalidating the Commission's regulation. Subject-matter restrictions
such as those in Consolidated Edison are sufficiently similar to viewpoint
regulations in the amount and quality of damage done to first amendment values that the "compelling state interest" test should be applied
by the courts. 10
Instead of elucidating the underlying value or values of the first
amendment, the Court in Consolidated Edison established the rule that:
"[w]here a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state
action may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest."' 1 2 What is missing, however, is an explanation of why this is the
standard. In the absence of an explanation of the basis for this rule, it is
difficult to predict when that rule will be applied. As Justice Stevens
pointed out in his concurrence, any student of history or the Court
knows that unequivocal rules about content and viewpoint neutrality
are, at least, part hyperbole.10 3 What is needed from the Court is its
reasoning for subjecting this particular subject-matter restriction to the
"compelling state interest" test. However, the Court's conclusion may
be reached by applying factors that do not require the adoption of a first
principle. Although a comparison of the values damaged by content
regulation with those values damaged by subject-matter restrictions is
an admittedly conservative approach, it has the virtue of adding an analytical tool that is flexible enough to be adapted to a wide variety of
principles.
C.

Content Regulation by Restrictions Based on the Efficacy of the Speech

This article has to this point suggested that two concerns, inequality
and distortive impact, explain why viewpoint or content-based restrictions are of particular concern. Professor Stone has divided into four
100. See Rcdish, Conlenit Dislinction, supra now 4. at 130-39.

101. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540.
102. Id.
103. Id.at 544-45 (Sievens, J.. concurring).
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categories the explanations of why content-based restrictions are disfavored: (1) neutrality; (2) communicative impact; (3) distortion of public
debate; and, (4) motivation. 10 4 Of the four, the first three are readily
recognizable
reformulations or variations of the previously discussed
"equality"' 0 5 and "marketplace of ideas" values.
Motivation is a possible separate basis for invalidating speech restrictions, but it seems inseparable from the objective explanatory interests of neutrality and nondistortion. If a regulation affects either of
these two interests, it is superfluous and problematic to ask about improper motivation as a separate basis for invalidation. Establishing motivation is difficult. Moreover, it would not be wise to introduce
subjective factors such as motivation into a first amendment analysis
when objective factors such as those of equality and nondistortion are
sufficient to establish the impropriety of a regulation. Therefore, elimination of motivation as a basis for distinguishing between content-based
and content-neutral regulations is desirable.
Professor Stone's reason for including communicative impact as an
explanation for the content-neutral/content-based distinction is less
readily apparent. Professor Stone seems to believe that this explanation
has three sub-categories. Communicative impact can be the basis for
regulation when speech is regulated because of concern that the speech
will be persuasive, prompt an adverse reaction, or affect other activities
by having a strong disruptive effect.' 0 6 He concludes that the first justification is the same type of paternalistic interest that is unacceptable
when viewpoints are regulated.' 0 7 Similarly, concern about the "communicative impact" of offensive or controversial speech is unjustifiable
as a paternalistic interference with what is said in the public debate. 10 8
The disruptive impact subcategory covers speech regulation because its message is particularly distracting or disruptive.' 10 Professor
Stone is tentatively reassured that this also should be treated as an illegitimate basis in many instances because it again rests on paternalistic
concerns over offensive content. However, he is not convinced that
these restrictions are inherently invalid when they are unrelated to the
presumed offensiveness because they may rest on legitimate concerns
that are not paternalistic or reactive to intolerance.' 10
Professor Stone does not suggest it, but it seems that the communicative impact explanation can be subsumed by the equality and distortion of debate categories. All regulations that are the result of
paternalistic concerns over acceptance are viewpoint differential and
104. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4,at 200-27.
105. Some first amendment scholars have emphasized the importance of equality in the
first amendment doctrine. See Karst, supra note 43. But see Redish, Content Distinction.,
supra
note 4, at 134-39.
106. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 4, at 212-16.
107. Id. at 212-14.
108. Id. at 215-16.
109. Id.at 216.
110. Id.at 216-17.
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are, at the least, distortive of the debate. Those regulations that are
concerned with some reaction other than acceptance should properly be
treated not as content regulation but as restrictions based on the efficacy
of speech because it is the reaction to the speech that prompts the restriction. Although he does not propose that efficacy of speech restrictions be included within the two values of nondistortion and neutrality
and treated in the same manner as content-specific restrictions, his analysis is helpful in understanding why this should be the case. A restriction based on acceptance is a paternalistic attempt to distort the debate
or may even seek to impose the view favored by the state. It is a restriction that is content-based, but that focuses upon the reaction to the disfavored view instead of upon the viewpoint. I11 If the restriction is based
on paternalistic concern for the reaction to offensive speech, it is just as
undesirable because of its distortive effect.' 12
Professor Stone suggests that the third type of restriction-regulations of speech having distractive or disruptive qualities that are not
prompted by concerns about acceptance or offensiveness-is a "vanishingly small" category.' 13 1 would agree and go further to suggest that
this classification adds little to the analytical scheme because regulations
related to the efficacy of this type of speech can be subsumed by either
the equality or distortion of debate categories or may reasonably be classified as time, place and manner restrictions unrelated to effect or
efficacy.
An example of this atypical restriction would be a city ordinance
prohibiting any demonstration or meeting in the vicinity of a school that
is reasonably calculated or likely to disrupt the educational activities.
This restriction reasonably could be classified as a regulation based on
communicative impact. However, doing so places too much emphasis
on the manner and extent to which the city has chosen to articulate its
goals. If the regulation were changed to a prohibition of all demonstrations within sight or sound of the schools, it would be more traditional
in form and also remove distraction as a basis. This type of evenhanded
regulation leaves ample opportunities for expression away from schools.
It is also nondistortive and therefore should be given greater deference.
It is more efficient to group these regulations with those regulations traditionally referred to as time, place and manner restrictions, which are
not subject to the heightened scrutiny of the "compelling state interest"
test. Continuation of the communicative impact basis is unnecessary so
long as no hypothetical is developed that combines the communicative
impact basis, violation of one of the two criteria of equality and nondistortion, and lack of paternalistic concern about acceptance or negative
reaction.
11I. The Court has noted in dictum that the government's fear of acceptance of an
idea is not a permissible basis for speech regulation. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 789-92 (1978).
112. Id. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
113. Stone, Content Reglation, supra note 4, at 216-17 n.7.
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If the efficacy category is divided into negative and positive reactions, most restrictions will be based on concern for acceptance. Such
restrictions are paternalistic regulations of positive efficacy; that is the
state would like to discourage the speech because it is persuasive. Restrictions based on concern for negative reaction by the audience, such
as to offensive speech, are paternalistic regulations of negative reactions
or negative efficacy. Negative and positive efficacy subsume any regulations within Professor Stone's communicative impact category that do
not easily fit into the content-based categories of viewpoint and subjectmatter restrictions. Regulations of this type exhibit the same paternalism as viewpoint and subject-matter restrictions because they lack neutrality and distort the debate. Even when the state is concerned about
some reaction other than acceptance, such as when the audience is offended by sexually explicit mailings, paternalism results if the speech is
regulated to prevent the reaction. Although the means may be different,
the method is as destructive of first amendment values as the direct, but
less subtle regulation of disfavored speech. These regulations may reasonably be grouped with the viewpoint and subject-matter bases. Thus,
the communicative impact category or efficacy category may reasonably
be eliminated.
D.

Content Regulation by Restrictions Based on the Identity of the Speaker

In First National Bank v. Bellotti, 1 14 the Court confronted the question of "whether the corporate identity of a speaker deprives [the] proposed speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to
protection."' 5 The answer was not an unqualified "no" because the
Court did not hold that corporations and other entities share all the
rights of a natural person, but instead held that the regulation was an
unconstitutional attempt to restrict protected speech.' 16
Although the restriction in Bellotti on contributions and expenditures for the purpose of affecting a popular vote on issues not materially
affecting the property or business of the corporation was reviewed
under the "compelling state interest" test,' 17 it is not clear whether the
Court would subject all restrictions based on the identity of the speaker
to that test. Although a finding of a legislative purpose giving an advantage to one side of the debate theoretically would make the difference in
what test the Court would apply, it is not clear that the Court found such
a purpose or relied on such in holding that the "compelling state interest" test applied.' 18
The regulation in Bellotti may be viewed as a subject-matter restriction as well as a speaker restriction because the legislation restricted
speech not only because of its corporate identity, but also because of the
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

435 U.S. 765 (1978).
Id. at 778.
Id. at 776, 786-92.
Id. at 767-68, 786-92.
See id. at 785-86. 785-86 n.22.
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subject on which the corporation chose to communicate.'I11 Such a
characterization raises the question of why this type of restriction should
be tested by the most stringent of first amendment tests. Only when one
segment of society is being stripped of its first amendment rights is a
restriction truly based on identity alone. In all other cases the decision
to restrict will be based on either the subject matter or the viewpoint
associated with the speaker. Unless there is a personal or group animus
on the state's part, the motivation will be one of promotion of a viewpoint or the distortion of debate by limiting discussion on a subject. As
in Bellotti, the legislature may have an admirable goal such as fostering
individual debate and preventing special interests from exercising undue influence,12 0 but these altruistic and well-reasoned goals do not justify the circumscription of debate when it results in distortion or lack of
neutrality.
Restrictions based on the identity of the speaker should be tested by
the previously identified factors. First, such restrictions distort public
debate when they exclude a group or class that plays a part in establishing the patterns and policies of American society. Even if all corporate
speech activities were restricted, corporate policy-making on economic
matters would still give corporations a significant role in shaping society.
There appears to be no better reason to permit the restriction of corporate speech than to permit the restriction of speech of any ethnic or racial group.
It also appears that restrictions based on the identity of the speaker
create inequalities instead of promoting evenhanded regulation. When
a bias or prejudice directed at a particular group is associated with restraints on speech, there exists a clear case of inequality destructive of
traditional first amendment values. If such regulation is not based on a
desire to hinder a particular group's expression, then the regulation reflects concern for the result that may follow from the group's expression. Such a regulation is then fundamentally a viewpoint or subjectmatter regulation that exclusively affects a particular group. Restrictions of this type are as unacceptable as any directly-imposed contentbased restriction.
Even when the classification is seemingly benign, as in the corporate
speech limitation of Bellotti, there are elements of both distortion and
inequality. A state should not be allowed to decide that legally created
entities such as corporations are not entitled to speak on certain subjects, although such state actions could be justified on the basis of philosophical paradigms or a reasonable interpretation of the intent of the
framers. The relevant question here, however, is not whether such action may be justified, but whether such a regulation violates the equality
value. Even if such a regulation does not distort the debate, the answer
has to be that its disparate and unequal treatment will certainly stifle
debate. In addition, although not singling out members of the group
119. Id. at 767-68.
120. See id. at 788-89.
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for regulation, restrictions such as those in Belloti also damage the selfrealization value because such restrictions curtail group speech activities
that may contribute to the development of group members as
individuals.
As Professor Redish has observed, the self-realization value is not
mutually exclusive of other first amendment values such as the "democratic process" and the "marketplace of ideas" values. 121 Nor am I suggesting that the values underlying the first amendment be reexamined.
The self-realization value suggested by Professor Redish and others
adds something that is missing from the equality and marketplace-ofideas concerns suggested by Professor Stone. If one accepts the selfrealization value as a first principle of first amendment theory, then regulations that inhibit that process are suspect. Those that do so directly
and forcefully by limiting viewpoint may be more damaging to that first
principle than those that indirectly and insubstantially interfere with the
self-realization process.
Professor Redish believes that content-neutral regulations may impair free expression and, thereby, undermine individual self-realization
2 2to an even greater extent than some content-specific restrictions.
This seems to be an accurate conclusion. Compare, for example, a regulation that prohibits Ku Klux Klan members from burning crosses and a
regulation prohibiting all speech within one-half mile of any "public"
building. Although the latter is clearly content-neutral, it is far more
likely to inhibit discussion and self-realization than is the very contentspecific, but limited-scope regulation against KKK symbolic speech.
This does not mean that the self-realization model is not useful. In
both hypotheticals, the regulation impaired self-realization and, therefore, is suspect. Thus, the self-realization model will make suspect a far
larger group of regulations than would an analysis using the equality
and nondistortion values, even when those values are used together.
Lack of equality and distortion in speech restrictions also damage the
self-realization value, but unlike the "marketplace of ideas" and "democratic process" values, which appear undamaged by neutral, nondistortive regulations, it seems that these regulations-traditionally described
as time, place and manner restrictions-may be destructive of the selfrealization value.123 Thus, all speech-impairing regulations should be
treated in a similar manner even when not content-based;124 otherwise,
distinctions must be made between the types of the impairment and
their relative significance.
At this point it is perhaps worthwhile to explain what the self-realization value adds to the analysis of what level of review should be ap121. Redish, Free Speech, supra note 1, at 594.
122. See Redish, Content Distinction, supra note 4, at 129-30.
123. This is the solution proposed by Professor Redish. See id. at 142-44. This article
adopts a modification of Professor Redish's approach and this modified approach has an
important role in the analysis of the limitations on state interest in regulating speech about
harmful and undesirable activities.
124. See id.
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plied. From the discussion of the first five bases for regulation, it should
be apparent that any regulation that impinges on free expression will
damage the self-realization value. All speech serves the salutary purpose of promoting self-realization even if it is commercial, defamatory
or incites unlawful action. 12 5 This, of course, does not mean that all
lawful speech, such as that which incites unlawful action, is absolutely
26

protected.1

If all speech can promote self-realization, the question arises as to
how to regulate it in a constitutionally permissible manner assuming
that the self-realization value is the first principle. Professor Redish has
implicitly confronted this problem by suggesting that the first amend2 -7
ment doctrine be modified by excising the "content distinction." '
Although Professor Redish does not explicitly say that accepting the
self-realization value as a first principle militates against continued acceptance of the content distinction, it is apparent that to accept the selfrealization model requires the abandonment of equality and governmental neutrality as first principles because some regulations that impinge equally on all speech are nonetheless violative of an individual's
interest in expression and self-realization.' 28 The example Professor
Redish uses is a modification of the fact pattern in Mosley. He asks which
is more damaging to free speech interests: a prohibition of labor picketing near schools or a prohibition of all picketing anywhere? ' 2 9 The obvious answer is that, despite its equality, the second prohibition does
greater damage. Professor Redish would avoid content distinction by
subjecting all regulations that impinge on free expression to the same
analysis. ' 3 0 Although it is not directly stated, this appears to be the only
reasonable analysis when self-realization is accepted as a first principle
because all speech regulations damage this value. Thus, the analysis is
reduced to merely a question of the degree of the infringement. Professor Redish does an admirable job of providing for this balancing by suggesting that the final step of the analysis of all speech-impinging
regulations should be a balancing of the strength of the state interest in
regulation against the speaker's ability to communicate ideas in another
13 1
way.
However, it seems that the purpose of balancing may be equally
well served by the adoption of the dual values of equality and non-distortion. Although Professor Redish is correct in noting that equality
alone may allow for greater infringement in some cases, this result may
be avoided if the state is required to show that not only is the equality
value protected, but that there is also no distortion of the debate. When
the state prohibits all debate on a subject or severely restricts the
125. See Redish, Free Speech, supra note 1, at 625-45.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id. at 626-27.
See Redish, Content Distinction, supra note 4, at 136-43.
See id. at 134-38.
See id. 136-37.
See id. at 143.

131.

See id.
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amount of expression, it will distort the balance of expression and persuasion that would have been reached if the participants were free to
seek their own level of involvement. As previously discussed, the most
obvious method of distortion-that of limiting debate-favors the status
quo. 132
The Court's application of the "compelling state interest" test in
Bellotti seems justified because when restrictions are based on the identity of the speaker, it seems that the interest of equality and non-distortion are damaged by identity-based restrictions, at least, to the same
degree as they are by content-specific regulations. Having distilled from
the current regulation cases the interests that appear to justify the application of the "compelling state interest" test, a basis emerges for rationally and coherently deciding whether identity of speaker regulations
should be stringently reviewed.
E.

Content Regulation by Restrictions Based on the Identity of the Audience

Despite its artificiality and near insignificant use, the category of restrictions based on the identity of the audience has been included for the
purpose of exhausting all possible bases of speech regulation. Greer v.
Spock '33 and Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation134
arguably involve this type of restriction because the audience's identity
was important in determining how much protection should be given the
speech. However, this would be a superficial conclusion because in both
cases the Court was primarily concerned with the subject matter of the
speech. The decisions turned on whether the state could restrict the
13 5
speakers as to subject matter (i.e., partisan political speech in Greer
36
and offensive, but not obscene speech in Pacifica).1
Greer involved a Fort Dix regulation that banned speeches and demonstrations of a partisan political nature.' 3 7 Spock and three other candidates for national office sought to campaign and distribute literature
on the military reservation and several non-candidates sought reentry to
the post to distribute literature after being evicted.' 38 Permission to
enter for these purposes was denied by the post commander, who relied
in part on his obligation to prevent interference with his troops' training
schedule and to avoid the appearance of support for a candidate by a
commanding officer. 139
The Court's opinion addressed the power of the government to
control use of its property and the specific need of the military to exclude civilians from military installations. 14" After concluding that the
132. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

424 U.S. 828, 831 (1976).
438 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1978).
424 U.S. at 831.
438 U.S. at 742-48.
424 U.S. at 831.
Id. at 832-33.
Id. at n.3.
Id. at 834-38.
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regulation was not facially invalid, 14 1 the Court found that the regulations had been applied objectively and evenhandedly to keep the post
2
wholly free of political activity.14
The Court did not discuss what standard of review was applied to
the regulation, but there are indications that it was treated as a time,
place and manner restriction. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
noted that the regulation might be invalid if applied "irrationally, invidiously or arbitrarily."' 14 3 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, also
suggested that the Court's approach was "to inquire 'whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time.' "144 It seems that because the regulation was applied evenhandedly to all partisan speech and other opportunities to reach the same audience were available, 14 5 the restriction,
though viewed as a valid subject-matter restriction, was tested as merely
a time, place and manner restriction of the subjects regulated.14 6
Greer demonstrates that in some instances speech restrictions would
not be permissible without the determinative influence of the combined
factors of audience identity and subject matter. Thus, it would be unacceptable to regulate partisan political activity or advocates of views that
threaten the loyalty, discipline or morale of an audience unless that audience were military personnel on a military installation. Nor would it
be permissible to restrict all communications to such an audience. It is
apparent, therefore, that the factors of audience and subject matter in
Greer were inextricably linked.
In Pacifica, the same confluence of concern for audience and subject
matter occurred, which was instrumental in persuading the Court that
the Federal Communications Commission restriction was permissible.14 7 George Carlin's satirical monologue, "Filthy Words," which the
Court held was not obscene, had been characterized by the FCC as patently offensive speech. 148 Because the broadcast contained patently offensive language and was aired in the afternoon when children were
likely to be part of the audience, the Court found that the broadcast was
indecent. 14 9 The Court held that the Commission's ability to regulate
the broadcast was dependent upon the factual context of the broadcast,
including the time of day, content of the program and the medium. 15)
Thus, it seems that the particular combination of the factors of subject
141.

Id. at 838.

142. Id. at 839.
143. Id. at 840.
144. Id. at 843 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 116 (1972)); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Tinker %.Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
145. Id. at 847, 849.
146. Greer, 424 U.S. at 834-38, 840, 843.
147. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738-40, 749-50.
148. Id. at 731.
149. Id. at 738-41, 750-51.
150. Id. at 750.
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matter and audience were determinative of the validity of the FCC
regulation.
Cases such as Rowan v. Post Office Department 151 and Perry Education
Association v. Peny Local Educators'Association 152 also focus some attention
on the audience identity factor as well as on the subject matter of the
speech in determining the proper amount of first amendment protection. From these cases it is apparent that audience identity alone is virtually an insignificant basis for regulation.
Regulations based on audience identity should be treated in the
same manner as regulations based on speaker identity because they attempt to control all communications to a person or group and, thereby,
damage the interests of equality and non-distortion. When, as in the
four cases previously discussed, the regulation is based upon the dual
elements of subject matter and audience identity, no less stringent a test
should be applied than when only one of these two factors is present.
Therefore, the "compelling state interest" test should be applied whenever both the audience identity and the subject matter form the bases of
the challenged speech regulation.
Self-realization is hindered by audience-based restrictions because
they retard the development of both the speaker and the audience.
Thus, the self-realization value could be stretched to include the development of the audience as a basis for invalidating a restriction; however,
such an extension is probably unwarranted given the restriction's effect
on the self-realization of the speakers.
Because self-realization is not determined by any particular level of
speech or expressive activity, but is instead achieved by different persons at different levels of involvement and expression, a regulation that
even slightly limits opportunities for expression should not, in the absence of a sufficiently important countervailing state interest, be countenanced. Therefore, a limitation on a speaker's access to an audience,
such as in Greer, should be considered impermissible even though other
means of expression are available that may equally further the self-realization value.
F. Content Regulation by Restrictions Based on the Time, Place, and Manner
of the Speech
This basis for speech regulation differs from the prior five because
its focus is not content, audience, speaker or efficacy. Instead, a time,
place and manner restriction may indirectly affect all four of these factors, but in its pure form it is neutral and evenhanded. Because time,
place and manner restrictions are facially neutral and evenhanded does
not, however, mean that they never impinge freedom of expression. For
instance, although a restriction that limits all speech activities of a "controversial or political nature" in the downtown of a city to between the
151. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
152. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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hours of midnight and two A.M. might be based on the legitimate concern of preventing congestion resulting from speeches and demonstrations during business hours, it would nonetheless violate the first
amendment, even though it is evenhanded and viewpoint neutral, because it effectively inhibits all speech. Because it imposes a limitation so
burdensome on such speech as to effectively prohibit it, such a regulation would be as damaging to first amendment interests as would a ban
on public speaking about matters of controversy.
The potential invalidity of time, place and manner restrictions may
be illustrated by using the previously-developed two-part test. Although
time, place and manner restrictions are facially neutral, they have a
heavily differential effect because without the circulation of views the
status quo is advantaged. Furthermore, no criticism can be voiced nor
opposition organized without inconvenience. Thus, this type of regulation seems to be both unequal in its effect and promotional of a particular viewpoint.
The content differential effect of time, place and manner restrictions is not a new concern. Schneider v. State 153 involved four separate
facially neutral municipal ordinances. Three prohibited all distribution
of handbills, pamphlets and similar items, while the fourth prohibited all
door-to-door canvassing and soliciting done without the prior approval
of municipal authorities.1 54 All four ordinances were held invalid be1 55
cause they impermissibly burdened freedom of speech and press.
Although the Court noted that not all time, place and manner restrictions were impermissible, it held that those that prohibited the traditionally important method of communicating by pamphlets and permitted
local authorities discretion in choosing which persons would be permitted to canvas door-to-door were unconstitutional abridgments of free
56
speech. 1

These two principles-the power to regulate and the protection of
free speech-are, in a superficial sense, logically inconsistent. However,
by harmonizing the underlying inconsistencies, it is possible to understand not only why time, place and manner restrictions are permissible,
but also why they should logically be subjected to a less stringent test of
constitutionality. To do so, however, requires a reexamination of the
three interests damaged by content regulation.
For time, place and manner restrictions to be valid, they must not
be triggered by content. Three of the four ordinances in Schneider were
neutral in design and operation.15 7 The fourth, however, was subject to
abuse because municipal authorities were allowed discretion that could
be used to suppress particular viewpoints; 1 511 a police official had the
power to determine what literature could be distributed and who could
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

308 U.S. 147 (1939).
Id. at 153-57.
Id. at 160-65.
Id.
See id. at 154-57.
Id. at 157-59, 163-65.

REGULATION OF SPEECH

1985]

distribute it. '59 This type of restriction is a classic example of a regulation impairing the equality and nondistortion values. When such discretion exists, officials may treat speakers differently on the basis of
content, thereby, violating the equality principle. Such discretion also
distorts public debate by filtering out communication that public officials deem is "undesirable."
The self-realization value is impaired by restrictions such as those
found in Schneider because there is both a reduction in the opportunities
for expression and a reduction in the expression of specific views and
the concomitant specific individual development. Because the three
aforementioned values were damaged by the fourth Schneider regulation
in the same manner as they would have been by content-based restrictions, the regulation was properly invalidated. The municipality was unable to show a "compelling state interest" served by the ordinance nor
impinge exwas it able to show that its restriction did not unnecessarily
0
pression in accomplishing the restriction's goals.16
The other three regulations reviewed in Schneider were content neutral in both design and application because they simply forbade all
speakers from communicating by one method. 16 1 Therefore, they did
not directly violate the equality principle. There was, however, a greater
probable effect on speakers who could not afford a means of communicating other than by pamphlet. The Court also noted that pamphlets
are "historical weapons in the defense of liberty" 16 2 and that the availability of other places for the distribution of pamphlets did not compensate for the restriction on distribution in streets and alleys, which the
Court held were "natural and proper places" for disseminating opinion
and information. '
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Professor Stone suggests that content-neutral restrictions of this
type may have a differential effect on those with unpopular or controversial views and those whose ability to disseminate views is limited by finances or the characteristics of the intended audience. 164 The logic and
appeal of Professor Stone's position is illustrated by the following example. An ordinance banning face-to-face discussions and pamphleteering
during harvest season at migrant worker camps would be a content-neu159. 1d. at 163.
160. Te Court did not analyze the ordinance in terms of the importance of the purpose of' the regulation. It stated that regulations of canvassing mav be permissible. bi
that this regulation was an impermissible burden on speech. Id. at 163-65. The censorship concern seems to be preeminent in the Court's reasoning. Id. at 163-64. [here is
language indicating that the ordinance was not sufficiently narrow to be a constitutional
regulation intended to prevent trespass and fraud. Id. at 164. [he Court found that there
were other methods available to accomplish such goals, noting that
Ii It it is said that thcir means are less efficient and convenient than bestowal of
police authorities to decide what information may be disseminated front house to
house, and who may impart the inlitrmation. the answer is that considerations of
this sort do not itempower a municipality tt abridge freedom of speech and press.
Id.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 154-57. 162.
/(1. ati 162.
Id. at 163.
St ne. 'mnletit

Iftitdaliott, ,mlu/a note 4, at 218.
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tral restriction seriously infringing speech because such workers are difficult to reach for activities such as union organization except when
brought together for work. Furthermore, odd hours, the lack of access
to televisions and radios by these workers and the higher than average
rate of illiteracy may make communication with them during harvest season through mass media difficult. Even if such an audience could be
reached by these methods, such communication would be less cost effective and convenient than direct contact, given the audience's size and
concentration.
Thus, there may be lurking in these superficially neutral restrictions
a disparate effect on certain speakers, audiences and viewpoints.
Although the "compelling state interest" test of content-differential regulations should not automatically be imposed, it would be a mistake to
dismiss these restrictions as harmless simply because of their superficial
neutrality and evenhandedness.
The distortive effect of time, place and manner restrictions is also
readily apparent as the following example will illustrate. Suppose that
within a state there are two cities each having a nationally respected
newspaper that often present opposing points of view and, thereby, provide a bipartisan perspective on most issues. If the state legislature
banned all written discussion of "controversial or partisan issues" except as presented in these two newspapers, such a restriction would undoubtably be held to be an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech
and press. Although such a prohibition would be an evenhanded restriction of all other speech activities and could be legitimately classed as
a time, place and manner restriction because no particular view would
be favored, it should certainly be held to be invalid on the ground that
such a prohibition was content-specific because it banned all views too
controversial or unpopular for the two major newspapers.
Thus, this type of restriction would limit the opportunities available
to those with no access to the two major newspapers and would have a
distortive effect on any debate of controversial or partisan issues,
thereby violating the "marketplace-of-ideas" and "democratic process"
values. Furthermore, for those who believe that the first amendment
contains the specific value of self-realization, this type of regulation is
inimical to that interest. By limiting opportunity for expression and by
forcing views through the filter of the paper's editorial process, individual self-realization is dangerously inhibited. To the extent that society
allows individuals to make decisions, it should allow individuals the
means and information needed to make a responsible choice. When the
choice is not removed, but the ability to reasonably make it is inhibited,
5
the "self-realization" and "democratic process" values are damaged.'("1
165.

See Redish, Free Speech, sura note 1, at 605-07.
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REG ULA TION OF SPEECH
VIEWING TIME, PLACE AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS FROM THE
PROPER PERSPECTIVE

First amendment cases have overemphasized the importance of
"time, place, or manner restrictions."' 6 6 Some opinions recognize that
the repetition of the phrase "time, place or manner" is an insufficient
justification for all such restrictions. An example of an in-depth analysis
of time, place and manner restrictions by the Court is Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 167 In Heffron the Society challenged a rule adopted by the Minnesota State Fair organizers that
prohibited sales, solicitations and distribution of merchandise or literature except from licensed booths. ' 6 8 The Society sought invalidation of
this rule on the ground that it suppressed speech necessary to the practice of Sankirtan, a religious practice requiring members to solicit donations and sell religious literature. 169
Justice White, writing for the majority, noted that although the Society's activities were fully protected speech activities even though the
literature was offered for sale, these activities were "subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions."170 The Court also argued
that the regulation's classification as a time, place and manner restriction was not determinative of its validity because such regulations must
also satisfy three distinct requirements: 1) they must be justified without
reference to the content of the speech; 2) they must serve a significant
governmental interest; and, 3) there must be alternative means to communicate the affected message.171
The Court's choice of wording for its content neutrality requirement is interesting for the Court held that "[a] major criterion for a valid
166. Consider, for example, the dicta in Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972). In striking the
Chicago regulation that prohibited labor picketing in the vicinity of a school, the Court
wrote: "Inthis case the ordinance describes impermissible picketing not in terms of time,
place, and manner, but in terms of subject matter. The regulation 'thus slip[s] from the
neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content.' " Id. at 99 (footnote omitted) (quoting Kalven, The Concept of thePublic Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
CT.REV. 1, 29). The implication is that restrictions which focus only on time, place and
manner and are not keyed to intent are valid exercises of the police power. What is missing from this analysis is an examination of why most time, place and manner restrictions
do not unconstitutionally impair free expression. This can be determined only by examining how these time, place and manner restrictions operate without damaging the fundamental first amendment interests that are damaged by content-based restrictions. Instead
of classi 'ing the speech, the Court should examine the interest underlying the speech and
determine whether this interest is damaged by restrictions falling under the broad rubric
of time, place and manner. The answer will not always be that the interest is safe when
speech is restricted in such a manner.
167. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
168. Id. at 643-44. The booths were allocated on a nondiscriminatory first-come, firstserve basis. Id.
169. Id.at 645. The Society did not challenge the rule as a specific violation of its
religious freedom and did not seek an exemption from the rule for its practices as the
Minnesota Supreme Court seemed to believe appropriate. Instead, the Society concluded
that any right it had was the resuIt of the general right of all persons to conduct similar
aclivilics at the firgrounds. Id. at 652 11.15.
170. Id. at 6-17.
171. Id. at 647-48.
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time, place, and manner restriction is that the restriction 'may not be
based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.' ,172 Implicit in this criterion is the possibility that time, place and manner restrictions can be invalid. However, the Court fails to explain why these
restrictions may be invalid. It seems that invalidity is, in part, a function
of being "based upon either the content or subject matter,"1 73 because
of the link to content and subject-matter restrictions.' 74 Similarly, the
Court states that a valid restriction must serve a significant state interest
and must leave alternative forums for expression of the restricted
speech. '

75

Putting aside the requirement of a substantial state interest, the
combination of content and subject-matter neutrality and the availability
of alternative means of communication is very similar to the previously
developed two-part analysis. The combination of the neutrality and
availability of alternatives elements provides an analytical method very
similar to the analytical method based upon the neutrality and non-distortion elements in which the presence of either element triggers the
requirement that the state meet the "compelling state interest" test.
The Commission's regulation in ConsolidatedEdison 176 is an example
of a time, place and manner restriction that failed the content neutrality
requirement. The Commission had attempted to prohibit all inserts in
utility bills that addressed "controversial issues of public policy."1 7 7 Because the Commission's regulation prevented all expressions on controversial issues in the form of bill inserts, it was, in its broadest sense, a
time, place and manner restriction. Although there was no attempt to
suppress just one side of any debate or any particular viewpoint,1 78 the
Court had little difficulty in finding the regulation invalid because it limited the choice of subjects for the public debate that may occur within
the forum of utility bill inserts. 179 Thus, it is insufficient to merely classify the regulation as a time, place and manner restriction.
Time, place and manner restrictions may unconstitutionally interfere with debate by impermissibly limiting the opportunity to participate. Schneider 180 is an early example of this criterion being applied to
invalidate what would otherwise be labeled a time, place and manner
restriction. Although three of the four ordinances in Schneider did not
discriminate or offer the opportunity to discriminate between viewpoints
or subjects, all four were invalidated. Part of the basis for invalidating
the ordinances in Schneider was the weak justification for the restrictions;
172.

Id. at 648 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.

530, 536 (1980) (emphasis added)).
173. Id.
174. See id. at 648, 649.
175. Id. at 649, 654.
176. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
177.
178.

ld. at 537.
Id.

179. Id. at 538.

1810. See supa notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
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specifically, the necessity of keeping the streets clean."'8 The traditional
role of pamphleteering in a democratic society and the lack of an appropriate substitute for the distribution of pamphlets in public places were
also significant factors. ' 8 2 Thus, the clear implication of Schneider is that
when a state takes away an important traditional method of expression
for which there is not adequate substitute, the state must show a state
8 3
interest more substantial than that of clean and orderly streets. '
More recently in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,' 8 4 the Court
reviewed an ordinance prohibiting all "off-site" commercial and some
non-commercial billboards.' 8 5 The ordinance was held unconstitutional because it effectively removed one method of communication
without the availability of alternative channels 186 and distinguished be8 7
tween permissible and impermissible signs on the basis of content.'
However, it is unclear whether either infirmity alone, especially that of
the lack of an alternative forum, would have prompted the Court to invalidate the ordinance. Nevertheless, the availability of alternative
modes of communication continues to be an important factor in determining the validity of time, place and manner restrictions.1 88

The divergent results reached in Heffron, in which restrictions on
peripatetic pamphleteering and soliciting were upheld, and Metromedia
may, in part, be harmonized by examining the scope and significance of
the effect each challenged restriction had on the speaker's ability to
communicate the same message by alternative methods. For the
Krishna Society in Heffron, the Society member's method of communication was Sankirtan' 8 9 and the site for this communication was the Minnesota State Fair.' 90
Sankirtan involves two different expressive
activities: proselytizing and fund solicitation. The Society's proselytizing involved both oral communication and the distribution of leaflets.' 9 '
Because only the distribution of leaflets was prohibited, the Society
members were free to walk about and communicate orally with
181. Id. at 162.
182. Id. at 162-63.
183. Id. at 162. Also appearing in the opinion is an early example of the least restriclive alternative analysis. The Court noted that: "This constitutional protection [of the
freedom of speech and press] does not deprive a city of all power to prevent street littering. There are obvious methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is the punishment
of those who actually throw papers on the streets." Id. at 162.
184.

453 U.S. 490 (1981).

185. Id. at 493-96.
186. Id. at 516.
187. Id. at 516-17.
188. This is a superficial enunciation of the nondistortion interest, an interest which is
at the core of this article's proposed content analysis. If a government can effectively
choke off all discussion, even if it is an evenhanded manner, it may benefit the status quo
or some other chosen position. The availability of equally etlletive, eflicient and convenient alternate methods ensures that the debate will not be distorted bv the removal or
amplification of any voice. f (onsolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 530 (l[he Court r'jecied as
tnconslitutional ihe Commission's "neutral' suppression of all discussion and noted that
hosility to conteni-based restrictions extends to suppressions ofa,n entire topic-.).
189. Ileffh. 452 U.S. at 645.
190. Id. at 643-45.
191. Id. at 656 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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fairgoers.' 2 The second type of expressive activity, fund solicitation,
was prohibited except from assigned booths.11 3 Thus, the Society had
unrestricted access to fairgoers to communicate its views orally, but was
restricted in the distribution of leaflets and solication of funds.
This ban on pamphleteering and soliciting did not extend beyond
the fairgrounds. Society members were free to distribute leaflets and
solicit funds outside the fairground's gates and in any other public place.
Although the exact audience may not have been available in these locations, the restriction did not prohibit the Society's expressive activities
in these locations. Furthermore, the Society had the opportunity to engage in both pamphleteering and soliciting from an assigned booth.
Although these were restrictions on expression, they were not restrictions which eliminated the medium as an effective method of
94
expression.'
In Metromedia, advertisers were prohibited from using billboards for
virtually any purpose other than on-site commercial advertising. San Diego's ordinance effectively eliminated noncommercial communication
by billboard and limited commercial advertising to a fraction of its traditional use.' 9 5 Although the plurality held the limitation on commercial
billboards to be a reasonable time, place and manner restriction, it rejected a similar justification for the noncommercial billboard restriction.' 9 6 The virtual prohibition of noncommercial billboards was held
invalid because it impermissibly differentiated between billboards on the
basis of content.' 9 7 Furthermore, the ordinance failed to leave sufficient
alternative means of communicating messages that would have been
communicated by noncommercial billboards.19 8
The Court relied on the parties' stipulation that other forms of advertising were insufficient because of inconvenience, expense or inability
to reach the same audience.

9 9°

It is unclear whether the ordinance

would have ben invalidated on this ground alone had it evenhandedly
prohibited all noncommercial billboards, although the plurality does
200
seem to imply that such an ordinance would be suspect.
Heffron and Metromedia are excellent examples of how time, place
and manner restrictions flirt with invalidity by being so restrictive that
they effectively foreclose an important means of communication. In Heffron, ample opportunities existed for the Society to communicate its
views even by the methods that were restricted within the fairgrounds.
In Metromedia, however, persons who chose a billboard as the most effective or convenient method of communicating were unable to use their
192. Id. at 656-57.
193. Id. at 656.
194. C(.]Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147. 161-62 (1939) (interest in preventing littering insulficient to permnit prohibition of pamphleteering).
195. See Aetromedia, 453 U.S. at 501, 503.
196. Id. at 512-13, 515-17.
197. Id. at 516.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.

200. Id. at 515 n.20.
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preferred medium. Furthermore, for those persons with a limited
budget who wished to reach a large audience over an extended period of
time, there may have been no effective alternative to the billboard. For
the Society, their preferred communicative method was available in
other places as was the alternative of peripatetic proselytizing without
soliciting funds or distributing literature. Thus, there was a higher
probability that the Metromedia ordinance would have had a distortive
effect on public debate than would the Heffron restriction.
The previously discussed cases illustrate that time, place and manner restrictions are not inherently innocuous. Tagging a challenged restriction with this phrase does little to advance the analysis of a
restriction's validity. Because a time, place and manner restriction must
be content-neutral and leave open alternative methods of communicating any messages impeded by the restriction to be valid, 20 1 it may be
more helpful to begin the first amendment analysis by focusing on the
elements of neutrality and nondistortion-the two interests previously
identified as determinative of whether a heightened level of scrutiny
should be applied-instead of jumping to determine whether the challenged restriction falls within the time, place and manner rubric.
In instances where neither of these two interests are damaged by an
alleged time, place and manner restriction, the restriction should be
classified as a "valid" time, place and manner restriction provided that it
meets the reasonableness test. However, if either of the interests are
damaged, then there should be applied a heightened level of scrutiny.
V.

THE LIMITS OF STATE POWER IN DISCOURAGING HARMFUL OR
UNDESIRABLE ACTIVITY

Neutrality and nondistortion have been identified as two factors
that trigger heightened scrutiny. Subject-matter restrictions may damage either or both of these values. Therefore, these restrictions can not
be treated as time, place and manner restrictions because they are either
content-based or they distort debate by preempting or restricting the
discussion of an entire subject. This section will initially distinguish several harmful or undesirable speech cases from the category of time,
place and manner restrictions. It will then be suggested that, despite the
heightened level of scrutiny that should be applied to these subject-matter restrictions, there are legitimate state interests to be served by them.
Finally, it will be proposed that a precondition to the legitimacy of subject-matter restrictions based on a state's interest in preventing harmful
or undesirable speech be incorporated into the first amendment
analysis.
201. 11elromedia, 453 U.S. at 516. In addition, such a restriction must serve a legitimate
and substantial state interest. This third requirement is important because it establishes
the minimum state interest required tojustify any restriction on speech. This article examines why certain types of speech can be interfered with only ifa high level of state interest.
instead of a mere nontrivial state interest, is shown. Therefore, all speech regulations

must satisfy this "substantial interest" requirement, but some must satisfy an even greater
interest.
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Classifying Restrictions on Harmfid or Undesirable Speech

In Consolidated Edison2 0 2 the Commission prohibited all inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy. 203 One of the three justifications advanced by the Commission 20 4 was that the order was a valid
time, place and manner restriction. 20 5 The case is an excellent illustration of why the time, place and manner classification is more rubric than
helpful. The Commission asserted that the regulation was merely a limited regulation because it applied only to bill inserts. The Court, however, questioned the basis of the regulation as well as its scope. The
Court dismissed the time, place and manner justification as untenable
because the regulation was based on the content of the speech. 2° 63
As previously discussed, the classification of a regulation as a time,
place and manner restriction is a prelude to asking questions about
three concerns: (1) content neutrality; (2) availability of alternative
means of communication; and, (3) the presence of a substantial state
interest. 20 7 In terms of the analysis developed in this article, the Commission's restriction was one for which a compelling state interest need
be shown because it was distortive of debate on controversial issues. Because it was an evenhanded prohibition of all discussion of such issues in
bill inserts, it did not violate the equality principle. However, because it
prohibited all discussion of controversial subjects, it was distortive of
debate. As the Court pointed out, to allow the government to select
topics for discussion is to allow it to control the debate. 20 8 Strict scrutiny should be applied when control of this type violates either the
equality or non-distortion values.
In Consolidated Edison, the Commission also failed to justify the content regulation by showing a sufficiently compelling state interest.2 0'
Time, place and manner restrictions, which are neutral and nondistortive, must be based on a significant state concern and must provide for
2 10
adequate alternative means of communication.
When the state decides what is fit for discussion by promoting or
prohibiting the discussion of a topic, it has expressed an opinion on the
importance of the discussion. This may violate the equality interest in
its broadest sense. 2 11 When the regulation limits not only discussion of
202. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
203. Id. at 537.
204. The Commission argued that, in addition to being a time, place and manner restriction, the prohibition was a valid subject-matter restriction or a narrowly drawn means
of serving a compelling state interest. Id. at 535.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 536.
207. Id. at 535-36. See aLvo supra notes 163-201 and accompanying text.
208. Conisolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 538.
209. After failing to justify the regulation as a permissiblc time, place and manner restriction or an evenhanded "subject-matter" restriction, the Commission argued that there
was a compelling state interest in protecting the consumer from information that was [lot
useful; thereby, safeguarding a privacy interest. Id. at 537.
210. Id. at 535. The dual concerns of equality and lack of distortion color the requirements of content-neutrality and the availability of alternate channels.
211. The regulation in Consolidated Edison was this type of paternalistic invasion of the
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a subject, but also directly favors one side of the debate, both the equality and nondistortion values are damaged.
Harmful or undesirable speech is that category of speech concerning subjects which the state has determined are of little value and are
socially suspect. This is an intentionally broad category; its utility as a
category is limited to elucidating the thesis of this article. When the
interest sought to be furthered by the state is the prevention of harmful
or undesirable conduct, speech promoting such conduct will be categorized as harmful or undesirable speech. Harmful or undesirable conduct is conduct which, although not illegal, the state may regulate or
even prohibit in the interest of the health, welfare and morals of the
public. Some examples of this type of conduct are drinking and smoking as well as legalized prostitution and gambling. Thus, an example of
harmful or undesirable speech would be a commercial advertisement of
any of these products or activities.
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court, lower federal courts and
some state courts have reviewed the constitutionality of subject-matter
regulations that impair free expression. Because of the breadth of cases
covered by the category of harmful or undesirable speech, this article
will focus on a relatively small group of cases. Excluded from the category of harmful or undesirable speech are expressions that the state
deems to be harmful or undesirable in and of itself and that has no connection to harmful or undesirable conduct. An example of this type of
speech may be found in Consolidated Edison, where speech which was not
associated with any harmful or undesirable conduct, was nevertheless
regulated because it was deemed by the state to be of little social
2 12
value.
The remainder of this article will develop an analogy between subject-matter restrictions of the type found in Consolidated Edison2 1-3 and
those regulating harmful or undesirable speech. From this analogy, it
will be argued that the "compelling state interest" test should be applied in cases where harmful and undesirable speech is regulated. It
also will be argued that the state typically may not justify such speech
restrictions unless it first prohibits the activity deemed to be harmful or
undesirable. Failure to prohibit the activity would be conclusive evidence of the lack of a compelling state interest in regulating speech
about that activity.
B.

The Limits of State Interest in Regulating Harmful or Undesirable Speech

In Dunagin v. City of Oxford 2 14 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit resolved a conflict between two separate Mississippi district
discussion; to promote not one side or the other, but to ban the entire range of topics
being discussed. Although not directly relevant to this article's thesis, the case is useful io
indicate why prohibitions of an entire subject in their most general and viewpoint-neutral
form are damaging io first amendment interests.
212. Id. at 537.
213. Id. at 536.
214. 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983), cerl. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984).
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court rulings. The district courts had reached opposite conclusions on
the validity of Mississippi's virtual ban on liquor advertising.2 15 This
severe restriction on liquor advertising cannot be characterized as a
time, place and manner restriction because it was activated by the con2 16
tent of the advertising.
Although acknowledging that its discussion of this subject was dictum, 2 17 the court's opinion about the extent to which a state may control speech concerning lawful, but harmful or undesirable conduct is
disturbing:
While we need not so hold, there may be no First Amendment protection of purely commercial advertising of those
products which the state could entirely proscribe. Or, if by virtue of its police power the state may prohibit or severely limit a
trade or conduct (e.g., prostitution, hand-guns, explosive devices, marijuana, pipes and paraphernalia designed to be used
with illegal drugs), the state may be entitled to allow the trade
but restrict the advertising without having to justify the restriction by balancing the state interest against the public interest in
2 18
the commercial speech.
The Fifth Circuit erred both in holding that Mississippi may validly prohibit liquor advertising in all areas, despite its legal sale in some areas,2 1 9 and also in its dictum concerning the constitutionally-imposed
limits of state action to discourage lawful liquor consumption. The
court offered no analysis to support its conclusion that a state may
choose to prohibit advertising of lawful activities or trades. 220 Instead,
the court based its decision on its belief that the four-part test for validity of commercial speech restrictions set forth in CentralHudson had been
satisfied by the Mississippi liquor advertising regulation. 2 2 ' By concluding that the four-part Central Hudson test had been satisfied, the court
was able to avoid the question of constitutional limitations on state
prohibitions of speech concerning a legal activity; a question inherent in
the Central Hudson test.
The court should have answered two related questions when it applied the Central Hudson test: (1) how can an interest be substantial if a
state chooses to indirectly promote that interest; and (2) how can a view215. Id. at 739-40. All off-site advertising was prohibited and the only advertising permitted was a printed and unilluminated sign eight inches or less, stating that the establishment sold package liquors or was a "lounge." Id. at 740 n.3.
216. See supra notes 202-14 and accompanying text; see also Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S.
at 537; Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516-17.
217. For two reasons, the Fifth Circuit's discussion of the limits in regulating speech
about lawful activity must be viewed with caution. First, the court acknowledged that its
discussion of this subject was dictum. Dinagin, 718 F.2d at 742. Almost as important was
the court's reliance on the special deference provided by the twenty-first amendment to
state control over liquor. Id. at 743-45. As an element of this special deference to state
regulation, the court applied a reverse commerce clause analysis: presumptive validity for
the state law and the lack of federal regulatory power. Id.
218. Id. at 742 (footnote omitted).
219. See Barnes, supra note 2.
220. Dunagm, 718 F.2d 742.
221. Id.
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point restriction of speech be no more restrictive than necessary in furthering the state interest? Although the court faithfully applied the
Central Hudson test, it nonetheless reached the wrong result because of
its failure to address these two questions, both of which underlie at least
one of the four elements of the test. Thus, the court failed to appreciate
the significance of the Supreme Court's requirement that speech regula222
tion promote a substantial state interest.
Mississippi's asserted state interest was the discouragement of liquor consumption. 223 Under Mississippi's regulatory scheme, some
counties permit liquor sales and consumption, while in counties where
the residents have voted to maintain the pre-existing statewide prohibition, such activities are prohibited. 2 24 Because the advertising restrictions applied to "dry" counties as well as "wet" counties, the court
rejected the asserted justification that, because liquor sales and consumption were illegal in almost one half of the state's counties, the restrictions were valid. 2 2 5 Nevertheless, the court found that the state's

ambivalent attitude towards liquor sales and consumption expressed a
substantial state interest in discouraging those activities and further
found that liquor advertising encouraged those activities. 22 6 The court,
therefore, concluded that a nontrivial state interest was present sufficient to justify a commercial speech regulation.
There are several problems with the court's analysis of the state interest. First of all, the court describes the state interest as the reduction
of consumption. Therefore, a law regulating advertising would seem to
be justified only if it could be shown that there is a link between increased advertising and increased sales. One of the district courts did
make such a finding. 22 7 However, two other portions of the opinion
characterized the state interest as the control of the artificial stimulation
of liquor sales and consumption. 2 28 These two interests are different
and may be furthered in different ways. For instance, if the state interest
222. This is the third part of the four-part test. The full test is:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
223. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 747. The Mississippi legislature permitted counties and judicial districts to allow liquor sales, but concomitantly reiterated the state's desire to prohibit
the sale and consumption of liquor. Only where the local populace voted to permit sale
and consumption of liquor would the prohibition be lifted. Id. at 740.

224. Id.
225. Id. at 742-43.
226. Id. at 747, 750-51.
227. Id. at 747. The trial judge in Dunagn upheld the regulation as a legitimate attempt
to reduce consumption and, therefore, reduce the problems associated with the increased
consumption of alcohol. The judge relied on one expert's opinion and his own common
sense for the necessary link between consumption and the substantive evil sought to be
abated. Id.
228. Id. at 747 (state interest section), 751 (effectiveness of the regulation section).
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is in preventing the artificial stimulation of consumption, the regulation
could have been tailored to prohibit the types of marketing techniques
that make liquor consumption attractive. Thus, the court should not
have blithely assumed that there was not a more direct and less intrusive
means of advancing the state interest than a prohibition on all liquor
advertising.
The court exhibited signs of discomfort with its finding of the existence of a state interest and that the regulation directly and narrowly advanced that interest. 2 29 In an effort to alleviate its discomfort, the court
unfortunately expanded its inquiry. 2 30 The court cited Central Hudson
and Metromedia in support of its proposition that "common sense" is
sometimes sufficient to support a legislative judgment, there being no
need for "concrete evidence." '2 3 1 Superficially, this seems a reasonable
proposition, but the "common sense" conclusion of the Mississippi legislature was that advertising increased consumption, not that it artifically
stimulated consumption. Furthermore, there is no "common sense" basis for concluding that nothing less than a virtual ban on advertising
would prevent the artificial stimulation of liquor consumption. By shifting from one statement of the state interest to another, the court never
directly addressed the question of whether a virtual ban on advertising
constitutes state regulation more restrictive than was necessary to re23 2
duce liquor consumption.
Even if the state interest is reduced consumption, there remains the
troublesome issue of how far a state may go to discourage a lawful activity by regulating speech that encourages the activity. Although the court
noted that it was unnecessary to address this issue, 233 this determination
seems to be based on the court's characterization of the state interest as
the control of the artificial stimulation of liquor sales and consumption.
If the interest were more broadly stated as reduced consumption, this
2 34
issue should have been addressed.
Central Hudson may have laid the foundation for the court's errors in
Dunagin. Its four-part test of commercial speech was the product of the
holdings of several commercial speech cases. In the abstract, the Central
Hudson test is a helpful and accurate reflection of prior holdings. Since
l17irginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,2 3 5 however,
the Court has never held that commercial speech could be differentially
229. See id. at 748-49 n.8.
230. See id. at 747, 751.

231. Id. at 750.
232. The court returns to the artificial stimulation concern to say that the ban is no
broader than necessary because only promotional advertising is affected. See id. at 751.
There is no discussion here of whcther only certain types of advertising techniques would
artificially stimulate consumption. If it is merely a commonsense approach the court is
using, would not a ban on only that advertising which sought to communicate the glamorous or attractive side of drinking be just as reasonable?
233. Id. at 472.
234. On the importance of establishing with precision the state interest advanced b%
the regulation, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.

235. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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treated because of the viewpoint expressed. What the Court has held is
that commercial speech is protected, but that there are common sense
speech that permit
differences between it and other types of protected
2 36
greater regulation of commercial speech.
The Court has permitted the regulation of commercial speech on
bases that would be impermissible if other types of speech were involved. The Court's reason for according less protection to commercial
speech has not been to allow states to promote any particular viewpoint,
but instead to "insur[e] that the stream of commercial information
flow[s] clearly as well as freely." 2 3 7 Virginia Pharmacy, as the progenitor
of modern commercial cases, is particularly helpful in revealing what the
Court sought to accomplish by extending first amendment protection to
commercial speech. Virginia's rationale for prohibiting the advertisement of prescription prices was its concern for continued competition
and professionalism among pharmacists. 23 8 These interests, however,
were considered too attentuated from the method chosen to accomplish
them. The Court rejected Virginia's contention that suppressing the advertising of prescription prices would directly advance the asserted goals
and do so without unduly restricting protected speech.2 3 9 A similar disbelief by the Court in the connection between the asserted interest and
the method chosen to further it resulted in the invalidation of attorney
2 40
advertising restrictions in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.
In Linmark Association, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,24 1 the Court invalidated an ordinance that prohibited "for sale" signs. The township
tried to distinguish its ordinance from the Virginia Pharmacy restriction
on the basis of the important goal of preventing panic selling in neighborhoods undergoing racial integration.2 42 The Court rejected the contention that such a ban was needed to advance the goal of racially stable
neighborhoods. 24 3 Instead of attacking the problem directly, the township chose to further its goal by reducing information available about
2 44
the problem; a method the Court found to be unconstitutional.
Thus, pursuit of an interest as strong and admirable as racial integration
was insufficient to permit the township to choose the highly paternalistic
regulatory practice of reducing the amount of information available
2 45
when there existed other means to remedy the problem.
Linmark, Bates and Virginia Pharmacy underlie three of the four parts
of the Central Hudson test. These cases recognize that commercial speech
236. E.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62; Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 433 U.S.
350, 381 (1977).
237. ,irginia Pharmac,, 425 U.S. at 772.

238. Id. at 766-68.
239. Id. at 678-70.
240. 433 U.S. 350, 364-79. Six reasons for the advertising restriction were examined
and rejected by the court as insufficient to justify the ban.
241. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
242. Id. at 94.
243. Id. at 95-97.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 97.
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may be regulated when necessary to further a substantial state interest.
More importantly, however, they are cases in which regulations were invalidated because they did not "directly advance the state interest ' 2 4 6 or
24 7
unnecessarily impaired free expression.
From the specific fact patterns and the holdings in the three aforementioned cases, the Central Hudson test emerged. 2 4 8 However, the important distinction between regulations which in the process of furthering a substantive state goal, tangentially interfere with speech and those
that further the goal by direct suppression of speech was lost in the
transformation of the holdings of Linmark, Bates and Virginia Pharmacy
into a test of general applicability. For example, in Virginia Pharmacy the
Court invalidated the prohibition against advertising prescription prices
because there was no direct link between the goals of promoting competition and professionalism among pharmacists and the inability to advertise. 2 4 9 In Central Hudson, however, the Court weakened the holdings of

all prior commercial speech cases by not discussing the availability to the
state of other means to accomplish its substantial state interest in energy
conservation. Although the Court reemphasized that speech restrictions
must be confined to methods which are the least restrictive, it concentrated its discussion on other, less restrictive ways of regulating speech
instead of methods unrelated to speech regulation. 2 50 Because it generalized from prior holdings, Central Hudson produced a test that allows a
state to chose a regulatory scheme that focuses on the content of commercial speech as long as the scheme is the least restrictive of the possible speech restrictions. 2 5 1 This startling, though subtle, shift permits a
state to control not only subject matter, but also the speaker's viewpoint,
provided that the regulation is the least restrictive of the speech-restric2 52
tive methods of furthering the state's interest.
Although Justice Blackmun concurred in invalidating the regulation, he authored a separate opinion to express, in part, his concern
about the Court's apparent willingness to allow a state to deprive its
citizens of information in order to influence their behavior. 25 3 Justice

Blackmun noted that:
Our
between
different
flow of

prior references to the "commonsense differences"
commercial speech and other speech "suggest that a
degree of protection is necessary to insure that the
truthful and legitimate commercial information is

unimpaired."

. . .

We have not suggested that "commonsense

differences" between commercial speech and other speech justify relaxed scrutiny of restraints that suppress truthful,
246.
247.
U.S. at
248.
249.
250.
251.

This was the case in Bates and Virginia Pharmacy. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
This was part of the reason the Linmark regulation was invalidated. Limiark, 431
96-97; Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 701-02 (1977).
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66.
lirginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769-80.
Central Hludson, 447 U.S. at 569-71.
See id. at 578-79 (Blackmun, J.,concurring).

252. Id.
253. Id. at 577.
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nondeceptive, noncoercive commercial speech.

The differ-

ences articulated by the Court . . .justify a more permissive

approach to regulation of the manner of commercial speech for
the purpose of protecting consumers from deception or coercion . .

.

. No differences between commercial speech and

other protected speech justify suppression of commercial
speech in order to influence public conduct
through manipula2 54
tion of the availability of information.
Justice Blackmun's attack on the Court's apparent willingness to uphold
a ban on the advertising of inefficient air conditioning units when no less
restrictive speech regulation existed to further the state's goal of reducing energy consumption is justified because such 25a 5direct viewpoint reConsequently, the
striction of commercial speech is unprecedented.
Fifth Circuit followed the Central Hudson test and nonetheless reached an
absolutely incorrect result in Dunagin.
There are three levels on which Dunagin should be examined for
theoretical and practical soundness. The first involves a return to the
equality and nondistortion interests to ask whether the restriction is one
that should be subjected to strict scrutiny. If the restriction does damage either of these interests and affects commercial speech, the next inquiry is to determine whether the Central Hudson test is satisfied. Lastly,
it must be asked whether the distinction set forth in Dunagin between
commercial speech and other types of protected speech is workable:
Can commercial speech be reasonably distinguished from non-commercial speech in order to permit the application of otherwise impermissible
viewpoint restrictions to commercial speech?
Dunagin is a classic example of a restriction violative of both the
equality and nondistortion interests. By severely restricting liquor advertising, Mississippi unabashedly expressed favoritism for one side of
the debate on liquor sales and consumption and also furthered its announced policy of reducing liquor consumption. 25 6 Rather than explicitly require its citizens to stop drinking, the state chose instead to reduce
their drinking by making it more difficult to make reasonable economic
choices about where to buy liquor and what type to buy. The state chose
regulation over prohibition and reformation.
A "compelling state interest" standard of review would have been
254. Id. at 578.
255. One court has accepted this position as articulated by Justice Blackmun. In Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Attorney General, 370 N.W.2d 328 (Mich. App.
1985), the Michigan Court of Appeals invalidated regulations of the Liquor Control Commission that were intended to discourage the artifical stimulation of liquor consumption.
Id. at 335-36. The court did an admirable job of wading through the interests advanced by
the Commission to conclude that liquor consumption was not likely to be artificially stimtlated by price advertisements where brand advertisements are permitted. The court also
concluded, without analysis, that police power interests, however important. do nut justil"
speech regulation in the absence of a real and substantial relationship between the personal fireedom impinged and the interest to be fturthered. Instead of suggesting that there
were regulatory ineasurcs available that were less restrictive than speech regulation. the
court relied onjustice Blackmtin's conclusion and the absence ol'a substantial finlherance
of ile state's interest by the regulations. Id. at 336-37.
256. Dittta'gi.
718 F.2d at 740-42.
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applied in Dunagin, but for the fact that the speech was commercial. 2 57
Because commercial advertising was the subject of the restriction, the
court was correct in applying the Central Hudson test. The test does not
require a compelling state interest. A state need only show that its regulation furthers a substantial state interest, 258 directly advances the state
interest and is not unnecessarily restrictive of speech. 259
There is little doubt that an advertising ban would directly serve the
state's interest in reducing liquor consumption, regardless of whether
the state interest is characterized as the reduction of all liquor consumption or only the reduction of the artificial stimulation of such consumption. 2 60 Because of the near hypocritical ambivalence that pervades a
state regulatory scheme that permits drinking in some areas, but not in
others, it is difficult to accept the state's argument that there exists a
substantial state interest. Instead of facing the politically difficult and
probably impractical choice of continuing the statewide prohibition, the
state chose to discourage consumption by requiring local governmental
units to vote affirmatively for the legalization of drinking, while concurrently restricting liquor advertising even in those areas where it could
legally be sold.
Although courts should generally defer to legislative judgments
about the existence of a substantial state interest in matters affecting
public health and welfare, in situations where a state may choose between the prohibition of an activity and a regulatory scheme that impairs
free expression, courts ought to carefully scrutinize the authenticity of
the state's declared substantial interest.
Closely related to the question of the presence of a substantial state
interest is the question of how invasive of first amendment interests a
regulation may be in furtherance of the state's goals. If a state's interest
is in curbing the artificial stimulation of consumption, then there should
be an inquiry into whether there are types of liquor advertisements
which do not artificially stimulate consumption. 2 6 1 Although there was
conflicting evidence in Dunagin on this issue, 2 62 the Fifth Circuit did not
bother to differentiate between types of advertising on the basis of
whether they were likely or unlikely to stimulate artificial
257. See id. at 747.
258. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. There is no doubt that the regulation of this type
of speech is permissible. See Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 743. There certainly exists a substantial
state interest in discouraging alcohol consumption. Had the state prohibited the sale and
drinking of alcohol, it would have expressed this legitimate concern. The authenticity of
its concern, however, is questionable where the state determines that there is a problem
involving the sale and drinking of alcohol, but does not take the obvious step of prohibiting the sale and drinking of alcohol.
259. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.

260.

l'he Court does not ocus on either interest to the exclusion of the other. Both

are legitimate because any reduction would help to relieve the serious problems associated
with liquor consumption . See Dunqgin, 718 F.2d at 747-48.
261. Ihere was evidence at the trial that most advertising did nothing more than allecl
brand loyaltv. Id. at 748.

262.
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consumption.263

Because commercial speech provides important information to consumers, it should not be without protection. 2 6 4 Although commercial
speech is subject to regulation, the Court has held that such regulation
must be based on content and not on commercialism. 2 6 5 The commercial speech doctrine permits a greater degree of regulation of commercial versus non-commercial speech in order to ensure that states
continue to fulfill their traditional role as guardians of the marketplace.
In this capacity, a state may regulate commercial speech to the extent
necessary to prevent illegality, fraud and deception, 2" 6 but may not paternalistically choose what is and is not worth hearing. 26 7 When the

choice is between free access to information and the suppression of
commercial speech, to further a substantial state interest that could be
accomplished by means other than suppression the state should permit
unrestricted access to information and further its substantial interest by
other means.

26 8

Because of the serious infringement of the equality and nondistortion values, the ambivalent. commitment to a goal evidenced by the failure to directly advance the purported state interest and the availability
of methods that do not impair free speech, the Dunagin regulation and
others like it should fail constitutional muster. This may be obtained by
strengthening the fourth part of the Central Hudson test as follows: The
method chosen to accomplish the goal must be such as would be chosen
by a reasonable legislature to accomplish its goal with the least possible
damage to first amendment interests. Under this test, if the goal were to
reduce liquor consumption, a large tax on liquor, its rationing or a flat
prohibition on its consumption would accomplish that goal without infringing first amendment interests.
Under the test established in Central Hudson and applied in Dunagin,
states not only may distinguish between messages on the basis of commercial subject matter, but also may promote their own interests by regulating the viewpoints expressed, suppressing those messages
inconsistent with the state interest being promoted. The Fifth Circuit
was unperturbed by this possibility because advertisements in the abstract are clearly commercial and the restrictions at issue furthered the
substantial state interest of reducing liquor consumption. 2-' Courts in
general, however, should be concerned with such viewpoint restrictions
in cases where it is unclear whether the speech to be restricted is com263. The prohibition also included billboards that did nothing more ihan give an address, the name of the product and a price in black and white print. Ju[st asJustice Harlan
had observed in Cohen v. California. 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971), that it was improbable that
[here existed any prurient interest in the )hrase "Fuck the draft." it is dillicul I0 believe
that such a plain annotucement would artificially stimulate consumption.
264. Se' I 'ni PhiaIarcy, 425 U.S. at 765.
265. Id. at 761-62.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 770.
268. IdS a/e
o Central ludt
d
. 447 U.S. at 576-78 (Blackunii, .. onturiing)
269. Dunagi,. 718 F.2d at 750-51.
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mercial or non-commercial. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, it
is often difficult to differentiate between commercial and non-commercial messages. 2 70 The problems associated with making this difficult distinction in a manner which does not seriously infringe first amendment
values has only recently been seriously addressed. 2 7 1 Suffice it to say
that any rule that relies on distinguishing commercial speech from other
types of protected speech likely will be problematic. 27 2 For this reason,
testing restrictions that damage the equality and nondistortion values by
a standard less stringent than the "compelling state interest" test, solely
because the speech is commercial, does not promote the development
of a more coherent theory of first amendment protection.
A recent Nevada case provides an excellent example of a state regulation that comports with this article's thesis. In Princess Sea Industries v.
State,2 7 3 a brothel owner and two newspaper publishers challenged a
Nevada law prohibiting advertisements for brothels in those areas of the
state where brothels are illegal.2

74

Thus, the regulation in this case

bears similarities to the regulation in Dunagin, because prostitution in
Nevada, as liquor sales and consumption in Mississippi, is legal only in
some areas of the state. 2 75 The Nevada regulation is distinguishable
from the Mississippi regulation, however, in that the advertising of prostitution is prohibited only where the prostitution is itself illegal, thereby
leaving brothel owners free to advertise in those counties where prostitution is legal.

2 76

Nevada's ambivalence in regulating prostitution is much less problematic than Mississippi's ambivalence in regulating liquor sales and
consumption because Nevada prohibited speech promoting prostitution
only where such activity was illegal. 2 77 Thus, where prostitution was an

illegal activity, Nevada legitimately exercised its right to prohibit advertising that could promote such unlawful conduct in order to counteract
the substantial danger that local prohibitions of prositution would
thereby be violated. 2 78 The Nevada regulation is an example of a commercial speech regulation that does not damage the equality and nondistortion values because it does not attempt to affect public behavior by
regulating speech about prostitution in those areas where it is an argua270. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 538-39 (Brennan, J.. concurring); V'iginia Pha rmacy, 425
U.S. at 764-65. See generally Barnes, supra note 2; Comment, Conimercial Speech: .4 Proposed

Definilion. 27 How. L.J. 1015 (1984).
271. See Barnes, supra note 2, at 476-93.
272. See id. at 490-93. But see Comment, supra note 267, at 1027-30.
273. 97 Nev. 534, 635 P.2d 281 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
274. Id. at 282.
275. Id. at 284 (Manoukian, j., concurring).
276. See id. Prostitution is not permitted in Clark County where L.as Vegas and a large
portion of' Nevada's tourist business is located. 1d.
277. Id. at 284 (Manoukian, j.,concurring).
278. Id. at 285 (Manoukian, J.,
concurring). See also Virginia
iharmacy. 425 U.S. al77172; Barnes, supra note 2, at 498-506. Because the advertising of a comnnercial activity
indicates that there is a willing seller who is able to sell and there has been communicated
inlformation about an unlawihl activity, which requires only an acceptance, such expression
presents a "clear and present danger" of a violation of substantive stle law prohibiting

the advertised activity. Barnes. supra note 2. at 498-506.
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bly undesirable, but otherwise lawful activity. 2 79
CONCLUSION

Underlying the application of the "compelling state interest" test
may be a concern for damage to the neutrality and nondistortion interests. When neither of these two factors are present, the less stringent
"reasonable regulation" standard of review should be applied. Regulations that focus on the content of speech, such as those that are applicable only to commercial speech, are subject-matter restrictions that
damage at least one, and probably both, of the above mentioned interests. Therefore, these regulations can not be justified by simply classifying them as neutral time, place and manner restrictions.
The application of the intermediate "substantial state interest" test
to commercial speech has led to the anomalous treatment of regulations
that infringe on commercial speech promoting harmful or undesirable,
but lawful activities. This article suggests that to accommodate both the
state interest in regulating harmful or undesirable speech and the first
amendment interest in the protection of expression, the Central Hudson
test should be modified to require the state to choose the method a reasonable legislature would choose to accomplish the substantive goal
without infringing free expression. Thus, the least restrictive alternative
requirement would require that a state legislature attempt to directly regulate the purported harmful or undesirable activity before it may regulate speech about that activity. A state should not be permitted to

manipulate behavior to reduce or eliminate harmful or undesirable conduct by reducing information about such conduct when that conduct has
not been directly regulated.

279. Speech regulation intended to affect substantive behavior does not require that in
all cases there be a prohibition of the underlying conduct. Instead, this type of regulation
should invoke the compelling state interest analysis. Thus, if the underlying conduct proposed by the speech is lawful, there must be a compelling state interest directly furthered
by the speech regulation and that interest must be impossible to achieve by a means less
restrictive of speech. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n. 436 U.S. 447 (1978), Ohralik was
suspended from the practice of law for face-to-face solicitation of two women, who had
been injured in an accident, to be his clients. Id. at 467-68. Although the underlying
transaction of providing legal services was lawful and the regulation of the solicitation was
not aimed at affecting that transaction, the regulation was intended to regulate such commercial transactions to prevent fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation, the debasement of
the legal profession, and the instigation of unnecessary litigation. Id. at 461. Thus articulated, it is apparent that the regulation of the manner in which an attorney communicates
the availability of legal services not only serves these compelling state interests, but is also
the least restrictive of those methods that may interfere with speech. For example, punishing the conduct after the fact would not prevent the substantive harm because even in the
best of circumstances it would only redress it. Note that in the instant context the evils
flow from the communication, not the conduct. This is not the case when the advertising
encourages the evil, but is not the evil, such as in the case of the advertising of liquor or
prostitution.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS:
THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
PAUL S. HUDNUT*

INTRODUCTION

State constitutions were originally the only source of protection
against the states' authority. However, as major portions of the Bill of
Rights were incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, the United
States Constitution increasingly assumed a dominant role in protecting
individual rights from state actions and the role of state constitutions as
an independent source of constitutional protection became submerged.
State courts either construed state constitutions to be coextensive with
the federal Constitution or ignored the state constitutions altogether.
In the past decade, there has been a dramatic rebirth of state constitutional law. No longer do state courts defer to federal interpretations
of the United States Constitution in construing similar provisions in
their own constitutions; rather, they often give their state constitutions
an independent life, thereby insulating their decisions from United
States Supreme Court review.' Both commentators and judges have
viewed this development favorably. 2 Moreover, the trend appeals to
both liberal and conservative philosophies: liberals see it as a means of
avoiding restrictive interpretations by the Burger Court and expanding
individual rights, while conservatives believe that the reemergence of
state constitutions is healthy for our federal system and reasserts the
3
power of the states in our union.
There are, however, troubling aspects to this development which
* Associate, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado; J.D., University of Virginia (1984); B.A., Colorado College (1980). The author would like to thank James C.T.
Linfield, Esq., for his helpful comments on an early draft of this article.
1. See, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979). affid, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 NJ. 287, 450
A.2d 925 (1982); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976). When based on an
adequate and independent state ground, a case which also decides federal questions will
not be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983). See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Brennan, State Cons/ittions and the Protection olIndividual Rights. 90 HARv. L.
REv. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and ConsttitionalRights in the Day of the Biirger Court,
62 VA. L.. RE v. 873 (1976): linde, E Plaribus-Costitutional Thenry and State Courts, 18 GA. L.
REV. 165 (1984): Developments in the Law--The In/tepretatioa of State CoistitationalRights, 95
HAV. L. REV. 1324 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the LaoI. In fact, some state

courts have stated that lawyers who fail to raise state constitutional claims are "skating on
the edge of malpractice." Bamberger, Boosting Y'oir Case with Y'our State Constitition, A.B.A.
J., March 1, 1986, at 49 (quoting Oregon Supreme Court justice Hans Linde).
3.

For the liberal view, see Brennan. supra note 2; Rights .ldvocates Shifting Trtics to

i-g/ht Reagan, L.A. DailyJ., Nov. 16. 1984, at 1, col. 6 (American Civil Liberties Union Legal
l)irector states thai [te Union plans to use state courts to protect individual rights in light
of the increasingly conservative federa Ijudiciary). For the conservalive view, see Roberts.
The. Ideqale and Indepeident State Ground: Souie PiaiCal Coasideiatins. 19 LAND & WVTER I..
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have gone largely ignored. Different levels of constitutional protection
in each of the fifty states may create difficult problems for law enforcement officials and an appearance of unfairness where different results
occur in similar situations. The issue of what remedies are available for
violations of recently expanded state constitutional rights has not been
addressed, and the implications for federalism have not been fully developed. This article surveys the problems caused by the expansion of
state constitutional protections beyond the protections of corresponding provisions of the United States Constitution, and suggests that due
consideration of these problems should lead state courts to be cautious
in expanding constitutional rights beyond those rights provided by the
federal Constitution. The article then discusses the role of state constitutional protections in the federal system and proposes a framework for
deciding when state courts should broaden constitutional protections
4
under state constitutions.
I.

THE EMERGENCE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AS SOURCES OF
PROTECTION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

A.

The Historical Context

In the early days of the American Republic, only state constitutions,
and the rights guaranteed thereunder, protected citizens from actions by
state governments. 5 These state constitutional rights preceded the federal Constitution and the framers of the United States Constitution considered such rights to be so complete that a federal "Bill of Rights" was
not added until several years after the Constitutional Convention of
1787. 6 The federal Bill of Rights was based on provisions of earlier
state constitutions and limited only the powers of the new federal
7
government.
A gradual evolution of constitutional protections, however, began
with the ratification of the fourteenth amendment following the Civil
War. Although initial United States Supreme Court interpretations indicated a narrow application for the new amendment,8 the fourteenth
amendment was subsequently found to incorporate substantially all of
the federal Bill of Rights, thus making these protections applicable to
REv. 647 (1984) (discussing the importance of adequate and independent state grounds as
rules of decision).
4. This article does not attempt to be an exhaustive study of state court decisions
which diverge from federal constitutional interpretation. For such a discussion. see Howard, supra note 2; Developments in the Law, supra note 2.
5. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). This
view of the respective roles of the federal and state constitutions remained for many years
following the ratification of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.. Adamson v. California.
332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. Ncw Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
6. See Develonnents in the Law, supra note 2. at 1327.
7. Id. at 1326-29. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112.
119 Cal. Rptr. 315. 329 (1975).
8.
lurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); The Slaughtcr-loose Cases. 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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the states.!' As these federal rights were being gradually incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment, they were concurrently being defined
by the United States Supreme Court.10 From the decision in United States
v. Gitlow II through the years of the Warren Court, the protections of the
first, fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth amendments were not only expanded
to encompass the actions of state governments, but were expanded to
12
provide greater substantive rights as well.
As federal constitutional rights were expanded and made applicable
to the states, state constitutional protections fell into disuse. This may
be attributed to several factors. First, because incorporated federal
rights became a constitutional "minimum" for states and were often
more expansive than existing state constitutional rights, state courts
were unlikely to provide even broader protections so soon after the ex3
pansion of substantive rights available under the federal Constitution. 1
The liberality of the Supreme Court in comparison with its state counterparts may also have been a factor because many state courts may have
viewed the federal "minimum" as granting too much protection. Finally, with the expansion of federal rights, the attention of litigants,
commentators and law schools was on the federal Constitution, and
state constitutions were viewed as redundant sources of constitutional
protection. 14 As a result of these factors, state constitutional rights were
overshadowed by federal constitutional rights and, on the rare occasions
when state rights were considered, they were held to be coextensive with
the federal guarantees.15
In the last decade, however, state constitutions have reemerged as
important sources of individual protections. As the Burger Court has
embarked on a more conservative path than its immediate predecessors,
litigants and judges have begun to look at state constitutions as sources
of more expansive rights than those available under the federal Bill of
Rights.
9. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating fourth amendment
protections); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating first amendment
protections).
10. See Brennan, supra note 2, at 493-95.

II. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
12. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I
(1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
13. One commentator has suggested that "[diuring the activist Warren vears. it was
easy for state courts . . . to fall into the drowsy habit of looking no further than federal
constitutional law." Howard, supra note 2, at 878. It should not be surprising from all
institutional view that state constitutions were largely ignored. Due to the supremacy
clause, state constitutions can only expand on those rights guaranteed by incorporated
federal constitutional rights. See iof'a note 15. Thus, when the court which defines federal
rights is more activist or liberal than its state counterparts. state constitutions are likely to
be ignored because the federal right will be defined more broadly than the state courts
would be willing to go with state rights. Conversely, when the court defining federal rights
is more conservative than some of its state counterparts, state constitutions become more

important, as federal rights are viewed as being "too narrow.14. See Linde, supra note 2, at 166, 174.
15. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 260 n.2, 312 A.2d 29. 31 n.2
(1973) ("Our discussion of the Fourth Amendment is equally applicable to the state constitutional provision."), re't. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
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Adequate and Independent State Grounds and the Supremacy Clause:
Federal Constraints on State Constitutional Interpretation

The degree to which state courts may interpret state constitutions
differently from federal constitutional precedent is governed by the interaction of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine and
the supremacy clause. Under the doctrine of adequate and independent
state grounds, state court decisions which rest upon an adequate state
16
ground will not be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.
The supremacy clause,1 7 however, limits the use of this doctrine because
state law may not conflict with federal law. Thus, if state constitutional
rights fall below the federal constitutional protections incorporated in
the fourteenth amendment, they will be preempted by the supremacy
clause.' 8 As a result of this interplay between the doctrine of adequate
and independent state grounds and the supremacy clause, state constitutional interpretation is skewed: state provisions may only be interpreted
to provide broader protections than similar provisions of the United
States Constitution.
The doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds is a constitutional limit on the United States Supreme Court's jurisdiction: the
Court has no jurisdiction to review a state decision which is adequately
based on state grounds. 19 This doctrine primarily serves federalism
concerns because it expressly recognizes the separation of federal and
state law and prevents federal courts from determining matters of state
law solely because a federal issue is also present. 20 As a result of this
doctrine, state decisions which extend protections beyond those provided by the federal Constitution will be respected by the federal courts
and will not be subject to review even if the case also raises federal con16. The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine had its origins in Murdock
v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). A recent articulation of the doctrine
may be found in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
17. The supremacy clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
18. Under the supremacy clause, state laws may not conflict with the federal Constitution. Thus, federal law sets a constitutional minimum below which a state law may not fall.
However, state courts may expand rights under state constitutions beyond the federal constitutional minimum, as long as one's state constitutional rights do not infringe upon another's federal constitutional rights. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
81 (1980).
19. If adequate and independent state grounds exist, there is no case or controversy
as to any federal question and the federal courts are without jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2. It has been settled since Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 616
(1875) that the United States Supreme Court will not review decisions of state law bv state
courts, although the basis for that holding was the Court's interpretation of TheJudiciary
Act of 1789 and not the Constitution. See Developments in the Law, stqpa note 2, at 1332-33.
20. Note, however, that federal district courts determine state law issues regularly
under diversity and pendent jurisdiction. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs. 383 U.S.
715 (1966) (state claim decided by federal court under pendent jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1982) (diversity jurisdiction statute).
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stitutional issues.2In addition to requiring that states, at a minimum, provide protections at least equal to federal constitutional requirements, the
supremacy clause has two other effects on state constitutional interpretation. First, expansive state constitutional interpretations may not interfere with the exercise of federal constitutional rights. 2 2 Second,
additional state constitutional protections presumably will not apply to
federal entities.2 3 Thus, the Federal Bureau of Investigation would not
be bound by stricter state search and seizure requirements than those
required by the United States Constitution.
The interplay between the doctrine of adequate and independent
state grounds and the supremacy clause defines the universe in which
state courts are free to interpret their state constitutions. The doctrine
of adequate and independent state grounds ensures that federal courts
will not interfere with the state courts' freedom to establish state law,
while the supremacy clause ensures that the state courts will not inter21. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). This case clarified the test for determining whether a state court decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds. In
Long, the Court reviewed a decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which had reversed
the conviction of the defendant on the grounds that certain evidence had been illegally
seized. People v. Long, 419 Mich. 636, 359 N.W.2d 194 (1984). The state decision cited
the Michigan Constitution and federal case law, but it was unclear upon which ground the
decision rested.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the United States Supreme Court's majority, rejected
the contention that the decision below rested on state law and used the occasion to set out
principles for determining when a state's decisional ground was adequate and independent. The Court stated that
when ...a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or
to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence
of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will
accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case
the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.
463 U.S. at 1040-41. To avoid the presumption that the decision rests on federal grounds,
the state court "need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that
the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves
compel the result that the court has reached." Id. The Court then restated the traditional
doctrine that "[ijf the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that itis alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will
not undertake to review the decision." Id.
For examples of "plain statements" by state courts, see State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260.
689 P.2d 519, 524 (1984) ("The holding with respect to the Arizona Constitution is based
upon our own constitutional provision, its specific wording, and our own cases, independent of federal authority."); People v. Timmons, 690 P.2d 213, 217 (Colo. 1984) (earlier
decisions diverging from federal precedent "rest solely and explicitly" on the state
constitution).
22. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899. 592 P.2d 34 1, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979), afd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
23. The federal courts have yet to face the issue of whether stricter state constitutional
rules will apply to federal agencies. In other areas, however, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the states may not regulate federal agencies so as to interfere with
federal programs or policies. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 402 (1963) (state
maintains control over patent practices except to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of federal objectives); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943) ("the activities of the Federal Government are free from regulation bv any' state"). It is likely.
therefore, that a similar supremacy clause analysis would be applied to more exacting state
constitutional rules.
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2 4
fere with the exercise of an individual's rights under federal law.
Under this framework, state courts enjoy great freedom to interpret
their constitutions as they wish, and they have been using this freedom
with increased frequency. 25 In many areas of constitutional law, most
notably criminal procedure and freedom of expression, states have recently provided more expansive rights under state constitutions. 2 1

II.

PROBLEMS CREATED BY STATE COURT DIVERGENCE FROM FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT

The trend toward increased reliance on state constitutions has been
largely applauded. 27 However, when state courts differ from federal
constitutional precedent, several problems may result. This section analyzes the problems which may occur when federal and state constitutional interpretations differ. Section III then proposes a framework for
determining when it is most appropriate for state courts to hold that
24. In addition to the supremacy clause, there are important political checks on state
courts. State initiatives allow voters to overrule unpopular constitutional interpretations.
See CAL. CONST. art. 1,§ 27 (1879, amended 1972) (an initiative by the people of California
which amended the state constitution to overrule People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493
P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) and reinstated capital punishment). Compare District Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 411 N.E.2d
1274 (1980) (declaring capital punishment statute unconstitutional) with MASS. CONST.
Part 1, art. 26 (1780, amended 1982) ("No provision of the Constitution, however, shall be
construed as prohibiting the imposition of the punishment of death."). Moreover, it is
often less difficult for legislatures to amend state constitutions than it is for Congress to
amend the federal Constitution. Howard, supra note 2, at 939. It should also be noted that
in many states, judges are elected or subject to "approval" votes. Developments in the Low,
supra note 2, at 1351.
Such political checks, however, may not always be an effective limit on activist state
courts. See Welsh, Reconsidering the ConstitutionalRelationship Between State and Federal Courts:
A Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME LAw. 1118, 1126-28 (1984) (discussing the
possibility of an "unreviewable state judgment" where a state court's reliance on both
federal and state constitutions results in "uncertainty about the accuracy of the state
supreme court's interpretation of federal law . .. [which] may deter state constitutional
amendment"). It should also be noted that the amendment process for state constitutions
is burdensome and that it would be difficult to utilize that process every time a state court
made an expansive definition of constitutional rights under the state constitution.
25. According to one commentator, every state has now utilized its constitution to
expand protections beyond those provided by the United States Constitution. Roberts,
supra note 3, at 648.
26. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979) (rejecting United States Supreme Court's holding in Hudgens v.
N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976) that there was no right under the first amendment to solicit
signatures for political petitions at private shopping centers), af1d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980);
People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976) (rejecting
United States Supreme Court's holding in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) that a
statement obtained in violation of an individual's Miranda rights was admissible for impeachment purposes); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983) (rejecting United
States Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) that pen registers do not violate a person's fourth amendment rights); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l,
Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983) (same holding as Robins); State v.Oppermain.
247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) (holding that an inventory search held to be permissible
under the fourth amendment by the United States Supreme Court violated the South Dakota constitution).
27. See supra notes 2-3.
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state constitutional provisions provide greater protections than their
federal counterparts.
A.

Uniformity

The United States Supreme Court has often stressed the desirability
of uniform interpretations of federal law. 28 Uniformity between state
and federal constitutional interpretations is also desirable, unless there
are valid reasons for differences. To assert that uniformity between
state and federal law is desirable is somewhat novel. The conventional
wisdom was perhaps best expressed by Justice Brandeis when he stated:
"It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.'29 While this may well be true in many areas of law, it is not
necessarily true in the area of constitutional law. 30 There are several
arguments for uniformity of state and federal constitutional law. First,
there is the possibility of different results in similar cases. Although this
is often the case among various jurisdictions with regard to common and
28. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983); see also Schlueter,Judicial
Federalism and Supreme Court Review of State Decisions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 1079, 1099 (1984).
29. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This statement is often cited in support of state court experimentation. See, e.g.,
Howard, supra note 2, at 940 ("While [Justice Brandeis] had in mind experimentation by
legislatures, the same reasoning supports innovation and diversity among state courts.");
see also California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2073 n.7 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[s]ome conflict among state courts on novel questions . . . is desirable as a means of
exploring and refining alternative approaches to the problem"). This author is not as
certain as Professor Howard orJustice Stevens that such is the case. As Professor Howard
notes in his article, judges are not subject to the same majoritarian political checks as
legislators. Howard, supra note 2, at 941. Moreover, Justice Brandeis addressed "social
and economic" experiments, not constitutional experiments regarding the relationship between individual liberty and state actions. As argued throughout this article, constitutional
experimentation should be undertaken carefully and with restraint. Finally, Justice Brandeis' statement assumes that such experiments will be "without risk to the rest of the country." As discussed later in this article, some state constitutional rights may have effects
outside state boundaries because they either conflict with other states' constitutional rights
or impede law enforcement. See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
30. Some state courts have been responsive to the need for uniformity between state
and federal constitutional protections. See State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519
(1984) where the court noted:
It is poorjudicial policy for rules governing the suppression of evidence to differ
depending upon whether the defendant is arrested by federal or state officers.
Therefore even though on occasion we may not agree with the parameters of the
exclusionary rule as defined by the United States Supreme Court, we propose, so
long as possible, to keep the Arizona exclusionary rule uniform with the federal.
Id. at 528.
Some members of the United States Supreme Court have also indicated that uniformity between state and federal constitutional law is desirable. See Colorado v. Nunez, 465
U.S. 324 (1984) (where three Justices concurred in dismissing certiorari, but wrote a separate opinion stating that the result reached by the state court was not the result required
by federal law). One commentary has indicated that Nnez is a signal that certain members
of the Court may become more active in disregarding purported adequate and independent state grottnds where it appears that these grounds are "a mere guise to avoid federal
precedent." Erickson & Neighbors, Pronouncements of the US. Supreme Court Relating to the
Crimiual Law'Field 1983-84, 13 Cot.o. LAw. 1561, 1617 (1984).
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statutory law, such varying results appear more repugnant or unfair in
the constitutional area, especially in the criminal area. 3 ' A second related argument is that bright lines are needed in constitutional law because it is this law which protects individual liberties from government
interference. Thus, where state and federal constitutional laws differ,
individuthere will be less certainty as to which laws apply to whom and
3
als will be less certain of the consequences of their actions.. 2
As discussed, state constitutional law is skewed by the supremacy
clause: states may only expand on individual rights; they may not contract on those rights which are guaranteed by the federal Constitution.
Therefore, a lack of uniformity will only occur when state constitutions
offer more protection than offered by the federal Constitution. Justice
Brennan argues that such "double protection" of individual liberties is a
beneficial product of federalism, 3 3 but it is troubling that such double
protection will result in different constitutional rights for citizens of different states. 34 For instance, assume state X has held, in accord with the
United States Supreme Court, that a warrantless inventory search of an
automobile by police is a reasonable search and seizure under the state
constitution. In addition, state X has a capital punishment statute. A
neighboring state, Y, has declined to follow such a federal rule and has
held capital punishment to violate state constitutional prohibitions of
cruel and unusual punishment. Assume that identical crimes were committed in both states, and in both cases, the murder weapon was found
during an inventory search of a car. In such a situation, it is entirely
possible that the defendant in state X would be executed while the defendant in state 17 would be set free. This is not to say that different
states would always reach the same results in similar cases if constitutional rules were uniform, but it points to the increased disparity that
will result if state courts diverge from federal constitutional precedent.
Moreover, such disparity will reinforce the popular perception of the
legal system being capricious, hyper-technical, and unfair. To many,
consistency is viewed as a virtue in the law. Having the interpretation of
odds
one's constitutional rights depend on which state one is in is at
35
with this popular conception of immutable constitutional rights.
See infratext accompanying notes 33-35.
32. The uncertainty affects both police and prosecutors who would prefer brighter
lines in the criminal procedure area and protestors who would prefer brighter lines in the
area of first amendment rights so that they may avoid criminal sanctions.
33. Brennan, supra note 2, at 503.
34. See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 341, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (1982) ("Divergent interpretations are unsatisfactory from the public perspective, particularly where the historical
roots and purposes of the federal and state provisions are the same."): Lipson, Serrano v.
Priest, I and II: The Continning Role of the California Supreme Court in DecidingQuestions .rising
Under the California Constitution, 10 U.S.F.L. REv. 697, 721 (1976) ("In an age of ever increasing technology and mobility, the American people may find it 'curiouser and ciriouser' that conceptions of their fundamental rights should change dramatically when they
merely cross a state line.").
35. See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 341, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (1982) ("JEInforcement of
criminal laws in federal and state courts, sometimes involving identical episodes, encourages application of uniform rules governing search and seizure. Divergent interpretations
are unsatisfactory from the public perspective .... ); seealso Lipson, supra note 34. At ihe
31.
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A second argument for uniformity is that uncertainty will result
where state and federal interpretations of constitutional protections differ. Prosecutors and police need to know the rules of the game. More
expansive state protections will not apply to federal agencies such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Drug Enforcement Agency. 6 As
stated by one Oregon Supreme Court justice: "Federal and state law
officers frequently work together and in many instances do not know
whether their efforts will result in a federal or a state prosecution or
'':
both. In these instances, two different rules would cause confusion. 7
Moreover, regional law enforcement projects, such as drug investigations, could become much more difficult if search and seizure rules, confession rules, and other rules of criminal procedure vary in each of the
states.38

B.

Remedies

Another problem created by state court divergence from federal
constitutional law is one of remedies. Section 1983 of the United States
Code is unique to federal law; there are no state counterparts.3: 9 Thus,
where the state court finds broader protection under a state constitution, the right may be in many cases only an illusory one. For example,
Massachusetts recently found a constitutionally protected liberty interest for a non-institutionalized mentally incompetent person to refuse
theoretical level, justice may be getting the "right result," but many equate justice with
achieving similar results under similar situations. See Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978); Walker, Lind & Thibaut, The Relation Between Procedural
and DistributiveJustice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401 (1979).
36. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
37. State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 346, 667 P.2d 996, 1005 (1983) (Jones, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169, 184-85, 527 P.2d 1202 (1974)).
As an example, Massachusetts recently decided to retain the Aguillar/Spinelli test for
probable cause, a test which was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548
(1985). Thus, in Massachusetts, there is "state probable cause" and "federal probable
cause." When an anonymous informant notifies law enforcement officers of facts which
indicate that an individual is violating both federal and state law, a situation may ensue
where a warrant based on the informant's statement would be supported by "federal"
probable cause but not "state" probable cause. Confusion and inefficiency may well
result.
38. See Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Reviewi, under the Calif,'nia Constittion, 6 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 975. 994-95 (1979).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who. under color... (state law) subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 is the primary method of recovering damages for the violation of federal
rights by state and local officials, and such cases are being filed with increasing frequency.
In 1960, approximately 300 civil rights actions were filed. J. COOK &J,. SOBIESKi. CIVI.
RIGHTS ACTIONS § 1.33 at 1-485, n.36 (1984). In 1984, over 21,000 civil righis actions
were filed, plus an additional 18,800 prisoner petitions alleging civil rights violations. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1984 ANNUAl. REPORT OF TE
)IRECTOR 254, table C2. These 39,000 cases constitute roughly 15 percent of the federal district
court caseload of 261,000 cases. Id. at 253, table C2.
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treatment with anti-psychotic drugs. 4 0 If state employees violate this
state created right, assuming there is no parallel federally protected
right, 4 1 what is plaintiffs remedy? At equity, the individual could obtain
an injunction against future injections. But can the individual recover
damages? Perhaps tort law would provide a remedy, but such action
may be barred by sovereign immunity or other limitations. 4 2 In all likelihood, to adequately protect the right it has created, a state court would
have to imply a remedy4 3 or be satisfied at having created a right without
a remedy. Although there are remedies for constitutional violations
other than damages, 44 proponents of state court divergence should not
ignore the tremendous number of § 1983 damage actions used to remedy violations of federal constitutional rights. 4 5 Without a damages
remedy for those instances in which state officials have violated state
constitutional guarantees, such guarantees are without substance for
many litigants.
The propriety of implying remedies from state constitutions is also
questionable. Implied remedies, from either federal or state constitutions, have none of of the limitations which have been developed in
§ 1983 actions. 4 6 Thus, divergence from federal constitutional precedent will involve another cost: developing a body of jurisprudence on
the limits of implied remedies under state constitutions. Moreover, implied remedies place a court in a quasi-legislative role; certainly, the argument can be made that the issues of remedies should be left to state
47
legislatures.
The final concerns about remedies relate to criminal proceedings.
When a state has adopted broader constitutional protections, what happens when there is a federal criminal proceeding in which the defendant
believes he faces irreparable injury and that his state rights are endan40. Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
41. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), remanded sub nom., Rogers v. Okin, 738
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
42. In the hypothetical case discussed, a plaintiff might sue the state in tort for battery. In some states, though perhaps not Massachusetts, the suit may be barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. See PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (5th ed.
1984). Moreover, both the elements and defenses which must be proven will be different.
In battery, a plaintiff must show offensive contact with his person by the defendant, id.§ 9
at 39, while the gravamen of a constitutional complaint would be that the plaintiFs constitutional rights, not his person, had been violated by state officials. See State v. Bolt. 142
Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519, 527 (Ariz. 1984) (discussing alternative remedies to the exclusionary rule, including damages actions in tort for invasion of privacy or for outrage).
43. Implied constitutional remedies have been found tinder the federal Constitution.
See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
44. Constitutional violations may be remedied by injunction, see,
e.g., Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908), or by exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, see. e.g.,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. See supra note 39.
46. For example, are there absolute or qualified immunities to implied cauises of action, as there are in § 1983 actions? Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
47. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text; seealso Deukmejian & Thompson,
su/ra note 38, at 999-1002 (criticizing the California Supreme Court for assuming legislative finctions).
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gered? May a state court grant an injunction against the federal criminal
proceeding under a theory similar to that allowed to defendants in state
proceedings in Younger v. Harris?4 8 Similarly, if a defendant has been
convicted in a federal criminal proceeding, can he file a habeas corpus
petition claiming that he is being imprisoned in violation of his state
constitutional rights? Although the answers to these questions are not
49
entirely clear, it is likely that these actions would be barred.
C.

Federalism

Some advocates of state court divergence feel it is a healthy aspect
of federalism and a revitalizing trend for the states'judiciaries. 50 While
it is true that the reassertion of a state's independence is healthy, these
advocates ignore some potentially damaging aspects of divergence on
the federal system.
Most damaging is the adverse effect that unprincipled state court
decisions have on federalism. Too often the adoption of a different rule
under the state constitution is inspired by disagreement with the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution. 5 '
When a state court diverges from federal constitutional precedent solely
because of a political or policy disagreement with the United States
Supreme Court, it weakens the federal system. It signals a lack of respect by state court judges for precedent and the United States Supreme
Court, and appears unseemly, result-oriented, and unprincipled. 52
48. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that
an injunction against pending state criminal proceedings would not be issued absent evidence of bad faith prosecution against the defendant. Where, however, state proceedings
have not been brought, but an individual legitimately feels threatened by a criminal proceeding to the extent that he can allege he will suffer irreparable injury, he may seek injunctive relief in federal court. Id. at 48.
49. It is unlikely that a state court could enjoin a federal criminal proceeding. See
General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977); Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408,
413 (1964) (a civil case which held that "state courts are completely without power to
restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions . . ."). As to the habeas corpus
petition, it would be unlikely to succeed, as it is likely that such an action would violate the
supremacy clause. See Geneial Atomic, 434 U.S. at 15 (stating that a state court injunction
prohibiting a party from litigating in federal court conflicted with the supremacy clause).
See also supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
50. See Brennan. supra note 2: Roberts, supra note 3.
51. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 109, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr.
360, 368 (1976) (holding that a decision of the United States Supreme Court was "not
persuasive authority"); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 142 n.6 (Colo. 1983) (where
the Colorado Supreme Court stated that it found a decision of the United States Supreme
Court "unconvincing").
52. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 349, 450 A.2d 952, 963 (1982) (Handler, J.,
concurring) (" 'here is a danger, however, in state courts turning uncritically to their state
constitutions for convenient solutions to problems not readily or obviously found elsewhere. The erosion or dilution of constitutional doctrine may be the eventual result of'
such an expedient approach."); Bator, The State Coarts and Federal Conistitutional Riglits, 22
WM. & MARY L. REv. 605, 606 n.1 (1981) ("1 must confess some misgivings about the
extent to which some . . . commentary seems to assume that state constitutional law is

sitnfply 'available' to be manipulated to negate Supreme Court decisions which are deemed
tnsatislactory."); letikmc jian & Thompson. supra note 38. at 1109 (criticizing California
Supreme Court for being "result-oriented" and noting that such opinions undermine the
har's and the public's confidence in a court's decisions).
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State court activism has also resulted in similar "unseemly" behavior by
the United States Supreme Court as evidenced by recent decisions of
that tribunal. The Court has been accused of "reaching out" to find
federal grounds for decisions, 5 3 rendering advisory opinions, 54 and refusing to remand cases to state courts. 55 While principled divergence
from federal precedent is a healthy aspect of our federal system, unprincipled divergence undercuts the cooperative aspect of the system. 56 Interpretations of the United States Constitution by the United States
Supreme Court are entitled to respect and deference by the state courts,
and such persuasive authority should not be lightly disregarded.
Moreover, although it is unlikely that there will be a major shift of
constitutional litigation to more "liberal" state courts, it seems that
more of such cases will be brought in such state courts. Thus, state
courts should realize that as they extend constitutional protections, they
will be increasing the demands on their judicial systems.
The emergence of different state constitutional rules will increasingly require federal courts to determine state constitutional law. Litigants in federal court asserting federal constitutional claims will now
also assert claims based on similar state provisions. While such issues
arise under pendent or diversity jurisdiction, 57 and the federal courts
clearly have the jurisdiction to decide them, a strong argument can be
made that federal courts should abstain from making such determina53. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1065-72 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. See Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U.S. 324 (1984) (Stevens,J., concurring). Apparently,
Justice White's advisory opinion was written so that other courts would not confuse the
Colorado rule and the federal rule on the disclosure of an informant's identity. One commentary has indicated that the opinion signals that the Court may become more active in
disregarding purported adequate and independent state grounds where it appears that
these grounds are "a mere guise to avoid federal precedent." Erickson & Neighbors, Pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court Relating to the CriminalLaw Field 1983-84, 13 COLO. LAW.
1561, 1617 (1984).
Note also the requirement in Long that an adequate and independent state ground be
"bona fide." 463 U.S. at 1042. Such a requirement may be another means by which the
Supreme Court could control state courts which it thought too "active." Thus, if a state
court diverges from federal precedent for unprincipled policy reasons, the United States
Supreme Court could assert jurisdiction on the ground that the state decision was not
"bona fide." This raises a disturbing spectre of the state court being reversed on state law
because the United States Supreme Court found the decision to be a bad faith effort to
avoid federal precedent. Whether the United States Supreme Court could assert such jurisdiction and whether the state would be bound by the reversal raises issues beyond the
scope of this article.
55. See Roberts, supra note 3, at 651-52. In the past, it was common to remand a state
case to the state court, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 729 (1975) (Marshall,J., dissenting),
but recently the Court has reversed without remand. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465
U.S. 420 (1984); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). This may be the Court's way of
preventing a state court, upon remand, from reinstating its original holding by substituting state grounds. It is unclear whether this method will avoid such state court responses.
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), on remand, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 432 N.E.2d 745, 447
N.Y.S.2d 873 (1982), the New York Court of Appeals treated such a reversal as a remand,
but held that state law compelled the same result as that reached bv the United States
Supreme Court.
56. State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 350. 450 A.2d 952, 964 (1982) (Handlcr. J.. concurring) ("a considerable measure of' cooperation must exist in a truly effective federalist
system").
57. See supra note 20.
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court stated that "absten-

tion is not required for interpretation of

.

.

. state constitutional

provisions" which "parallel" the federal Constitution. 5 9 However,
where state courts have previously diverged from federal precedent in
interpreting state constitutional provisions, abstention may be proper,
as interpretation of the state constitution would avoid the necessity of
reaching a federal constitutional issue. 60 Thus, when a federal court is
presented with claims that a litigant's state and federal constitutional
rights have been violated, it would be a proper exercise of discretion to
abstain from deciding the case when the state claim is based on a constitutional provision which has been subject to a different interpretation
than a similar federal provision. 6 I Thus, a side effect of divergent state
court decisions may be to deny litigants a federal forum unless they are
willing to sacrifice or delay their state law claims. 62 Divergence from
federal precedent, therefore, may increase the caseload of the state
courts and result in judicial inefficiency. Both federal and state courts
may need to become involved in a case that a federal court could have
decided entirely on its own were it not for the possibility of a different
interpretation of the state constitution.
58. It should also be noted that even if federal courts choose not to abstain from
deciding state constitutional issues, their power to grant relief for violations of state constitutional rights is limited. In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984), the United States Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment bars federal
courts from ordering state officials to comply with state law. Thus, injunctive relief for
violation of expanded state constitutional rights may not be provided by federal courts.
See Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1984).
59. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 n.4 (1984). In .Midkif,
however, the state constitutional provision, which parallels the fifth amendment "takings
clause," had not been interpreted differently from the fifth amendment. A different case
would present itself if a litigant in Federal District Court for South Dakota raised a constitutional claim under South Dakota's parallel provision to the fourth amendment because
South Dakota has diverged from the federal interpretations of the fourth amendment's
"illegal search and seizure" on several occasions. See, e.g., State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d
673 (S.D. 1976). In such a case, there is an "uncertain question of state law" which may be
"subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary" or substantially modify the
federal constitutional question, ,Vidkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2327, thus presenting a proper case
for abstention.
60. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800. 814
(1976).
61. The grotnds for abstention could be either the Pullman type, where an unsettled
question of state law may render the federal constitutional issue unnecessary, Railroad
Conini'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), or the "comity" type. where a state
constitutional law is a "mailer ... largely of local concern and which [is within the special
competence of local courts." International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1245 v. Public
Scrv. Comm'n, 614 F.2d 206, 212 n.l (9th Cir. 1980). See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315 (1943); see also Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 305-06 (1982).
62. If the case is seni to state court, the litigants will eventually get a federal hearing
on an asserted federal claim once they have exhausted state appeals and applied for ceriiorari to the United States Supreme Court. There may be other reasons for preferring federal court, however, such as certain rles of procedttre or evidence or the convenience of
the parties. Abstention in such cases would certainly Undercut pendent and diversity jurisdiclion. as litigants would lie forced to abandon state claims in order to slay in federal
court, or would lie forced to abandon federal court to maintain their state clains.
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Another disturbing aspect of state divergence is a danger which affects the federal bench as well: judicial review is often a countermajoritarian exercise. This problem is aggravated when state constitutions are interpreted to provide broader protections than those afforded
by the federal Constitution. Decisions in which state courts strike down
legislative acts which satisfy federal constitutional requirements should
not be undertaken lightly. 63 Although there may be more political
checks on state judges than on their federal counterparts, 64 state judges
would do well to remember that "judicial review ... is never without an
anti-democratic flavor."'6 5 The line between judicial functions and legislative functions is a thin one, and activist state courts must avoid stepping into the legislature's shoes. 6 6 Divergence, therefore, should be
limited to occasions when there are principled reasons for extending
further constitutional protections, for, as pointed out by one commentator, "[p]ossessed of neither the purse nor the sword, the power and influence of ... [a] Court are in direct proportion to the respect which its
67
decisions command."
III.

DECIDING WHEN TO DIVERGE:

A

DECISIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR

STATE COURTS

The purpose of this article is not to argue that state courts should
not interpret state constitutions as providing broader rights than those
provided under the federal Constitution; rather, it is to point out the
problems caused by such divergence. The author does not believe that
the problems outlined above, either by themselves or taken together,
compel the conclusion that state courts should never diverge. Rather,
such problems lead to the conclusion that the independent interpretation of state constitutions is not a path without certain costs, and that
such costs, when considered carefully, counsel against it becoming a
common practice of state courts.
When should a state court diverge from federal constitutional precedent when interpreting similar state constitutional provisions? This
section first discusses the role of state constitutions in protecting indi63. A court which the public believes has become too active may be reined in by political checks. See supra note 24 for examples. In Florida, an initiative was passed providing
that the search and seizure clause of the state constitution "shall be construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court." FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (1968, amended 1982). After the
California Supreme Court found that capital punishment violated the state constitution,
the California voters enacted by initiative a constitutional amendment declaring that the
"'death penalty . . . shall not be deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or
unusual punishment . . . nor . . . be deemed to contravene any other provision of this

constitution.- CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (1879, amended 1972).
64.

See supra notes 24, 63; see also Bator, suJ)r note 52, at 623-25: Neubornc. The M1Iyth

,/Parvty, 90

HAv. I.. REv. 1105 (1977).
65. Howard, supra note 2. at 941.
66. Deukmejian & Thompson. suira note 38. at 999-1006.
67. Bite, 'ladeyon apid the .ldequale State Grotwd, 45 S. (CAI,, I.. REV. 750. 758 (1972).
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vidual liberties. It then discusses several factors which should be considered by state courts in deciding whether to expand individual
protections under the state constitution beyond those granted by the
federal Constitution.6 8
A.

The Role of State ConstitutionalProtections in the Federal System

One premise of this article is that the role of the United States
Supreme Court is to protect the fundamental civil liberties guaranteed
by the federal Constitution. The role of the state courts in constitutional jurisprudence, therefore, is to determine when to provide greater
protection under the state constitution than is available under the federal Constitution.
In determining the respective roles of federal and state constitutional rights, it is necessary to begin with the recognition that, in some
instances, state bills of rights preceded the federal Bill of Rights, and
that federal constitutional protections did not apply to actions by the
states until their incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. 6 9 Since
such incorporation, however, it is apparent that the federal Constitution
has emerged as the primary source of fundamental constitutional
rights. 70 Although some commentators hark back to the classical model
of state primacy, the better view is to treat the role of state constitutional
protections as a supplemental one. 7 1 Such a "supplemental" view re68. The discussion below assumes that the federal constitutional issue in question has
been decided by the United States Supreme Court. When the scope of federal protection
has not been so decided and instead there is federal precedent only from federal appellate
and district courts, or perhaps no federal precedent, the problem of divergence is not as
great. First, there is often no settled federal law from which to diverge. Second, in such a
case, the state court may decide the case on the federal issue. Third, where there is federal
law on point, it is often split. The state court could decide to adopt one rule or the other
as its own rule. In short, there is not the problem of disrespect, lack of uniformity (which
may also exist in the federal caselaw) or unprincipled divergence.
69. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr.
325, 329 (1975):
It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually
identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their federal counterpart.
The lesson of history is otherwise: the Bill of Rights was based upon the corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than the reverse.
Id. at 550, 531 P.2d at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329. See also Right to Choose v. Byrne. 91
N.J. 287. 293, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (1982); Linde, supra note 2, at 174 ("[T]he federal Bill of
Rights was drawn from the earlier state declarations of rights adopted at the time of independence... land] most protection of people's rights against their own states entered the
federai Constitution only in the Reconstruction amendments of the 1860's ..
) Developments in the Law, supa note 2, at 1326-29. Cf State v. Bolt. 689 P.2d 519, 523 (Ariz. 1984)
(stating that "Arizona's constitutional provisions generally were intended to incorporate
the federal protections").
70. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 293, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (1982); Pollock.
State Conslitutions as Separate Sources of Fundanimenlal Rights, 35 RtrGERS L. R.v. 707, 718
(1983); see also Neuborne, The .1y"th of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1127-28 (1977) (arguing that the political insulation of federal courts renders them better able to protect individual liberties against majoritarian pressures).
71. Advocates of the "primacy" approach argue that the state constitution is an cntirely separaie source of cons tit utional protection and that, therelire, the state cou't is
hligated to decide a constitutional issue first under its own constitution before reaching
the federal constitutional issue. Linde, supra note 2. at 178-79: Welsh, supra note 24, at
I125: Note. The .\Ne Federalisn: 7iiu,arid a Iincipled Ialeqtneta/ion of the State Constiition. 29
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flects the realty of federal constitutional protections and the supremacy
of such protections.7 2 Once it is accepted that state constitutional protections will serve as supplements to federal constitutional protections,
the issue becomes one of when these state protections should be extended. Although the state courts possess the power to diverge whenever they desire, problems of uniformity, remedies, and federalism
counsel against frequent exercise of this power. This article proposes a
conservative approach for such divergence, based on the national or local character of the right in issue, and whether it is a matter of extending
protection beyond that provided under the federal Constitution or
maintaining a protection in the face of a contraction of the federal
protection.
When a state constitutional right does not interfere with federal interests and concerns activities that do not have substantial effects beyond state boundaries, it can be considered a "local" right. In contrast,
a right is "national" in character when it is either intertwined with federal laws and policies which would be disrupted by separate state rules,
or when it will have substantial effects beyond state boundaries. Divergent interpretation by state courts of local rights may involve fewer costs
than those which result when the right is national. State courts are often
better equipped to determine the need for additional constitutional protections in local situations. Moreover, because the exercise of such
rights would have minimal impacts outside the state, there is less of a
need for uniformity. Where a national right is involved, state court divergence is more difficult to justify. Uniformity is important in these
national areas, and direct conflicts between state and federal laws should
be avoided. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court is better able
to balance national concerns when determining the scope of these rights
because a state court's views are more provincial.
An example of a national right is provided by the cases of People v.
L. REV. 297, 317 (1977); see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2089-91
(1984) (Stevens,J., concurring); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 346-48, 450 A.2d 952, 960-62
(Pashman, J., concurring). One problem with the primacy approach is that no matter how
true such a model is to constitutional history, see Welsh, supra note 24, at 1132-41, it is of
questionable value in describing the role of state constitutions in the current federal system. As noted by Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the primacy model
"downplays the realty of the dominant role of the federal Constitution." Pollock, supra
note 70, at 718; see also Developments i the Law, supra note 2, at 1356-59 (proposing an
"interstitial approach"). This "dominant role" results from the incorporation of the Bill
of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, and from the supremacy clause which prohibits
state laws from conflicting with the federal Constitution. The net result is that state constitutional protections are relegated to a "supplemental" role. State constitutional protecSTAN.

tions are only meaningful if they go bevond federal protections, for ifthey fall below the

federal protections, they are of minimal practical significance as they will be preempted by
federal protections by operation of the supremacy clause. Bit see Massachusetts v. Upton,
104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens sees the relative roles of
federal and state constitutions in a different light; to him, state constitutions are the "primary guardian'" of individual liberty, while the federal Constitution is the "ultimate guardian of individual rights." 1d. at 2091.
72. Federal constitutional protections are more complete because state protections do
not constrain the federal government. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Sporleder 73 and People v. Timmons, 74 in which the Colorado Supreme
Court decided not to follow Smith v. Maylands 75 and held that pen registers 76 infringed upon individual expectations of privacy protected by the
Colorado Constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court based its holdings on the state constitution because it found the United State Supreme
Court's holding in Smith to be "unconvincing." ' 77 In neither opinion did
the Colorado Supreme Court address the extent to which federal law
was involved. As noted by Justice Erickson in his dissent in Timmons,
"the area of electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping has been the subject of pervasive federal legislation." '7 8 Moreover, it is an area of national concern because it implicates an individual's privacy interest in
telephone calls that go beyond state lines. Thus, Colorado's constitutional protection may conflict with other states which follow the holding
in Smith. 79 For instance, assume that X places a call from Denver to Y in
New York to order illegal narcotics. Presumably, a pen register record
of the call would not be admissible in a prosecution against X in Colorado. But, assuming New York does not extend state protections beyond Smith, may New York use the record as evidence if it prosecutes X
and Y? As telephone communication is the most common method of
interstate communication, it would be desirable to have uniform rules
for the use of pen registers so that both federal and state law enforcement officer will be able to monitor interstate criminal activity. It is in
such areas that state courts should be most hesitant to diverge from federal precedent, yet the Colorado Supreme Court did so without considering these issues.
An example of local law is illustrated by the "shopping center"
cases which considered the constitutional rights of those who wish to
collect signatures for political petitions on private property. In 1979,
the California Supreme Court departed from federal constitutional precedent 8° and held that the California Constitution "protect[s] speech
and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when
the centers are privately owned." 8 1 The United States Supreme Court
73. 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983) (installation of pen register must be preceded by
search warrant because it is a search and seizure under Colorado Constitution).
74. 690 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1984) (applied rule in Sporleder).
75. 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no search warrant required when installing a pen register
because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed).
76. "A pen register records the numbers dialed from a particular telephone and
counts the numbers of incoming calls. It does not record or monitor conversations." Timinons, 690 P.2d at 214, n.I.
77. Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 143 n.6. Cf State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982)
(reaching a holding similar to Sporleder but basing it on a difference in language between
constitutional provisions and preexisting state law).
78. People v. Timmons, 690 P.2d 213, 218 (Colo. 1984) (Erickson, C.J., dissenting)
(citing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510
(1982), which regulates the interception of certain wire and oral coinmmunications by both
federal and state officials).
79. See .rnpra
note 75.
80. E.!., Hudgens v. NIIRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (employees did not have firs( amendmcnt right to picket in frount
of their employer's leased store in a shopping center).
81. Robins %. Pruneyard Shopping Center. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347.
153 Cal. Rpir. 854, 860 (1979), afd 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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affirmed this decision, holding that the exercise of such a state constitutional right did not infringe on the shopping center owners' federal first
amendment rights or their federal protection from a taking of property
without just compensation under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.8 2 Other states have followed the California Supreme Court's
ruling and found constitutionally protected rights to speak and petition
on privately owned property. 8 3 The issue of whether there is a constitutional right to speak, petition, or assemble on private property such as
shopping centers does not implicate national concerns. It is largely a
local issue because political elections are conducted by the states, and
state law governs private ownership of property. Thus, when such local
rights are at issue, state court divergence is more appropriate. There
will be a negligible effect beyond the state's boundaries if it adopts such
a right, and the state courts are better suited to weigh the local interests
84
involved.
A second area in which state constitutional protections can play an
important role is when they serve as a "backup" in the event that rights
guaranteed by the federal Constitution are dramatically curtailed. The
presence of an alternative source of individual protection provides a
check on severe contractions of federal constitutional rights.8 5 in the
case of such a contraction of federal rights, state constitutions could assume a more important role in delineating individual rights and protecting those rights in which individuals have an expectancy. 8 6 Such a role
82. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
83. E.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983)
(state constitution protects the right to solicit nominating signatures in private shopping
centers in support of political candidate's efforts to be placed on ballot); State v. Schmid,
84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980) (state constitution protects freedom of speech and assembly on the grounds of a private university), appeal dismissed sub nom., Princeton Univ. v.
Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
84. See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 352, 450 A.2d 952, 966 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring) ("When particular questions are local in character and do not appear to require a
uniform national policy, they are ripe for decision under state law.").
An influential article, Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1344-45, proposes that
state constitutional law be treated as a "core" area under National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and that therefore, federal intervention in the form of United
States Supreme Court review of state judgments should be limited. The Court, however,
recently overruled NVational League of Cities, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, reh'g denied, 105 S. Ct. 2041 (1985) where the Court held that
Congress could regulate the states under the commerce clause. Nonetheless, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that in certain areas of law, federal intervention
should be avoided and that the expertise of local courts should be applied. See Alabama
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1951).
One commentator has suggested that constitutional issues concerning local taxation
and education policies are better suited to state courts. Pollock, supra note 70. at 714-17.
85. It should be noted that state constitutions would not be a complete "backup."
Presumably, the federal government is not subject to state constitutional protections due
to the supremacy clause. See supra notes 18 and 23.
86. See People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981):
A blind following of Supreme Court precedent would frustrate our ability to protect rights enjoyed by Californians and to maintain consistency in California law.
If the United States Supreme Court hands down a decision which limits rights
established by' earlier precedent in a manner inconsistent with the spirit of the
earlier opinion, it may become incumbent upon this court to employ the Califownia Constitution to maintain consistent principles protecting those rights.

1985]

STATE CONSTITUTIONS

should come into play, however, only when dealing with exceptional legislative or executive actions, such as amendment of the Bill of Rights or
congressional limits on, or elimination of, the lower federal courts or

federal remedies. 8*7 It is in such exceptional cases that the state courts
may need to become the primary protectors of both state and federal
s8
constitutional rights.
Thus, as a first step in determining when to diverge from federal
constitutional precedent, a state court should decide whether the right
asserted is local or national in character, or whether it is a right which
has been substantially contracted under federal law and therefore may
be in need of additional state protection. Once a state court determines
that the institutional role of state constitutional protections may justify
more extensive protection of the individual right, several other factors
should be considered before deciding to diverge.
B.

Other Factors Involved in the Decision to Diverge From Federal
Constitutional Precedent

In addition to considering the character of the right asserted and
whether there is a need for state protection due to a contraction of a
parallel federal right, there are other factors a state court should con-

sider before diverging from federal constitutional precedent.
Id. at 94, 634 P.2d at 932-33, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
While the Bustamante opinion is not a model of the judicial restraint advocated by this
article, it does illustrate the expectations of the citizenry in certain constitutional rights. In
the event the Bill of Rights were amended so that it did not protect the right of citizens to
assemble in public forums to express their opinions, the state courts might decide that
such a right exists under their state constitutions, thus protecting the expectations of those
who have become accustomed to this constitutional right.
87. In most cases exceptional circumstances would be limited to legislative or executive action. In some situations, however, contraction of federal constitutional rights by the
United States Supreme Court could also initiate greater state protections. To this author,
the "exceptional circumstances" justification should be used rarely and should not be used
as an excuse to avoid federal precedent with which state court judges disagree for political
reasons. The touchstone should be citizen expectancy, see supra note 86. As an example.
should the United States Supreme Court ever hold that the Miranda warnings are no
longer required by federal law, see Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (1985), and
New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630-31 (1984) (both cases describe Miranida as a
"prophylactic rule" that is not constitutionally required), state courts might decide that.
due to the widespread belief that citizens have a right to irianda warnings, constitutional
Aliranda-type warnings would still be required under the state constitution.
A distinguishable situation is presented where federal law is uncertain and the United
States Supreme Court has oscillated, such as in the scope of automobile searches incident
to arrest. See Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BAir. ..
RExv. 379, 394 (1980). In this situation, state courts may decide to base a decision on state
law due to the uncertainty of federal law. See Pollock, supra note 70, at 712. This uncertainty should be a factor for state courts to consider in deciding whether to diverge, but it
should not be dispositive.
88. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 52, at 627 (where, in discussing the state court's roles in
interpreting federal constitutional protections, Bator notes that "litl is the state, and not
the lower federal courts that constitute our ultimate guarantee that a usurping legislature
and executive cannot strip us of our constitutional rights").
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1. Uniformity, Remedies, and Federalism
In deciding whether to diverge, the effects of such divergence
should be considered. Uniformity interests will, of course, be considered in analyzing the local or national character of the right asserted.
But such an interest in uniformity should also be considered in the abstract: is this a right involving an interest in uniformity, or is this a right
in which experimentation in the different states would be beneficial?
Remedies should be considered. If the right could not be adequately
protected by injunction, state courts should hesitate to diverge from federal law because any state damage remedies would need to be implied
by the state court. As with uniformity, federalism concerns will also be
considered in the local/national analysis. But the state court should analyze any further impacts on the workings of the "federal" judicial system, such as whether the right would commonly be asserted in federal
court under diversity or pendent jurisdiction.
2.

Similarity of Language Between State and Federal Provisions
and Legislative History

When the state and federal constitutional provisions are substantially identical, a state court should be more hesitant to diverge from
federal constitutional precedent absent special circumstances. 8 9 Where
special circumstances are present, such as where the legislative history
of the state constitutional provision indicates that the state intended to
offer broader protections than those available under the federal Constitution, state courts should give content to such legislative intent.9 0
Substantial differences in language between the state and federal
provisions also support a finding of more extensive rights under the
89. "Substantially identical" means that the differences in wording are not material.
For example, the Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . ."U.S. CONST.
amend. IV, while the Colorado Constitution provides: "The people shall be secure in
their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no
warrant to search any place or seize any person or things shall issue without ...probable
cause. . . ." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7.
There are many instances, however, where material differences in language exist. For
example, while the first amendment to the Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to
CONST. amend. I, the New Jersey
assemble and to petition the Government . . "U.S.

Constitution provides "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on
all subjects . . " NJ. CONST. art. I, para. 6, and the Massachusetts Constitution provides
"The right of free speech shall not be abridged." MASS. CONST. art. XVI (1780, amended
1948). Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (forbidding "cruel and unusual punishments")
with CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1879, amended 1974) (forbidding "cruel or unusual punishment"). In People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972), the California Supreme Court used this difference in language
to find that capital punishment violated the state constitution.
90. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152
(where California court analyzed legislative history and difference in language between
state and federal constitutional provisions), cert. demed, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). It should be
noted, however, that there is a paucity of legislative history regarding legislative intent
when differently worded state provisions are enacted.
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state constitution. 9 l For example, in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center,9 2 the California Supreme Court found that the difference in language between federal and state constitutions was dispositive. The
court held that the language of the state constitution's guarantee of freedom of expression 93 was broader than the first amendment and therefore granted broader rights than its federal counterpart.
3.

Special State Factors: Pre-existing Law or Tradition

In some instances, there may be other state law factors which suggest expanding state constitutional protections beyond those provided
by federal law. Several courts have considered the development of state
law in related areas. For example, in Right to Choose v. Byrne, 94 the New
Jersey Supreme Court based its divergence from federal law, in part, on
the greater rights a woman had under state common law. Other courts
have considered less tangible state traditions. The Alaska Supreme
Court protected adults possessing marijuana under the state constitution's guarantee of privacy stating that Alaska "has traditionally been the
home of people who prize their individuality and who have chosen to
. ..[live] here in order to achieve a measure of control over their life95
styles which is now virtually unattainable in many of our sister states."
Pre-existing law and tradition alone, while relevant to the state court's
decision, would seldom rise to the level of importance which would justify divergence from federal law. If, however, other factors are present,
traditions or pre-existing law may support a decision to diverge.
C.

Summary

A state court's decision to expand state constitutional protections
beyond those provided by the federal Constitution should begin with an
analysis of whether there is a role for additional state protection. Such
state protection is most clearly justified when the right asserted is local
in nature or when a similar federal right has been contracted. If such a
right is at issue, a state court should then consider other factors such as
the similarity in language between state and federal provisions, any special state law or traditions, whether special remedies will be required,
and the impact that extending the protection will have on uniformity
and federalism.
Where the state court has decided to diverge from federal prece91. See, e.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590
(1983) (broader right of freedom of expression based on difference in language between
state and federal constitutions); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 295, 450 A.2d 925,
933 (1982) (New Jersey Supreme Court diverged from federal constitutional precedent
basing its decision on "more expansive" state constitutional language and pre-existing
state law governing a woman's right "to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to fullterm").
92. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), afd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
93. "Every person may freely speak, write, and publish his or her sentiments on a
subject .... CAL. CoNsr. art. 1, § 2 (1879, amended 1974).
94. 91 N.J. 287, 295, 450 A.2d 925, 933 (1982).
95. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
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dent, it should clearly set forth its reasons for doing so.'! " The proper
approach would be to address the federal issue first and state that fed57
eral law would not protect the right in issue.9
Then the state court
should set out its reasons for differing from federal law and make a
"plain statement" that its holding is based on state law.'-18 Such an approach would make it evident that the right was based on state law and
also make clear what the federally guaranteed minimum protection
would be, thus allowing for valid amendment of the state constitution if
the new rule was unpopular. 99
When a state court decides not to diverge from federal constitutional precedent, the issue arises whether it should rest the decision on
federal law without mentioning state law, or whether it should explicitly
adopt the federal rule as state law. Two considerations are important.
First, if the state court rests its decision on federal grounds, unnecessary
state constitutional adjudication can be avoided.10 0 Moreover, if the de96. State courts have taken several approaches in deciding when to base a decision on
state grounds when a litigant has raised both federal and state constitutional grounds. See
Linde, supra note 2, at 178. One approach is to decide both state and federal grounds in
different parts of the opinion. See State v. Badger. 141 Vt. 430. 450 A.2d 336 (1982). A
different approach, advocated by Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court, is to
reach state law only after deciding that the right is not protected by federal law. See Pollock, supra note 70, at 718-20; Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982).
A third approach, advocated by Judge Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court, is to
decide first whether the right is protected under the state constitution. The federal issue
should be decided only if the state constitution does not prohibit the infringement of the
right asserted. See Linde, supra note 2, at 178-79; Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 625
P.2d 123, 126 (1981) (stating that "the proper sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its constitutional law, before reaching a federal constitutional claim").
97. See supra note 71. Courts applying the "primacy" approach would not discuss
whether the right was protected by federal law unless they decide that the right was not
protected by state law. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 2, at 178-79. Under the "supplemental"
approach advocated by this article, federal protections should be considered first before a
decision is made to extend state protections beyond those provided under the federal
Constitution.
98. By making a "plain statement" that the decision is based on state law, the state
court will be complying with the rule announced in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983), discussed supra at note 21.
99. A common criticism of state court divergence based on an "interstitial" or "supplemental" model is that it creates the possibility of "dual reliance" or "unreviewable"
judgments. See, e.g., Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 38, at 996-99; Welsh, supra note
24, at 1126-28. When a state court adopts broader rights explicitly under the state constitution, review by the United States Supreme Court is barred by the doctrine of adequate
and independent state grounds. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. If, at the
same time, the state court alternatively bases its decision on federal law, the state ground
will be more difficult to change by amendment. The uncertainty of the state court's accuracy in its determination of the federal ground makes amendment by the legislature or the
initiative process more difficult. Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 38, at 987, 999;
Welsh, supra note 24, at 1127. If, however, the state court only extends protections under
the state constitution when the federal Constitution does not guarantee such a right, the
problem of alternative grounds will be avoided. In many cases, state courts will defer to
federal law, and their decisions will be reviewable by the United States Supreme Court. If
a court decides to diverge, such divergence will be expressly based on the state constitution, so that "political" review will be available.
100. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (United States Supreme Court avoids ruling on constitutional
issues when the case may be decided on other grounds); see also In )e Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d
921, 944, 569 P.2d 1286, 1300, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 312 (1977) (Clark,J., dissenting) (Cali-
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cision is based alternatively on both federal and state grounds, it may
create an "unreviewable decision." The decision will not be reviewable
by the United States Supreme Court because it rests on adequate and
independent state grounds, and it cannot be changed by state constitutional amendment because it rests on federal constitutional grounds. '
Thus, where both state and federal issues have been presented and the
state court has decided not to diverge from federal precedent, the better
course is to rest the decision on federal grounds, explicitly stating that
the state court has decided not to extend further protection under the
state constitution. Such a decision would be subject to United States
Supreme Court review, but it would also inform citizens that their state
constitutional rights were coextensive with their federal rights. It would
foreclose future reliance based on a belief that state rights might be
broader in a particular area of law and would inform citizens that if they
desire broader rights, such rights would need to be effectuated by constitutional amendment.
CONCLUSION

This article has urged that, for a number of reasons, state courts
should be hesitant to diverge from the constitutional protections provided by the federal Constitution. The discussion has centered on the
issue of when state courts should provide additional protections to their
citizens and has urged that a conservative approach be adopted by state
courts.
State constitutional protections are best viewed as supplemental
sources of protection for individual rights. Reliance on state constitutional provisions generally should be limited to cases in which the right
asserted is local in character or where it is necessary to protect a right in
the face of a substantial contraction of federal constitutional rights. In
such situations, state courts should also examine the costs of divergence
and the effects that such divergence will have on the federal system.
United States Supreme Court Justice Stone once commented that
"the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self
restraint."' 0 2 This statement aptly applies to state courts as well, for
fornia Supreme Court avoids ruling on constitutional issues when the case may be decided
on other grounds). But see Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct, 2085, 2090-91 (1984) (Stevens J., concurring) (stating that by deciding state constitutional questions first, the state
court will avoid deciding an unnecessary federal constitutional question).
101. See discussion supra note 99. In a case where the state court has decided not to
diverge, thejudgment should rest only on federal or state grounds to avoid the problem of
an "'unreviewable judgment." For several reasons, this article takes the position that the
state court should base its judgment on federal grounds when it decides not to diverge
from the federal rule. First, the role of state constitutional protections is supplemental.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Thus, where the state court decides not to extend rights beyond those provided by federal law, the supplemental role of state constitutions is not triggered. Second, state courts have no obligation to decide state questions
before reaching federal law. If they may avoid reaching an issue of state constitutional law
by resting their decision on federal law, they are following the prudential rule against
unnecessary constitutional adjudication. See supra note 100.
102. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1. 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
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their power to independently interpret state constitutional provisions is
subject to few constraints. Yet, while the power of state courts to interpret their state constitutions as they wish is clear, it is also clear that
divergence from federal constitutional protections is not without cost.
The independent interpretation of state constitutions is protected in the
federal system, but this protection should not be abused. State courts
must act with a "sense of self restraint."
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most frequently litigated issues in criminal law, from
traffic tickets to first degree murder cases, is whether to suppress incriminating statements made by a suspect during the course of the initial
police contact. In making this determination, a court must balance the
government's interest in effective law enforcement against the protections afforded an individual under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of
the United States Constitution.' In Miranda v. Arizona, 2 the Supreme
Court held that police questioning of a suspect who was "in custody"
must be preceded by the now familiar Miranda advisement, and by a
knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver by the suspect of his fifth
amendment rights. 3 In Terry v. Ohio, 4 handed down two years after Miranda, the Court sanctioned the so-called "stop and frisk," which includes reasonable inquiries by a police officer regarding a suspect's
B.A., Dartmouth College, 1976;J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1980.
B.A., University of Colorado, 1978;J.D., University of Colorado, 1982.
SB.A., Grinnell College, 1971;J.D., Harvard Law School, 1982.
Messrs. Conner, Garnett, and Loewi are Deputy District Attorneys in Denver, Colorado.
1. The fourth amendment governs unreasonable seizures, the fifth amendment embodies the privilege against self-incrimination. The fourth amendment, in pertinent part,
provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ......
U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
The fifth amendment, in pertinent part, provides: "No person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Although the amendments are distinct, they are nevertheless related. Justice Bradley,
for the Court in Boyd v. United States, addressed the intimate relation between the two
amendments:
For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1885).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 478. The fear voiced by ChiefJustice Warren in Miranda was that the custodial setting had a tendency to elicit involuntary confessions by exerting psychological pressures on a defendant. Id. at 448-58, 460-61.
The Miranda advisement would be required whether someone was in custody, or had
his freedom of movement "deprived in any significant way." Id. at 444, 477. Officers need
not advise the suspect in any precise or ritualistic litany; substantial compliance will suffice.
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981). Comment, Crimnal Law." The .'ccnsed Rights to
Miranda ll'anings-Or Their Functional Equivalent, 21 WASHBURN l,.J. 427 (1982).
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
*

*
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activities. 5 The Court held that although based upon less than probable
cause, such a seizure was permitted by the fourth amendment."
There is a pronounced distinction between a "custodial interrogation" under Miranda and a "seizure" under Terry. Miranda was meant to
relieve the hardship imposed upon a defendant when significant restraints of his liberty, comparable to an arrest, exert coercive pressures
on him, yielding an "involuntary" confession in violation of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Terry, on the other
hand, defined the circumstances under which a police officer may detain
and question an individual by applying the "reasonableness" requirement for a "seizure" under the fourth amendment. Despite the apparent lucidity of this distinction, the Colorado Supreme Court, in the
recent case of People v. Johnson,7 equated "seizure" with "custody," maintaining that the standards used to determine each are identical.,
This article will discuss the serious problems created by People v.
Johnson. In equating the fourth amendment concept of seizure with the
fifth amendment concept of custody, the Colorado Supreme Court has
ignored the careful analytical distinctions between Terry and Miranda,
distinctions which were intended to resolve problems arising from two
different types of police-citizen contact. Moreover, if "seizure" is
equivalent to "custody," then Johnson compels the conclusion that Miranda warnings are to be rendered as a predicate to any investigatory
questioning conducted in the course of a Terry stop. Such a conclusion
squarely conflicts with the teachings of the United States Supreme
Court, as most recently articulated in Berkemer v. McCarty,9 and threatens
to emasculate the Terry stop as an effective tool of law enforcement.

I.

MVIRAND..I,

TERRY AND BERKEMER: THE SUPREME COURT GRAPPLES

WITH INTERROGATION DURING DETENTION

Few decisions are of greater importance to the criminal practitioner
than Miranda and Terry. Although each arose from a distinct factual situation, and were decided under different constitutional doctrines, it is
nevertheless possible to misconstrue the two rulings and their applications. This is due, in part, to the fact that there is no clear line between a
simple Terry stop and a custodial interrogation under Miranda; the possibility for overlap is as great as the fact patterns are diverse. A review of
Miranda, Terry, and their progeny will clarify their application and pro5. Id. at 30. The issue of the admissibility of statements made by a suspect during
the course of a Tervy stop has not been frequently litigated. This is due in part to the fact
that Terry stop cases generally deal with the suppression of physical evidence seized pursuant to the pat-down search or frisk. Similarly, most inculpatory statements are made following actual arrest of the suspect. See Weisgall, Stop, Searic. and Seize: The Eiiieigin
Doctrine of Founded Suspicion, 9 U.S.F.I.. REv. 219 (1974).

6. 392 U.S. at 22.
7. 671 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1983), afd,681 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1984) (aflirming trial Court's
holding on remand).

8. 671 P.2d at 962.
9. 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984).
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vide the needed context within which the Colorado Supreme Court's
decisions must be viewed.
Four cases were consolidated for appeal in Miranda v. Arizona, I0 all
involving self-incriminating statements made by individuals while in custody and subject to police interrogation. I I In each case, the defendant's
statements were made before any advisement concerning the rights of
an accused was given.' 2 Two years earlier, the Court had addressed a
similar situation in Escobedo v. Illinois,13 ruling that certain incriminating
statements made by a defendant during a custodial interrogation were
constitutionally inadmissible on the grounds that the failure to apprise
the defendant of his right to a lawyer and his right to remain silent was a
denial of his sixth amendment right to counsel. 1 4 In Miranda, the Warren Court granted certiorari to further develop the rule regarding incriminating statements elicited during a custodial interrogation and to
provide concrete guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to
follow. 15

The Supreme Court in Miranda held that before a suspect who was
in custody could be subjected to interrogation, he must be advised of his
right to remain silent and of his right to either retained or appointed
counsel. Furthermore, if a defendant should choose to waive his rights,
that waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. 16 The Court in
Miranda perceived that the traditional safeguard of voluntariness under
the due process clause simply was not sufficient to protect against the
evils inherent in long term, incommunicado interrogation at a police station. 17 The Court quoted at length from various of "the most recent
and representative"'

8

of police manuals to illustrate the pervasive prac-

tice employed by police in custodial interrogations of obtaining a psychological advantage over a suspect so as to elicit a self-incriminating
response. The Court nevertheless recognized that volunteered confessions are still a viable aspect of law enforcement, and such statements
are admissible in evidence when freely given without coercive pressures. I ' However, when a suspect is both in custody and subject to in10. Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965); Miranda v. Arizona, 98
Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721 (1965); California v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P.2d 97, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (1965); Vignera v. New York, 15 N.Y.2d 970, 259 N.Y.S.2d 857, 207 N.E.2d 527
(1965).
II. Miranda, 384 U.S. 491-98.
12. id.
13. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
14. Id. at 490 (holding that when a police investigation has gone beyond a general
inquiry, and has subsequently become focused on a particular suspect who has been denied a request for counsel, and also has not been advised of his rights, self-incriminating
statements made during the course of a custodial investigation are inadmissible).
15. liranda. 384 U.S. at 443. Unlike Esrobedo. the inquiry in Viraildn was directed at
the privilege against selfincrimination.
16. Id. at 478.
17. Id. at 444, 477.
18. Id. at 448. See al.,o F. lNBslAt&J. REID. (RIMINA.
INTERRO;A'T ION AN) CONFESSIONS
(1962): C. OIARA. FtNtD)AMENTAI.S O CRIMINAL INVESrI(;AION (1956).
19. 384 U.S. at 457-58. Prior to Miranda, the test for admission of cotlessions was
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terrogation, the Court concluded that Miranda safeguards apply.-2
The Miranda decision held that warnings are required whenever a
suspect is "deprived of his freedom in any significant way." '2 1 The trend
immediately thereafter was to interpret Miranda as applying only to station house questioning because the primary concern was with longterm, incommunicado interrogation. The Supreme Court clarified that
Miranda was not confined to the station house in Orozco v. Texas, 22 in
which it held that Miranda warnings should have been given to a suspect
who was awakened at four a.m. in his bedroom and immediately ques23
tioned by four armed and uniformed police officers.
By contrast, in Oregon v. Mathiason,2 4 the Court clarified that even
questioning conducted at the station house is not necessarily "custodial." In Mathiason, the Court dealt with the admissibility of inculpatory
statements made by the defendant to police. 2 5 A burglary victim gave
police the name of the only suspect of whom she could thinkMathiason. 2 6 Three weeks after the crime, an officer attempted to contact this suspect but was unsuccessful and left his card and a note at the
27
defendant's residence requesting that the defendant call police.
Mathiason did call and was asked to meet with the officer at a police
station that same day. 28 The defendant complied. 29 In a room with the
door closed, the officer told the defendant that he was not under
arrest. 30 The officer then asked the defendant about the burglary and
falsely told the defendant that his fingerprints had been found at the
whether they were "voluntary." Kamisar, Involuntary Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728
(1968).
20. 384 U.S. at 467. The question of what constitutes interrogation was resolved in
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). The Supreme Court found that interrogation
means any statement by a police officer which is designed to elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 301. See also People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583, 589 (Colo. 1981); Grano, Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM,. L. REV. 1 (1979); Kamisar,
Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation?" When Does It Matter?, 67
GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (1978); White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of
His Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (1979); White, Interrogation Without Questions
Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1980);
Note. Rhode Island v. Innis: A Heavv Blow to the Rights of a Suspect in Custody; and No "Christian Burial" to Ease the Passage,41 LA. L. REV. 928, 929 (1981); Note, The Meaning of"Intei'ogation" Under Miranda v. Arizona: Rhode Island v. Innis, 12 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 725, 734

(198 1); Comment. Rhode Island v. Innis-CriminalPocediiie-FifthAiendnienit-interrogatioi
in Violation of Miranda Includes Not Only Direct Questioning But also Conduct Police Officers Knew or
Should Have Known Ilould Elicit an Incriminating Response, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 (1981);
Comment, Criminal Procedure Defining Interrogation Under Miranda, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 434,
441 (1981).
21. 384 U.S. at 478.
22. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
23. 394 U.S. at 326. For a discussion of Oio-co. see Comment, Custodial Interrogation
and Res Gestae 'nder Miranda, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 88 (1970).
24. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
25. Id. at 493.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28.
i.
29. Id.
30. 1d.
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scene of the crime. 3 ' The defendant then confessed. 3 2
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, upheld the use of the
defendant's confession against him at trial, relying heavily on the fact
that the defendant's freedom of movement was not inhibited by the police and that after having confessed he was permitted to leave the police
station. 33 As a result, the Court concluded that "Mathiason was not in
custody 'or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' -34 The Court went on to note that
such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which
Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes
that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a coercive
environment. Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a
police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of
the fact that the police officer is a part of a law enforcement
system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged
with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer
35
Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.
Finally, the Court held that a Miranda advisement is not required merely
because the questioning transpires at a police station or "because the
questioned person is one whom the police suspect." 13 6 The facts of
Mathiason present circumstances more coercive and more custodial than
the situation that confronted the Colorado Supreme Court in Johnson,
yet the Mathiason Court recognized that specific factual circumstances
that fall short of custody do not call for an advisement of rights. The
seminal case of Terry v. Ohio illustrates this proposition.
In Terry, a veteran police officer observed Terry and two others en37
gaged in suspicious activity focused upon a particular store window.
After confronting the suspects, asking for their names, and receiving no
response, the officer abruptly patted Terry down, thereby discovering a
pistol in a pocket of Terry's overcoat. 3 8 A subsequent search disclosed
that Terry was carrying a .38 caliber revolver and that one of Terry's
cohorts also possessed a concealed weapon. 3 9 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the search violated the defendants' fourth amendment rights. 40 The broader issue before the Court
was when, if ever, might a police officer detain a suspect to investigate or
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 493-94.
34. Id. at 495.
35. 1(1.
36. Id. See also Note, Custodial Interrogation After Oregon v. Mathiason, 1978 )1KE L.J.
1497, 1499, 1505 (1978); Comment, "In Custod?'" .4 Relaxation of Miranda. 23 1oy. I.
REv. 1057, 1059-60 (1977); Comment, Ointnal Procedure-Defining "Custodial Iterogation""
For Piposes of Miranda: Oregon v. Mathiason, 57 OR. . REv. 184 (1977).
37. 392 U.S. at 6.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 8.
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prevent a crime without probable cause for arrest. 4 I
The Court first laid an analytical foundation, holding that every
stop and frisk is governed by the fourth amendment:
It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
"seized" that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture
of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of
the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his'4 2or her
body in an attempt to find weapons is not a "search."
Applying a fourth amendment analysis, the Court held that any involuntary detention by a police officer must meet the fourth amendment requirement of "reasonableness, ' 4 3 which involves "balancing the need
for the search [or seizure] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails."' 44 Addressing the facts of Terry, Chief Justice Warren
stated that the officer must advance "specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." '45 The Court applied a two-part analysis: whether
the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstance which first justified the
intrusion.
The Court did not hold, as Justice Douglas argued in his dissent,
that only an arrest based on probable cause could be a reasonable detention under the fourth amendment. 4 6 Rather, it deferred to the government's interest in "effective crime prevention and detection" and the
need to authorize "necessarily swift [police] action predicated upon onthe-spot observation of the officers on the beat."'4 7 The Court implicitly
acknowledged that a police officer must be able to forcibly detain a citizen, even without probable cause to arrest, for effective crime prevention. However, because Terry not only permits a pat-down search and a
brief seizure of a person, but also "reasonable inquiries" of that person, 4 8 how does Terry relate to the privilege against self-incrimination
4 I. Id. at 10. Terpy has received substantial attention in the academic community. See,
e.g., LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Comstitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67
Micii. L. REV. 40 (1968). LaFave addressed the course of a Terty stop and determined that
generally, such situations were not custodial because the suspect was not "swept away" to
"unfamiliar surroundings," and then held and questioned incommunicado. Id. at 95-106.
See aLto Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: l'hat Constitutes Custodial intef'ogation?. 25 S.C.L. REV. 699 (1974) (trend toward admittance of statements made during onthe-scene questioning). See generally Platt, The Limits of Stop and Frisk-Questions O'answered
by Terry, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 419, 433-35 (1968) (reviewing trends immediately after Terry):
Stern, Stop and Fiisk: ,In HistoricalAnsU'erto a lodern Problem, 58J. CRIM. .. CRIMINOLOGY &
'o.CE Sci. 532 (1967) (advocating that stops with questioning significandy deterred criminal activity during the pre-7erir era).
42. 392 U.S. at 16. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (stopping ofa
vehicle on the highway is a "seizure"); Comment, Delaware v. Prouse: Dilution o/ Fointh
limendmnent Rights it# Constitutional Balancinkg, 57 DENx. .1. 345 (1980).
43. 392 U.S. at 19-22.
44. /d. at 21 (citing Caniara v. Municipal Ct_, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 35-39 (Douglas..].. dissenting).
47. Id. at 20.
48. I. at 30.
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addressed in Miranda?
The extent of the inquiries permitted under Terry remained unclear
for a number of years. The United States Supreme Court touched on
this issue in Florida v. Royer:4 9 "Although not expressly authorized in
Terry, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce....

was unequivocal in saying that

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure
'5
for the purpose of questioning limited to the purpose of the stop. 0
Yet, Royer did not resolve the question: if a predicate for Miranda is that
the suspect be in custody or have his freedom deprived in any significant
way, and Terry permits a forcible detention of a suspect for investigation
and reasonable inquiries, when does the forcible detention in Terry become a "significant deprivation of freedom" for the purposes of Miranda, thus making advisement of rights mandatory?
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 5 1 the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Marshall, addressed this issue in the context of a routine
traffic stop of an automobile. 52 In Berkemer, the defendant was stopped
for investigation of driving under the influence of either alcohol or
drugs. 53 Prior to arrest, but while forcibly detained, the defendant was
asked several questions and he made incriminating replies. 54 He was
then arrested and taken to the police station where he was questioned
again and made further damaging statements. 5 5 At no time was he ad56
vised of his Miranda rights.
The Court suppressed all statements in response to interrogation
made after the arrest because there was no Miranda advisement. 5 7 It did
not, however, suppress the statements made during the course of the
stop. 5 8 Analogizing the traffic stop with a Terry stop, the Court held that

a traffic stop itself was a seizure under the fourth amendment. Justice
Marshall noted:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and the
49. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
50. Id. at 498 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975)).
Although Brignoni-Ponce involved a border search to asertain the status of a vehicle's passengers, it has consistently been cited as a Terry case without reference to its particular fact
pattern. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
51. 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984).
52. Strictly speaking, the Berkemer opinion was not unanimous. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but felt the issue was not properly before the Court. 104 S. Ct.
3153-54 (Stevensj., concurring). Justice Stevens believed the sole issue on certiorari was

whether .liranda was applicable to misdemeanor arrests. He was distressed by the fact that
Berkemer s holding went considerably further. While Berkemer held that .1irandadid apply to
misdemeanor arrests, the issue of whether the full panoply of criminal procedure rights

accompany traffic stops or arrests is an interesting one. For discussions of some of these
issues, see Comment, Search Incident to Custodial .. rmest for Traffic Iiolation, II AM. CRIM. ..
REv. 801 (1973); Comment.4 Lawful Custodial.Inrestfor a Traffic I iolation
Justifies
a Full .Search
oJ'the
.Irrestee. I I Hous. L. REv. 1283 (1973); Annot., 25 A.L.R. 3d 1076 (1969).
53. 104 S.Ct. at 3142.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
/d.
Id.

57. Id. at 3148.
58. Id.at 3152.
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passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of
most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policeman's signal to
stop one's car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission .... Certainly few motorists would feel free either
to disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the
scene of a
59
traffic stop without being told they might do so.
The defendant argued that Miranda warnings should have been
given prior to the questions asked during the traffic stop because the
60
defendant had been "deprived of his freedom in a significant way."
The Court emphatically rejected this contention. It held:
we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent.
[W]e have held [that] a policeman who lacks probable cause but
whose "observations lead him reasonably to suspect" that a
particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to "investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion."... "[T]he
stop and inquiry must be 'reasonably related in scope to the
just*ication for their Initiation.' " Typically, this means that the
officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to
determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. . . .The comparatively
nonthreateningcharacterof detentions of this sort explains the absence of
any suggestion
in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates
6
of Miranda. '
Berkemer clarified what was implicit in the Terry and Miranda doctrines as they developed: that when determining the applicability of Miranda to an initial contact short of arrest, practicing lawyers and trial
judges must do more than ask whether the defendant was free to leave,
or seized under the fourth amendment. The issue that must be addressed is whether the person detained has also been "subjected to
treatment that renders him 'in custody' for practical purposes." 6 Colorado decisions addressing this issue have sent practitioners mixed
messages.
II.

PEoPL. v JoILxS.vo: COLORADO EQUATES CUSTODY WITH SEIZURE

With its decision in People v. Johnson,"3 the Colorado Supreme Court
appeared poised to require Miranda warnings prior to any questioning
made in the course of an investigatory stop. In order to understand how
the Colorado court arrived at a position seemingly in conflict with that
of the Berkemer Court, it is necessary to briefly examine the Colorado
59. Id. at 3149.
60. Id. at 3148.
61. Id. at 3149-51 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 422
U.S. 873, 881 (1975)).
62. 104 S. Ct. at 3151.
63. 671 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1983). qlr[d,
681 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1984).
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doctrinal history of both the fourth amendment concept of the investigatory stop and the fifth amendment concept of custody.
A.

The Colorado Supreme Court Adopts and Interprets Terry.

The investigatory stop in Colorado was sanctioned three years after
Terry in the seminal case of Stone v. People.64 Impliedly following Terry,
the Colorado Supreme Court held that although an investigatory stop
was a "seizure" under the fourth amendment, such a stop could be
made for limited purposes upon less than probable cause. 6 5 While Stone
specifically authorized police questioning only to ascertain a suspect's
name and address, the court was quick to recognize, as had the commentators, that "the right to interrogate during a 'stop' is the essence of
Terry and its progeny.' '66 Only four months after Stone, the court further
noted that "there is an area of proper police practice in which less than
67
probable cause may still justify temporary detention for questioning."
The Colorado court's enthusiasm for the Stone stop as a tool for
police questioning soon was carried to unreasonable lengths. In People
V. Stevens, 6 8 a woman suspected of smuggling marijuana into the state
penitentiary was taken from the prison lobby to a conference room,
where she was questioned for one half-hour by several prison officials
and subsequently made a confession. 6 9 Over a vigorous dissent byJustice Erickson (in which he emphasized his apparent pique with a fortyone case string cite), the court held that the confession did not result
from an illegal arrest made without probable cause, but rather was derived through proper questioning during a "temporary detention for
field investigation.' '70 In a subsequent habeas corpus action, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals needed only a short paragraph to "dispel any
7
notion that this was a Terry-type detention." '
As the composition of the court changed after Stevens, the limits of
the so-called Stone stop were more sharply, and narrowly, delineated. In
cases such as People v. Tooker, 7 2 People v. Schreyer,73 and People v.
64. 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971).
65. Id. at 508. The language in Stone does not precisely mirror that of Teiny. Under
Slone, to lawfully detain an individual for questioning, the court created the "Stone area,"
announcing the following standard: "(1) the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that
the individual has committed, or is about to commit, a crime; (2) the purpose of the detention must be reasonable; and (3) the character of the detention must be reasonable when
considered in light of the purpose." 174 Colo. at 509, 485 P.2d at 497.
66. J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 10:15 (1982) (quoting United States v. Oates, 560
F.2d 45, 63 (2d Cir. 1977)).
67. People v. Gurule, 175 Colo. 512, 515, 488 P.2d 889, 890 (1971) (emphasis
added).
68. 183 Colo. 399, 517 P.2d 1336 (1973), re,'d sub nora., Stevens v. Wilson, 534 F.2d
867 (10th Cir. 1976).
69. 183 Colo. at 402, 517 P.2d at 1337-38.
70. 183 Colo. at 405, 517 P.2d at 1339.
71.

534 F.2d at 870 (state court erred in determining voluntariness of confession, not

ihe illegality of arrest).
72. 198 Colo. 496, 601 P.2d 1388 (1979).
73. 640 11.2d 1147 (Colo. 1982).
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Hazelhurst,7 4 the court repeatedly emphasized that only a brief line of
questioning is permitted in a Stone stop. 75 In none of these cases did the
court even hint that such questioning in a Stone stop amounted to custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. 76 Indeed, a sentence in
Schreyer seemed to indicate just the opposite. "Terry," the court said
through Justice Erickson, "upheld the lawfulness of certain brief police
stops based upon a standard of less than probable cause for the traditional arrest or custodial interrogation."77 Thus, as late as 1982, the court
seemed to be distinguishing between an investigatory stop and custodial
interrogation. Within a year that distinction would be considerably
blurred.
B.

Custodial Interrogation in Colorado

The Colorado history of "custodial interrogation" has been similarly tortuous. Although Miranda had replaced the "focus of investigation" test of Escobedo v. Illinois78 with a standard requiring police officers
to advise suspects of their rights after being "taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way,' 79 early
Colorado Miranda-tvpe cases combined the two tests. In People v. Or,80
for example, the court cited both Miranda and Escobedo in suppressing
statements made by the defendant because "the investigation at this
time 'focused' on the defendant and only the defendant." 8 1 In People v.
Algien, 8 2 however, the court strictly construed the Miranda analysis and
stated that, in determining whether someone was in custody, "the objective test should be applied, that is, whether under the circumstances a
74. 662 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1983).
75. As stated in Shreyer: "Any temporary police detention made for the purpose of
questioning a suspect who might otherwise escape is limited to determining an individual's
identity or obtaining an explanation of his behavior." 640 P.2d at 1150 (citations
omitted).
76. Arguably, such a hint did occur in People v. Pancoast, 659 P.2d 1348 (Colo.
1982), where Justice Quinn (now Chief Justice) remanded the case to the district court to
determine if a proper seizure had occurred. He clarified the appropriate standard by
stating:
['1]he issue whether a person has been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment must be resolved by an objective standard-that is whether "in view of all
the circumstance surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." This objective standard is consistent with
Colorado case law on the meaning of "custody" for purposes of the Viraiida
warning.
659 P.2d at 1350 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) and
citing People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468 (1972) and People v. Marioneaux, 618
P.2d 678 (Colo. App. 1980)).
'he distinction between the objective standard to determine custody and the objective standard to determine seizure is recognized, although not explicitly, in I W. IxFAv'E &
. lSRAIE, CRIMINAl. PROCEDURE § 6.6(c) (1984) (noting the similarity between the two
standards but not equating the two).
77. 640 P.2d at 1149 (emphasis added).
78. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). For a discussion ofEsobedo, see spra notes 13-14 and acconipanying text.
79. .lirawla, 384 U.S. at 444.
80. 172 Colo. 253, 472 P.2d 123 (1970).
81. Id. at 260, 472 P.2d at 127.
82. 180 Colo. I,501 P.2d 468 (1972).
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reasonable man would believe himself to be deprived of his freedom in
83
any significant way."
Three years later, then ChiefJustice Pringle authored an opinion in
People v. Parada84 which should have ended the confusion once and for
all:
[W]hether Miranda warnings are required in a particular situation depends on a threshold determination that the interrogation is "custodial." While "custodial" does not necessarily
refer to a police station investigation ...

it does require that the

interrogation be conducted under circumstances where a person "has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.... Thus, the thrust of
Miranda substituted the "custodial interrogation" requirement
for the "focus of the investigation" test which had earlier been
enunciated ....

85

Yet, less than one year after Parada, the Colorado Supreme Court
86
seemed to drift back to an Escobedo-type analysis. In People v. Thornton,
the only Colorado case dealing directly with the issue of whether Miranda warnings are required in a Stone stop, police stopped a car for a
traffic infraction, a vehicle which matched the description of the "getaway car" in a recent burglary of a construction site. 8 7 Noticing some
wet, mud-covered welding equipment in the back seat, the officer questioned the driver, who claimed that the equipment was his and had been
in the car all day. 8 8 The driver was then arrested. 89 Justice Erickson's
opinion for the court, while acknowledging that the officer did not have
probable cause at the time of the stop, nevertheless concluded that
[t]he police did ... possess sufficient information to raise a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of this vehicle may have
been involved in the reported burglary. When the police saw
the acetylene tanks and other welding equipment in the back
seat of the car, further inquiry was in order. The responses of
the defendant were made during the investigatory, not the accusatory
stage of this criminal proceeding, and the Miranda warnings were,
83.

Id. at 7, 501 P.2d at 471.

84. 188 Colo. 230, 533 P.2d 1121 (1975).
85. Id. at 233-34, 533 P.2d at 1122-23 (citations omitted) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 444). The Colorado Supreme Court went on to note that
[slince neither party asserts that Parada was "taken into custody" at the time of
questioning, the question before this Court is whether she was "'deprived of (her)
freedom of action in any significant way." Resolution of this question turns on
whether she reasonably believed that she was not free to leave.... In Hall,Judge
Friendly, writing for the court, explained this test. He stated: "[In the absence
of actual arrest, something must be said or done by the authorities, either in their
manner of approach or in the tone or extent of their questioning, which indicates
that they would not have heeded a request to depart or to allow the suspect to do
so.
Id. at 1122-23 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 545 (2d
Cir. 1969)).

86. 190 Colo. 397, 547 P.2d 1278 (1976).
87. Id. at 399, 547 P.2d at 1280.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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therefore, not necessary.9 0
In subsequent cases, however, the court resumed reliance on the objective test for establishing custody set forth in Algien " ' and Parada,)2 and
such was the state of the law when the Colorado Supreme Court decided
People v. Johnson9 3 late in 1983.
C.

The Fifth is the Fourth and the Fourth isthe Fifth: People v. Johnson

In People v. Johnson, a plain clothes sheriff's investigator went to the
place of employment of one Evan Dean Johnson, who had been named
by a burglary victim as a possible suspect. 94 The investigator, who had
no visible weapon and was dressed in plain clothes, asked Johnson to
step outside, and he complied. 9 5 The female investigator identified herself as a law enforcement officer and told him she desired to talk to him
about the burglary. 9 6 After the defendant, in response to a question,
denied any knowledge of the burglary, the officer asked the defendant if
he would submit to a polygraph test.9 7 "The defendant looked down at

his feet for ten to twenty seconds, appeared as if he was going to cry,
and said 'I guess I might as well tell you, I did it.' -98 The defendant was
immediately advised pursuant to Miranda, signed a waiver form regarding those rights, and gave the investigator a written statement admitting
his involvement in the crime. 9 9 After making that statement, he was
00
taken from his place of employment to jail.1
In ruling to suppress this statement and a written confession made
subsequent to Miranda warnings, the trial court made no finding as to
whether the defendant was in custody, basing its decision simply on the
notion that an advisement must be given "before someone asks that ultimate question."''
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for determination of whether the
defendant was in custody at the time he incriminated himself.' 0 2 The
court reviewed several United States and Colorado Supreme Court
90. Id. at 400, 547 P.2d at 1280 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thornton has
not been explicitly overruled. But see People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583, 590 n. 12 (Colo. 1981)
(court declines to consider whether police considered the defendant a suspect; Thoniton
distinguished on its facts), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1182 (1982). Lee has recently been cited
with approval on its facts. See People v. Clements, 665 P.2d 624, 625 (Colo. 1983) (anticipating Berkemer in holding Miranda warnings not required in routine traffic stops). The
court has soundly rejected as misplaced its reliance on the investigatory-accusatory distinction. See Lee, 630 P.2d at 588-90.
91. 172 Colo. 253, 260, 472 P.2d 123, 127 (1970).
92. 190 Colo. 397, 400, 547 P.2d 1278, 1280 (1976). See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez,
198 Colo. 118, 119, 596 P.2d 759, 760 (1979).
93. 671 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1983), aft'd, 681 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1984).
94. 671 P.2d at 959.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 959-60.
99. Id. at 960.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 965.
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cases defining custody, reiterrating that the objective test of Algien and
Paradaapplied when making a custody determination. ' 0 3 Then, prefacing the court's forthcoming equation of "seizure" with "custody," it
asserted:
This objective standard is consistent with the decisions of this
court and the United States Supreme Court which construe the
word "seizure" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
[The] test is whether under the circumstances surrounding the
incident a reasonable
man would have believed that he was not
0 4
free to leave.1

By this statement, the court had imported fourth amendment doctrine
to the analysis of the fifth amendment custody issue. It did so without
apparent consideration of the very different policies which underly the
two amendments. Rather, the court seemed to "accord talismanic
power"' 1 5 to the phrase "whether a reasonable man would have believed that he was not free to leave," the test which the court had
adopted in the fifth amendment context in People v. Parada,106 and in the
fourth amendment context in People v. Pancoast.10 7 Nor did the Johnson
court leave any room to believe that it was merely analogizing; its equation of the two concepts was emphatic: "the standards to be employed
in determining the meaning of 'custody' under the Fifth Amendment for
purposes of Miranda and 'seizure' for purposes of the Fourth Amendment are identical... "108 Although the objective standard had previously been applied by the Colorado court to determine both custody
and seizure questions, the court's equation of the two concepts obscures
and conflicts with the teachings of the United States Supreme Court as
exemplified by Berkemer.
If, afterJohnson, "seizure" and "custody" are synonymous, then the
central question remains: are Miranda warnings required prior to any
questioning in a Stone stop? A Stone stop is, of course, a seizure under
the fourth amendment,' 0 9 and the test for determining whether a
103. Id. at 960-61.
104. Id. at 961 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)): People v.
Pancoast, 659 P.2d 1348 (Colo. 1982); People v.Bookman, 646 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1982)).
105. Berkemer v. McCarthy, 104 S. Ct. at 3149.
106. 188 Colo. at 234, 533 P.2d at 1123.
107. 659 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Colo. 1982) (objective test applied to determine timing of
defendant's arrest). See also People v. Lewis, 659 P.2d 676, 681 n.3 (Colo. 1983).
108. 67i P.2d at 962 (emphasis added). On remand, "[tihe trial court found the conduct of the investigator was not such as to indicate to a reasonable person that he was in
custody, with the exception, however, of the question regarding the polygraph exam." Id.
Additionally, the trial court stated that "[a]ll but the specific question [concerning the
polygraph request] that we are dealing with was not that coercive .... People v. Johnson,
681 P.2d 524, 525 n.3 (Colo. 1984) aff'g 671 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1983). The court's brief per
cunamo decision affirmed the trial court's ruling suppressing the admission because its finding that he was in custody was "supported by the record." Id. at 525. Thus, the court had
endorsed a ruling that a mere question, absent any indicia of coercion, could render a
situation as "custodial." One month later, however, the court held that it was error to
focus "essentially on one circumstance only" in determining whether a suspect is in custody. See People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 202-03 (Colo. 1984).
109. See Stone v.People, 174 Colo. at 508, 485 P.2d at 497; seealso supra text accompanying notes 64-77.
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seizure has occurred applies to Stone stops as well as arrests. As the
court said in Lewis v. People, I10 "Pancoast and Bookman make clear that we
adopted Mendenhall's objective or reasonable person standard to all
forms of police intrusions constituting a 'seizure' of the person, includIl
ing temporary detentions.""'
Now, after Johnson, the question that
must be answered by the Colorado Supreme Court is when will Miranda
warnings be required?
The question, whether Miranda warnings are required in a Stone
1
stop, was neatly framed, though not answered, in People v. Wells. 12
There a police officer on an early morning routine patrol of a warehouse
complex observed that the defendant "had backed up his vehicle, with
the trunk open, against a tractor-trailer and appeared to be pulling on
the gate handle of the trailer."' 13 Moments later, as the defendant was
leaving, "[t]he officer drove to the side of the defendant's vehicle, rolled
down his window, and told the defendant to 'hold on a second.' " 14
The officer then asked what the defendant was doing there and the defendant replied that he was looking for a job.'5 An identification check
disclosed an outstanding warrant for the defendant, who was arrested
and searched.' 16 Further investigation disclosed that the tractor-trailer
l1 7
had been entered unlawfully.
The defendant questioned only the validity of the initial stop, a
challenge which the court rejected.' 18 In a footnote, however, the court
pointedly stated that, as the issue had not been raised before the district
court, it could not consider "whether the defendant's statement to [the
officer] at the scene was the result of custodial interrogation which
should have been preceded by a proper advisement of the defendant's
Miranda rights."' 19 The court then cited Miranda and Johnson. 120 In
110. 659 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1983).
111. Id. at 681. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), involved a confrontation between federal agents and the defendant in the public concourse of an airport.
The Court applied the objective standard in determining that the circumstance surrounding the contact did not amount to a seizure. Id. at 553-56.
112. 676 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1984).
113. Id.at 700.
114. Id.
115. Id.

116. Id

117. Id.
118. The court stated:
The total circumstances observed by the officer immediately prior to the stopthe defendant's physical action in attempting to forcibly open the trailer door and
his obvious effort to leave the scene as the officer entered the parking lot-constitute a sufficiently particularized basis in fact for stopping the defendant in order
to briefly investigate the circumstances of his conduct.
Id. at 702. But see People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272 (1983) ("Even when the act of running
[from police] is motivated by an effort to avoid contact with the police, it still does rlot
constitute the type of specific and articulable fact that is constitutionally sufficient to justify
a stop."); People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo.) (stop to determine whether burglary
has been committed when no criminal acts have been reported to police is constitutionally
impermissible), cert. granted, Colorado v. Quintero, 103 S. Ct. 3535, cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct.
543 (1983) (due to death of defendant).
119. 676 P.2d at 702 n.3.
120. Id. at 702.
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light of Johnson, the trial court could have only answered the question
posed by the footnote in the affirmative. Thus, afterJohnson, but before
Berkener, the Colorado Supreme Court appeared poised to require that
police officers, before any inquiry into reasonably suspicious activity,
must advise suspects of the right to remain silent. 12 1 The Johnson holding, if interpreted literally, presents a threat to traditional law enforcement procedures in Colorado by effectively eliminating the distinction
between seizure and custody, potentially creating fifth amendment protections in situations not contemplated by the Supreme Court in Miranda and its progeny.
III.

JOH\soN's PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AFTER BERKEME)

The confusion engendered in the lower courts by the uncertain validity of the Johnson analysis has been evident in recent decisions of the
Colorado Court of Appeals. In People v. Harris,12 2 fragments of a parking light scattered about the scene of a fatal accident led a police officer
to suspect that the defendant's car was involved in the fatal accident on
the previous day. 123 The officer followed the defendant's car to a parking lot. The officer requested the defendant's identification and asked
him whether he had been involved in any accidents in the last twentyfour hours. 124 The defendant's response led to several more questions. 2 5 The court of appeals held that the trial court had erred "as a
matter of law" in finding that the defendant was not in custody during
this conversation. 1 26 As support, the court cited Pancoast for its view
that "[a] person is in custody for Miranda purposes if, in view of all the
circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free
127
to leave."'
Oddly, the court ignored Johnson entirely, citing Pancoast, a fourth
amendment seizure case as support for the fifth amendment custody
standard. The court's ruling in Harris is also at odds with precedent in
that it seemingly relies on the officer's state of mind in determining the
custody issue. 128 Thus, while the result in Harris is not necessarily erroneous, since the defendant was possibly in custody, the analysis applied
by the court clearly was not in accord with precedent.
Even more striking was the Colorado Court of Appeals' attempt to
121. Even before Berkemer. such a ruling would have been at odds with the overwhelming weight of precedent on this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286
(9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1211, (1983). See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND

SEIZURE § 9.2 & n.66 (Supp. 1984) ("The courts have generally concluded that police
questioning outside the station house is not 'custodial'..."); 2 W. RINGEI., SEARCHES AN)
SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 27.3(a)(3) & n.55 (1984) ("Courts are also virtually
unanimous in finding that questioning of a suspect during an investigative stop authorized
under Tei, v. Ohio . . . does not meet the requirement of custodial interrogation.").
122. 763 P.2d 667 (Colo. App. 1985).

123. Id. at 669-70.
124.

Id.

125. Id.
126. Id. at 669.
127. Id.
128.

Id. at 670.
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wrestle with Johnson in People v. Koolbeck. 129 In Koolbeck, the defendant
was asked to get into the police officer's car while the officer investigated
a burglary.' 3 0 The defendant was not free to leave. In response to general inquiries, the defendant made some arguably incriminating statements."3' The court cited bothJohnson and Pancoast as the basis for its
employment of an objective standard: "whether a person has been
'seized' under the fourth amendment and thus is in custody for the purposes of the fifth amendment is an objective standard."' 132 Yet, the
court then held that the brief detention involved was a Terry/Stone
stop,] 33 which meant that although the defendant was not free to leave,
and therefore had been seized, his seizure was temporary and did not
amount to an arrest. Following through on its misplaced analysis, the
court concluded that the police officer's detention was a lawful Stone
stop, and therefore, "a Miranda warning was not necessary for the questions asked."' 13 4 While this is an arguably correct interpretation of
Berkemer, it is totally inconsistent with Johnson. If seizure equals custody,
then Miranda warnings would have logically been required in Koolbeck.
Perhaps Judge Babcock, author of the Koolbeck opinion, was making a
good faith effort to reach the correct result, but failed to force the aberrant holding of Johnson into the orthodox mold.
People v. Black,' 35 indicates that the Colorado Supreme Court is unaware of the effect of Berkemer on its holding in Johnson. In Black, the court
suppressed statements made by a suspect at the scene of a vehicular
crime, correcting a trial court that had resurrected the "focus of the investigation" test from Escobedo. 136 Correctly, the court stated that Mi3 7
randa had substituted a custodial analysis for Escobedo's "focus" test.1
Citing Johnson twice, the court held that the subjective mindset of the
police officer is simply not relevant to the issue of custody.1 3 8 In a footnote, the court cited Berkemer in support of this proposition. 139 There is
no recognition in the opinion that Berkemer had effectively rejectedJohnson's holding that seizure and custody are identical.
CONCLUSION

The validity of Johnson is at best uncertain in light of the United
States Supreme Court's ruling in Berkemer. Although the Colorado court
is free to interpret the Colorado Constitution more strictly than the
United States Constitution, and has not hesitated to do so in the past,'14
129. 703 P.2d 673 (Colo. App. 1985).
130. Id. at 667.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 668.
133. Id. (citing People v. Shreyer, 640 P.2d 1147 (Colo. 1982)).
134. Id.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

698 P.2d 766 (Colo. 1985).
Id. at 767.
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id. at 768 n.6.
See, e.g., People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811 (Colo. 1985) (extending fourth amendment
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People v. Johnson was decided under the federal Constitution and therefore appears to be an inadvertent mixing of doctrinal analysis rather
than a bold departure from federal precedent. To remedy this flawed
interpretation, the Colorado Supreme Court must either recognize its
error in Johnson and adopt an analysis consistent with orthodox
Terry/Mirandadoctrine as illustrated by Berkemer, or embraceJohnson and
anchor its equation of seizure with custody as the law under the Colorado Constitution. The latter would effectively emasculate the "stop
and frisk" as a law enforcement tool.
While the Johnson holding affects only one issue of criminal procedure, those unfamiliar with criminal litigation may not appreciate the
practical significance of the problem created by the case. Every criminal
trial lawyer knows that statements made during the first few moments of
contact with a police officer are crucial. A person's off-hand remark, or
response to a police officer's general questioning, made when the fear of
being caught is most intense and before time has given an opportunity
to craft a careful explanation, can be essential in proving a criminal
charge. Koolbeck, Wells, Harris,and Berkemer all provide vivid illustrations
of this fact. The admissibility of such statements is almost always conditioned on applying the distinct teachings of Terry and Miranda.
The Colorado Supreme Court should recognize Johnson as a deviation from traditional Terry/Miranda analysis which significantly changes
police conduct in "stop and frisk" situations. Acknowledging Johnson's
conflict with entrenched practice, the Colorado Supreme Court should
give lower courts and practicing lawyers some additional guidance. As it
stands now,Johnson theoretically requires police officers to "Mirandize"
virtually anyone they contact under even remotely suspicious circumstances. 14 1 This result could hardly have been contemplated by the
Supreme Court in Miranda. Indeed, ChiefJustice Warren in Terry recognized that the "stop and frisk" is a legitimate investigative tool that carefully balances society's need for law enforcement against the individual's
14 2
right to be left alone.
Acknowledging the Stone stop as an effective tool of law enforcement, the Colorado Supreme Court should qualify Johnson and correct
its erroneous ruling. Such a course would return Colorado to a more
sensible interpretation of fourth and fifth amendment precedent, permitting law enforcement personnel to continue to work with familiar
protection under the Colorado Constitution not found to exist in the United States
Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Karot, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984), which held a
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to a beeper placed
in a steel drum); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983) (extending protection
under the Colorado Constitution for pen registers in opposition to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)): Charnes v. DiGiacomo. 200 Colo. 94.
612 P.2d 1117 (1980) (extending protection under the Colorado Constitution to bank
records not found to exist in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
141. [he authors have been informed in at least one jurisdiction in Colorado the District Attorney has instructed law enforcement personnel to "Mirandiz'c" every person they
have contact with in a criminal investigation.
142. 392 U.S. at 20-21.
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standards that in no way compromise defendants' fifth amendment
rights. Admittedly, the orthodox Teny/Miranda analysis is not always
easy and there are no bright lines. Such an analysis ultimately requires
careful, fact-specific determinations made not by "according talismanic
power" to a simple precedential phrase, but rather, as in Berkemer, by
appreciating and applying the underlying tenets of the fourth and fifth
amendments. Only through this type of analysis can the court give due
deference to both the legitimate needs of law enforcement as recognized
in Terry, and the fifth amendment principles embodied in Miranda.

PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE VERTICAL
RESTRAINTS UNDER THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST
ACT: DOES "JUSTICE" CARE?
INTRODUCTION

Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "every contract, combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal...."I Section 2 of the Sherman Act, states that
"every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... 2
A capitalistic society seeks to promote competition. Therefore, antitrust laws in a capitalistic society address the protection and survival of
competitors only to the extent that competition is threatened by conduct
affecting those competitors. 3 "Congress designed the Sherman Act as a
consumer welfare prescription." '4 Consumer welfare is promoted by an
increase in the quantity of products if that increase is accompanied by an
increase in quality and a decrease in price. 5 Restraints on competition
are condemned by the antitrust laws if they restrict output. 6 Thus, one
objective of antitrust laws must be to promote economic efficiency.
To survive, manufacturers must implement distribution practices
which maximize their profits, not those of their distributors. A manufacturer cannot succeed if its distributors are earning monopoly profits because such profits will cause a decline in demand for the manufacturer's
product, reducing, if not eliminating, profits to the manufacturer.
Therefore, most manufacturers attempt to impose certain restrictions
on distributors in an effort to promote efficient product distribution.
This note examines the Supreme Court's approach to the legality of
vertical price and non-price restraints 7 by tracing case law development
of the "per se" and "rule-of-reason" standards of evaluation from the
1. 15 U.S.C. § I (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
3. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679. 691
(1978): Brown Shoe Co. v. United States. 370 U.S. 294. 3" (1962).
4. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting R. BORK, THtE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)).
5. R. BORK, I'i ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978).
6. Broadcast Music. Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1,20 (1979).
7. Vertical restraints describe restrictions involving different market levels, i.e. manufacturer-supplier, distributer, and retailer. Horizontal restraints involve restrictions at
only one level. i.e. restrictions only with respect to distributor activity. Vertical price restraints usually involve agreements which set prices between suppliers, distributors, and
retailers. On the other hand, vertical non-price restraints involve agreements belween
diflerent marketing levels which establish such requirements as the employment of technicifly skilled sales personnel at the retail level. employment of a suflicient number of ser-
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early days to the present. The most recent Supreme Court case dealing
with vertical restraints, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,8 is given
particular attention. In addition, this note will critically analyze and contrast to the case law the recently issued United States Department of
Justice guidelines and enforcement policies pertaining to vertical
9
restraints.
I.

STANDARDS

OF EVALUATION

When vertical trade restraints are alleged to be in violation of the
Sherman Act, one of two judicial standards are applied. Under the ruleof-reason standard, in order to determine Sherman Act legality or illegality courts will take into account all factors which may impair competition.' 0 The factors most frequently considered by courts are the
positive or negative economic effects of the restraints, the market power
of the parties involved in the restraints, and the intent underlying the
restraints.'' In order to prevail, a plaintiff in a rule-of-reason case must
usually prove that the restraints result in an anticompetitive effect which
outweighs any procompetitive results. 12 In contrast, under the per se
rule, certain restraints are presumed to violate the Sherman Act on their
face without any proof of actual effect on competition.1 3 The practical
rationale for the per se rule seems to be to facilitate judicial expediency,
particularly given the underlying belief that "certain conduct almost always results in serious anticompetitive consequences."' 4 Because of the
very different burdens of proof required under each standard, the imvice personnel, and limited geographic sales areas, to name only a few. See 2 E. KINTNER,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw §§ 10.3, 10.15, 10.39 (1980).
8. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
9. Guidelines for Vertical Restraints, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
50,473 (January
23, 1985).
10. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1971). See also 2 E.
KINTNER, supra note 7, at § 9.20.
11. Carter- ll'allace, Inc., 449 F.2d at 1381. See also Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text; White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), infranotes 60-64 and accompanying text; Continental
[V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), infranotes 74-85 and accompanying
text.
12. Continental 1, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
13. United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Northern
Pacific Ry., 356 U.S. 1 (1958). Restraints determined to be illegal per se include: horizontal
price fixing (price fixing among competitors at the same level of the market), United States
v. 'renton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1926); vertical price fixing (price fixing among a
manutfcturer and his distributors), United States v. Bausch & l.omb Optical Co., 321 U.S.
707 (1944); tying arrangements (sale of one product conditioned upon the buyer's
purchase of another product when the defendant has enough economic power to appreciably restrain free trade). United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Times-Picavune
Publishing Co., v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt Co. v. United
States. 332 U.S. 392 (1947); group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal, Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 114
F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940). aJTd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); horizontal division of markets (competitors at the same market level divide either territories or customers among themselves).
United States v. lopco Associates. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
14. Pitofsky, i Defensr ?/ Discowiters: The .\o-Foll, Cast br a Per Sc Rile, lgaiist IVertical
1r ix m'g. 71 Gho. l.J. 1487, 1489 (1983).
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portance of the initial procedural determination of which test to apply is
readily apparent. To some commentators, the standard applied seemed
to determine the outcome.' 5 Thus, as the two rules have developed, the
most significant changes in their evolution have centered around determining the types of restraints to which these tests will apply. This section will trace the history of this development, emphasizing the
interrelationships and tensions between the two rules.16
A.

Early Development of the Doctrines

Of the early cases, 17 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. is
is the most significant in terms of determining the types of restraints to
which the per se rule will be applied. Dr. Miles Medical Company was the
manufacturer of proprietary medicines prepared in accordance with secret formulas. Dr. Miles devised a system by which it sought to maintain
the prices it deemed appropriate for the sale of its products. 19 The system entailed the creation of a minimum price which was to be enforced
throughout the entire chain of sales: from Dr. Miles to the jobbers and
wholesale druggists, and then to the retail druggists who sold to the
consumer.2 0 The Court, finding that this practice infringed upon the
freedom of the retailer, held that a supplier who sells his medicine to a
wholesaler is not entitled to restrict its resale through interference with
the purchaser's pricing decisions. 2 ' Justice Hughes concluded that such
agreements between manufacturers and retailers to fix prices "are injurious to the public interest and void." 2 2 Though the extent of its applicability has been both expanded and contracted over the years, 2 3 Dr.
Miles remains the leading case supporting the application of the per se
rule of illegality to vertical price restraints.
Seven years later the Supreme Court qualified Dr. Miles in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States.2 4 Here, members of the Board of Trade's
Exchange adopted a rule whereby all transactions made between the afternoon close of the Exchange and its reopening the next morning were
to be made at the price of the last pre-closing sale. 2 5 Obviously, the rule
resulted in the fixing of prices. Nevertheless, Justice Brandeis, balanc15. Id. See alsoPosner, The .Vexi Step in the ,ntitruit
Treatment of Restricted Distribution. Pet
Se Legality, 48 U. Cot. L. REv. 6, 15 (1981).
16. For a more comprehensive discussion of this historical development, see Redlich,
The Bitget Cnilu",,d thpPor So Rule. 44 ALB. L. REV. I (1979).
17. For other early cases addressing the legality of price restraints, see United Staters
v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (assertion that price fixing was
reasonable not a defense to Sherman Act violations), mnodified. 175 U.S. 21 1 (1899); United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (reasonableness not a defense
to illegality of unitbrm rate agreements).
18. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
19. /d. at 394.
20. Id.
21. Id. al 408.
22. Id.
23. See inl]i 0 notes 35-44. 65-71 and accompanying text.
24. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
25. Id. a! 237.
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ing the effect of the restraint against the underlying purpose of the Exchange to promote competitive trading, found the restraint to be less
important than the Exchange's purpose. 2 6 In Brandeis' view, the restraint was not designed to affect price. Brokers who had no vested interest in raising or lowering prices were involved, not producers or
consumers. Freezing prices in mid-afternoon may keep those prices
from rising or falling until the next day, but there was no reason to expect that anything worse would occur. Therefore, Brandeis found the
arrangement to be price neutral.2 7 More interesting than this conclusion is the language employed by Justice Brandeis in reaching his decision. He stated that the issue of anticompetitive effect of restraints must
be determined by considering "the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its conditions before and after the restraint is imposed; [and] the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable.''28 By this language, Justice Brandeis foreshadowed, as
well as provided the intellectual foundation for, the application of the
29
rule-of-reason standard by the Burger Court some sixty years later.
Nearly ten years later, Chicago Board of Trade's effect on price-fixing
cases was diminished by the result the Court reached in United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co. 0 Convicted of price fixing, the defendants claimed
on appeal that-the trial court had erred when it failed to instruct the jury
as to the law in Chicago Board of Trade.3 1 The trial court instruction had
been "that an agreement on the part of the members of a combination
controlling a substantial part of an industry, upon the prices which the
members are to charge for their commodity, is in itself an undue and
unreasonable restraint of trade and commerce .... 2 The Supreme
Court held this instruction to be correct. 3 3 Justice Stone was unimpressed by the Brandeis opinion in Chicago Board of Trade: "That decision, dealing as it did with a regulation of a board of trade, does not
sanction a price agreement among competitors in an open market, such
'3 4
as is presented here."
With the Trenton decision, it became clear that price fixing agreements would not be tolerated by the Court. Henceforth, price fixing
agreements were condemned as unreasonable restraints, violative of the
basic precepts contained in the Sherman Act, and illegal per se.
26. Id. at 240-41.

27. Id.
28. /d. at 238.
29. See inji. notes 74-85 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Cicago Board of Trade
is representative of distinctions between price and non-price vertical restraints first articulated bv the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (defendant's
aggregation of control over petroleum industry found to be an unreasonable combination
in restraint of trade).
30. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
31.

/i. at 395-96.

32. Id. at 396.
33. hi.
34.

Id. at 401.
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B.

The Colgate Exception

The apparent emergence of the per se doctrine as the primary
arbitor of Sherman Act violations must be qualified by a line of cases
from the same period which gave manufacturers a means to implement
certain vertical price restraints and still avoid per se illegality problems.
United States v. Colgate & Co. ,5 in 1919, dealt with a manufacturer who,
prior to dealing with wholesalers and retailers, announced resale prices
for its goods and later refused to supply any wholesalers or retailers who
did not comply with such prices. No express agreement as to prices was
ever entered into between the manufacturer and its wholesalers and retailers.3 6 The Court, citing Dr. Miles, noted that it was illegal for a manufacturer to enter into an agreement to set minimum resale prices, but
distinguished Dr. Miles by holding that it was appropriate for a manufacturer to choose to do business only with wholesalers and retailers who
voluntarily maintained prices suggested by the manufacturer. 3 7 Any unilateral action by the manufacturer at a later date would not be found to
violate the Sherman Act.3 8 Thus, by avoiding any express agreements,
manufacturers had at their disposal a means to implement vertical price
restraints without becoming susceptible to per se violations. 3 9
The importance of the Colgate exception to Dr. Miles was gradually
lessened by a line of cases 40 culminating in United States v. Parke, Davis &
4 1
Co.
In this case, not only had Parke, Davis suggested resale prices and
discontinued its dealings with retailers who did not abide by them, it
colluded with its wholesalers to enforce maintenance of its minimum
prices by retailers. In other words, if wholesalers refused to cut off retail
discounters, Parke, Davis would discontinue its dealings with the wholesaler. 4 2 This action, lacking express or implied agreement, was seen to
be a combination in restraint of trade which violated the Sherman Act
rather than mere independent action of the type held to be lawful in
Colgate.43 Even with this Parke, Davis collusion limitation, however, the
Colgate doctrine permitting suggested retail prices enforced by independent supplier action is still valid, qualifying the scope and applica35.
36.
37.
38.

250 U.S. 300 (1919).
Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 306-07.
Id.

39. Similarly, in 1926, the Court held that if wholesalers or retailers operated in an
agency capacity the manufacturer could determine the resale price. The fact that the manufacturer acted as a principal, retaining title and risk, entitled it to set the resale price, In
effect, this decision enabled a manufacturer to enter into agency agreements on paper and
then proceed to set the price of their products. United States v. General Elec., 272 U.S.
476 (1926). In 1964, however, the court significantly narrowed this agency exception to
Dr Ailes by restricting it to patented products. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13
(1964).
40. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) (exclusive dealing arrangement combined with extensive use of suggested retail prices found unlawfully):
ITC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (manufacturer's use of coercion to
maintain suggested retail prices restricts competition).
-I1. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
42.
43.

Id. at 35-36, 45.
/d. ait 45-46.
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bility of the Dr. Miles per se rule of illegality of vertical price
44
agreements.
C.

Further Development

The evolution of and interaction between the per se doctrine and the
rule of reason proceeded throughout the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's; the
issue continuing to be the type of restraints to which the respective doctrines would apply. 4 5 For example, in Albrecht v. Herald Co. ,46 the Court
dealt with the issue of maximum resale price restraints. In Albrecht, the
Herald Company had created a distribution system enabling its newspaper carriers (such as plaintiff Albrecht) to obtain what amounted to an
exclusive route. Because other carriers could not enter Albrecht's specified territory, Albrecht was able to set the price of his papers higher than
47
that suggested by the publisher and advertised in the paper itself.
Upon notice of this outrageous behavior, the Herald Company tried to
force Albrecht to lower his prices, and later tried to force him out of
business .48
The Court first noted that express agreements creating maximum
resale price restraints had been held to be illegal per se. 4 9 Here, however, although it was clear that in pressuring Albrecht to lower his prices
the Herald Company was attempting to maintain a retail price ceiling,
no express agreement existed. 50 Thus, it appeared that the Colgate
"suggested" retail price rule would not prohibit this activity. However,
the newspaper had hired another subscription solicitor and carrier to
take over Albrecht's area, leading the Court to find a Parke, Davis type of
combination which was illegal per se. 5 1 Thus, in spite of Colgate's inconsistencies, at this point in the case law development not only would an
express agreement to restrict prices require per se treatment, but evidence of a combination used to restrain prices, maximum or minimum,
52
without more would invoke the per se rule.
44. Along with Parke, Davis, actualities of the marketplace which make it difficult for
manufacturers to police prices without the help of other distributors or retailers may further limit the Colgate exception. Redlich, supra note 16, at 20.
45. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (exchange of price
information between competitors which affected prices is unlawful, but per se rule not expressly relied on); United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (GM's refusal to
deal with distributors who sold to discounting dealers is illegal per se); United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956) (manufacturer's refusal to sell to wholesalers who did not agree to set prices was illegal per se); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (per se rule applies to agreement among competitors
to fix maximum resale prices); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940) (per se rule applies to gasoline distributor combination aimed at raising prices by
purchasing price-cutting competitors).
46. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
47. Id. at 168 (Stewart,.,.dissenting).
48. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 148.
49. Id. at 152 (citing Kicletr-Stewart Co. %.Joseph E. Seagram & Sons. 340 U.S. 211
(1951)).
50. 390 U.S. at 147.
51. Id. at 148-50, 153.
52. Id. at 153.
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Kor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. ,53 was a case involving an alleged
agreement to boycott plaintiffs appliance store. It was Klor's contention that Broadway-Hale, its next door retail competitor, had obtained
agreements from the other defendants, who were manufacturers and
distributors, to stop dealing with Klor's. 54 Broadway-Hale did not deny
that agreements not to deal had been made. Instead, they claimed there
had been no injury to the public or to the competitive process since
Klor's could sell other products similar to those withheld by the
defendants.

55

The district court, using an economic analysis, held that the defendant's actions did not affect the competitive process. 5 6 Justice Black's
opinion for the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that
public injury should be measured by determining whether a given restraint impairs the freedom of individual traders, not by whether the restraint affects the general competitive process. 57 Because the freedom
of traders was affected by the agreements not to deal, the boycott was
deemed illegal per se. 58 To arrive at this conclusion Justice Black relied
on the Sherman Act itself and not on the economic analysis urged by
defendants. In his opinion, the fact that free trade was impinged upon
outweighed any economic detriment, or lack thereof, perceived by the
defendants. 5 9 Thus, upon the same facts, application of the rule of reason by the district court and the per se rule by the Supreme Court led to
opposite results. The Klor's case is significant because this comparison
between the two courts' approaches highlights the sometimes result-oriented nature of the two tests. For example, in cases like Klors, the initial
decision of which test should apply to the particular restraint is more
important in determining the outcome than is the actual application of
the test to the facts.
D.

Non-Price Vertical Restraints

In the 1963 case of White Motor Co. v. United States, 60 the Supreme
Court was presented for the first time with the issue of non-price vertical
restraints. The White Motor Company allocated exclusive territories to
its dealers, in effect eliminating intrabrand competition within these geographic areas and limiting interterritorial customer solicitation. 6 1 The
district court granted the United States' request for summary judgment
and invalidated the restrictions White Motor imposed on its dealers and
53.

349 U.S. 207 (1959).

54. Id. at 208-09.
55. Id. iat 209-10.

56. Id. at 210. Unchallenged affidavits "showed hundreds of other household appliance relailers, some within atfew blocks of Klor's. who sold many competing brands of
appliances. including those the dcendants reftised to sell to Klor's." Id.
57. Id. at 2 12-14.
58. /it.

59.

i.

60. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
61. Id. at 255.
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distributors. 6"2 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court was confronted by
a vertical restraint case which did not involve an agreement to fix prices.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, refused to apply the per se rule
and reversed the district court's summary judgment. 63 He made it clear
that the Court was not commenting on the merits of the case, only that
"the legality of the territorial and customer restrictions should be deter'6 4
mined only after trial."
Just four years after it had declined to apply a per se rule in White
Motor, the Court again faced the issue of vertical non-price restraints in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 6 5 Schwinn employed various methods to sell its bicycles, including sales and consignment arrangements
with franchise distributors and retailers. 66 Generally, the franchise
agreements prohibited franchise distributors from selling to nonfranchise distributors. Furthermore, franchisees could not sell wholesale to buyers outside a specific territory. To enforce these restrictions,
67
Schwinn allegedly threatened the distributors with termination.
Justice Fortas, distinguishing the consignment issues, held that
"where a manufacturer sells products to his distributor subject to territorial restrictions upon resale, a per se violation of the Sherman Act resuits." ' 6 8 He went further and applied the per se doctrine to "restrictions

of outlets with which the distributors may deal and to sales to a retailer
which limited its freedom as to where and to whom it will resell the
products."' 69 Justice Fortas stated that "[s]uch restraints are so obvi'70
ously destructive of competition that their mere existence is enough."
This extension of Dr. Miles, applying per se illegality to vertical restraints
involving no pricing agreements whatsoever, was criticized by many as
illustrative of an overly broad application which ignored all the possible
7
pro-competitive aspects and effects of non-price vertical restraints. '
62. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
63. 372 U.S. at 264.
64. Id. In effect, however, the Court's reversal set the stage for the rule-of-reason
analysis to be applied to non-price vertical restraints:
Horizontal territorial limitations .... are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition. A vertical territorial limitation may or may
not have that purpose or effect. We do not know enough of the economic and
business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain. They may
be too dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small company has for
breaking into or starting in business [citations omitted] and within the 'rule of
reason.' We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of these
arrangements on competition to decide whether they have such a 'pernicious effect on competition and lack . . . any redeeming virtue' [citations omitted] and
therefore should be classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act.
372 U.S. at 263.
65. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
66. Id. at 367, 370.
67. Id. at 370-71.
68. id. at 379.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
7 I. Se gmeeraIly Baker, trical
,
Restian in Jimes of Chmange: Frtm While toSchwitn to
Schwim.
n
J1ethodt .Ie,"
r1975):
Pollock-,lAlerntive Distributio
I leNe?. 41. AN1TrITIST L5.1.537 (
63 Nw. lI.L. Rl':\'.
595 (1968); Posne'r-l,/i/rus/ PoticO) mid /hr Suprour Court." .M.-loolYsis q]'lhe
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Thus, when the Warren Court era came to a close, the per se rule was
firmly entrenched in all cases involving agreements to set price and also
in those situations where the freedom of trade was affected by specific
agreements. 72 Although a rule of reason analysis was utilized in several
non-price cases, 73 Schwinn represents the extent to which the per se analysis dominated the scene during the Warren Court years.
E.

The Burger Court

The most significant of the Burger Court's early antitrust cases is
Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 74 In Sylvania the Court returned
to the pre-Schwinn distinctions between price restraints, to which the per
se rule clearly applied, 75 and non-price restraints, to which the rule of
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and PotentialCompetition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
282 (1975).
72. See supra note 13.
73. See supra note 29, and notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
74. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). However, two other cases should be mentioned. In Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Burger Court held price fixing illegal without using the per se rule. The plaintiffs in Goldfarb were purchasing a new house and
needed to obtain financing for their purchase. The bank requested a title search before it
would agree to finance the home. In Virginia, a title search could only be performed by a
licensed attorney. The plaintiffs contacted several attorneys; however, none would complete the necessary work for less than the amount listed in a minimum fee schedule published by the county bar association. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 775-77.
The State Bar argued that the fee schedule was not a means of fixing prices but rather
was merely a tool to be used to help gauge the appropriate fee for this kind of work.
Finding the argument unconvincing, the Supreme Court found that the arrangement created "a pricing system that consumers could not realistically escape." The Court believed
the attorneys complied with the fee schedule, in part, out of fear that disciplinary action
would be taken if they charged a different fee. Id. at 780-83.
In arriving at this decision, the Court employed the rule of reason. Nowhere in the
opinion is there a hint ofper se analysis. The clear impression garnered from the opinion is
that Burger did not wish to apply the strict per se analysis to a learned profession.
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), involved an attempt to eliminate price competition. At issue was a formal Society policy
which barred competitive bidding on engineering projects. Members of the Society were
not allowed to accept work if they were asked to estimate the final cost; only after an
engineer had been selected for the project could a price be negotiated. The trial court did
not apply the rule of reason analysis to this situation in spite of the fact that Goldfarb
seemed to require it. Instead, the trial court found the arrangement illegal per se, and the
appellate court affirmed. 435 U.S. 679, 683 n.3.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff offered a public policy argument, which
asserted that the prohibition was reasonable since price competition between engineers
was contrary to the public interest. justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated: "To
evaluate (the Society's] argument, it is necessary to identify the contours of the rule of
reason and to discuss its application to the kind of justification asserted by petitioner."
Justice Stevens concluded that the arrangement was not price fixing but was clearly anticompetitive. Id. at 679, 687, 692. Although affirming the lower court's decision against
the Society, the Court did so upon rule-of-reason grounds rather than via application of
the per se rule, again not wanting to set a precedent for application of the per se rule to a
learned profession. For other examples of the Court's reluctance to apply the pei se rule,
see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (rule
of reason, not per se rule, applies to BMI's blanket copyright licensing system which utilized
fixed licensing fees as opposed to fees based on amount used by licensee): United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (effect on prices is not sufficient to allow%a
Sherman Act criminal conviction; there must be intent present to fix prices).
75. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
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reason would be applied. 76 In an effort to increase its share of the market, Sylvania limited the number of retail franchises granted in a particular area, and required retailers to sell Sylvania products only from
franchise locations. 7 7 Continental TV was a Sylvania franchisee seeking
another franchise for a new store. Sylvania rejected Continental's request, but Continental ignored them and began filling its new store with
sylvania products. 78 Sylvania terminated Continental's franchises and
sued for recovery of money owed and secured merchandise held by
Continental. 79 At trial, Continental argued that the location restriction
was a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act under the Schwinn
80
doctrine.
Addressing Continental's argument, the Court admitted that such
location clauses were among the restraints found illegal in Schwinn,8s

but stated that " [t]he question remains whether the per se rule stated in
Schwinn should be expanded to include non-sale transactions or abandoned in favor of a return to the rule of reason." 82 So framing its analysis, the Court overruled Schwinn and returned to applying the rule of
reason in cases involving non-price restraints, calling Schwinn "an abrupt
and largely unexplained departure from White Motor Co. v. United
States."83 The Court found that the location restraints did not have a
"pernicious effect on competition" nor did they "lack ... any redeeming
virtue.''84 Thus, by overruling Schwinn, Sylvania delineated more clearly
between the circumstances under which the two respective rules would
apply and, at the same time, marked the beginning of what some critics
viewed as the Burger Court's gradual movement away from extensive
use of the per se rule towards an expanded application of the rule of
85
reason.
F.

Summary: The Critics Line Up

Although the evolution outlined above was inconsistent and entailed several significant expansions and contractions, it is fair to say
that, after Sylvania, the Supreme Court would apply a rule-of-reason
analysis to non-price vertical restraints and a per se rule of illegality to
vertical price restraints.8 6 However, to the extent that this development
seemed to result in a clear procedure as to which rule applied in various
cases, it also evoked several criticisms which had been growing along
with the doctrines. One criticism was that procedural application of one
76. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

433 U.S. at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 58 (quoting Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
85. Posner, The Ride of Reason and the Economic Appinach: Reflections on the Sylvania Derision, 45 U. CHi. L. REv. 1, 2 (1977).
86.

Redlich, supra note 16, at 54.
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doctrine or the other always tended to be outcome determinative.8 7 In
other words, plaintiffs won per se cases with regularity but found it very
difficult to win rule-of-reason cases, due mainly to the stringent burden
of proof.8 8

An entire school of critics decried the overly broad use of

the per se rule, arguing that many vertical price restraints declared illegal
per se actually had valuable pro-competitive effects.8 ' Some even asserted that the per se rule of illegality should be abandoned entirely, substituting a per se rule of legality. 90 Critics on the opposite side, however,
asserted that "vertical price fixing almost always generates anticompetitive horizontal effects at the dealer level.' '' Thus, theperse rule is beneficial in making the illegality of the activity clear and unambiguous,
inviting compliance with the Sherman Act, and preventing judges from
delving into complex and differing economic analyses. 92 Finally, the
Supreme Court's inconsistent application of the Colgate exception to the
per se rule had resulted in a major split in the lower federal courts."
This split was due in part to the difficult evidentiary question of the extent to which circumstantial evidence (of either collution or non-price
restraints affecting prices) could be used to invoke the per se rule. In
1984, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.94 brought most of these issues to the attention of the Supreme Court.
87. Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 1489; Posner, supro note 15, at 15. See also snpra notes
53-59 and accompanying text, discussing Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores Inc., 349 U.S.
207 (1959).
88. United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972), exemplifies this inflexibilit'. In this case, a number of independent small and medium-sized grocery chains were
stockholders of Topco. In effect, Topco acted as their purchasing agent, enabling the
chains to pass on to the consumer savings generated by bulk-buying under the private
Topco label. Topco was formed for the purpose of enhancing its members' ability to compete locally with the large chains that sold their own private labels. However, Topco members were bound by territorial and customer restrictions. The district court found that the
pro-competitive effects of the Topco restraints "far outweighed" the anticompetitive aspects. See United States v. Topco, 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. I1. 1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 596
(1972). However, the Supreme Court found the restriction to be a division of markets
between competitors and hence, illegal per se. Topco, 405 U.S. at 608.
89. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
90. Posner, The .Vext Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Lealit,
48 U. CHI. L. REx'. 6 (1981).
91. Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 1491.
92. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 142 (1959).
93. Five circuit courts had held that proof of termination of a distributorship following complaints was not sufficient to find Sherman Act violations: Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 688 F.2d 853, 856-57 (1st Cir. 1982); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service
Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1199 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 93! (1984);
Schwimmer v. Sony Corp., 677 F.2d 946, 953-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 459 U.S. 1007
(1982); Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840, 845 ( 10th Cir. 1981); Edward J. Sweeney &
Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
[wo circuit courts had held that such circumstantial proof could lead to a finding of conspiracy to fix prices. Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1213-15 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 984 (1983); Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d
1226 (7th Cir. 1982), affd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
94. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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From 1957 to 1968, Spray-Rite, a large distributor of agricultural
chemicals, was an authorized wholesale dealer of products of the Monsanto Company, a manufacturer of herbicides. 9 5 In 1967, Monsanto instituted a policy of non-price vertical restraints centered around
renewals of distributorships on a year-by-year basis. Such renewal
would be based upon several non-price factors, including the extent to
which the distributor sought sales to retail dealers and employed sales
personnel with sufficient knowledge to inform purchasers of Monsanto's
products, and the degree to which the dealer would "exploit fully" the
market in its area. 9 6 In October of 1968 Monsanto refused to renew
Spray-Rite's distributorship based on this new policy. 9 7 However, fifteen months prior to this denial, Monsanto had received complaints
from competitor distributors who voiced concern about Spray-Rite's
price discounting activities.9 8 Spray-Rite sued Monsanto, alleging Sherman Act violations consisting of a conspiracy between Monsanto and
other distributors to fix resale prices of its chemicals, one consequence
of which was the termination of Spray-Rite's distributorship. 99 In defense, Monsanto claimed that a lack of trained sales personnel and poor
retail sales promotion were the reasons for termination.' 0 0 At trial, the
jury found that a conspiracy existed in violation of the Sherman Act and
awarded $3.5 million in damages, which was then trebled to $10.5 million.' 0 ' The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding
that there was sufficient evidence to support ajury verdict of termination
due to a price fixing conspiracy.' 0 2 Thus, proof of complaints of other
distributors, followed by termination of the discounting dealer by the
supplier, was held to be enough evidence for a plaintiff to prevail under
10 3
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
B.

The Supreme Court's Narrow Holding

Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the Seventh
1 4
Circuit's judgment, but rejected its evidentiary standard of proof.
The Court summarized the case law by outlining two basic distinctions.
First, it noted that independent actions by a manufacturer, as opposed
to collusions between manufacturers and distributors, were not forbidden under the Colgate doctrine. 10 5 Second, the Court distinguished be95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 756.
at 756-57.
at 758-59.
at 757.

Id.
Id. at 758.
684 F.2d 1226 (1982).
Id. at 1240.
465 U.S. at 759.
Id. at 760-61.
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tween "concerted action to set prices," to which the per se rule of Dr.
Miles would apply, and "concerted action on non-price restrictions,"
which, under Sylvania, would be subject to the rule of reason. 0° 1 citing
specific manufacturers' interests,'0 7 the Court emphasized that, in order
to prevent Sylvania and Colgate from being "seriously eroded," price fixing must be distinguished from suppliers' independent actions and nonprice restraints which are implemented through concerted action. According to Colgate and Sylvania, the rule of reason would apply to this
conduct. ' 0 8 The Court of Appeals' holding, stated justice Powell, failed
to take into account this threat of an overly broad application of the per
se rule.' 0 9 Thus, the Court set forth the new standard: "[S]omething
more than evidence of complaints is needed. There must be evidence
that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and non-terminated distributors were acting independently." ' "10 In applying this
test to the facts, the Court concluded that enough direct evidence was
present for the jury to reasonably conclude that an agreement or conspiracy to fix prices existed.'it
More interesting than this narrow holding, however, are the issues
the Court declined to decide. For example, the Department of Justice's
amicus brief, in addition to asserting arguments similar to Monsanto's,
urged the Court to discard the per se rule entirely and instead apply the
rule of reason to all vertical restrictions, including resale price restraints. 1l2 The Department's argument embraced the economic effects
theory that price restraints should not be treated differently than nonprice restraints because both can have valuable pro-competitive effects.' 13 In a footnote, however, the Court refused to address the question because it was not argued in the lower courts.' 14
Similarly, the jury found that several of Monsanto's non-price restraints were part of an overall price-fixing strategy, resulting in the application of the per se rule rather than the rule of reason which typically
106. Id. at 761.
107. Manufacturers have legitimate reasons for being in constant communication with
distributors about pricing and marketing strategy, especially for purposes of eliminating
"free riders." Id. at 762-63. "Free riders" are dealers who provide no pre-sale services
and, as a result, undercut prices of competitors who provide such services, usually at the
behest of the manufacturer. Posner, supra note 85, at 6-7.
108. 465 U.S. at 762-63.
109. Id. at 763-64.
110. Id. at 764. "[Tihe antitrust plaintiff should present direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others 'had a conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.* " Id. (quoting Edward .. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980), ced.
denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
111. 465 U.S. at 765.
112. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19-28.
Interestingly, Congress prevented the Justice Department from presenting this position in

oral argument before the Court by attaching a rider to the Department's appropriations
bill which prohibited the Department from spending any money on work to eliminate the
perse rule. Act of Nov. 28, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 510,97 Stat. 1071, 1102.
113. Bricffor the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19-28. See
supra note 89 and accompanying text.
114. 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7.
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applies to non-price restraints. Monsanto's brief to the Supreme Court
had argued that "there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's
findings" on this issue, essentially maintaining that showing an effect on
price by non-price restraints is not enough to justify application of the
per se rule. 115 The Court avoided this underlying issue in a footnote,
saying that because Monsanto failed to raise the argument in the Court
of Appeals, it was not properly before the Supreme Court. II
C.

Analysis

The Supreme Court's decision in Monsanto clarified the Court's position regarding vertical non-price restraints in several respects. First,
although Dr. Miles emerged relatively unscathed, the Monsanto evidentiary standard makes it more difficult for a plaintiff to prove collusion to
fix prices, thus making it harder to come under Dr. Miles' per se coverage. 1 7 This evidentiary standard tends to strengthen the Colgate unilateral action exception. Further, the stated reason for the standard-the
Court's belief that many vertical relationships are legitimate-may indicate a greater responsiveness by the Court to the pro-competitive aspects of vertical restraints and, as a result, a movement toward
increasing use of the rule of reason."" However, the two issues not
dealt with by the Court leave questions unanswered and future litigation
difficult to predict. For instance, it is unclear whether footnote seven is
an invitation to future attacks on the per se doctrine or merely a compromise on the part of the Court in order to hand down a unanimous opinion.' 19 Similarly, if Dr. Miles and Sylvania are to coexist, the question
that note seven of Monsanto avoided must be answered, namely, whether
a plaintiff can "end run" the rule of reason by showing that non-price
restraints detrimentally affect pricing. 120 It was into this post-Monsanto
setting, and perhaps with these issues in mind, that the Department of
Justice thrust its Guidelines for Vertical Restraints12 1 in 1985.
III.

A.

GUIDELINES FOR VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

Introduction

On January 23, 1985, the United States Department of Justice issued guidelines explaining its enforcement policy concerning vertical restraints. 122 The significance of these Guidelines stems mainly from the
115. Brief for Petitioner at 23-27.
116. 465 U.S. 752, 759 n.6.
117. For a thorough treatise on how future manufacturer/defendants can reduce the
risk of losing a case like Monsanto, see Klein, Some Thoughts on the Practicalities in Coiminicating lith Distributors After Spray-Rite, 40 Bus. Lw. 581 (1985) (avoiding circumstantial evidence of common scheme to fix prices by establishing direct evidence of vertical
interaction).

118. Id. at 584. See Distinctions in "1Ionsanto Provide Little Giiidance, Legal
1984. at 13, col. 1.
119. Id at 13, col. 2.
120. See sulra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
121.

5IRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

122. Id.

9150473

-inies,

April 9.

i.
(Jan. 23, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Guielines

1985]

5VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

insight they give on the stance the Department will assert in prosecuting
antitrust violations and in drafting amicus briefs. The Guidelines establish a market power criteria by which the Department intends to analyze
vertical restraints. "The Division will not challenge vertical practices
used by firms with less than 10 percent market share."' 123 This percentage test is based upon the Department's belief that a firm having less
than a ten percent share of a particular market cannot institute anticompetitive vertical restraints. 124 Through the Guidelines, the Department
expects to "eliminate almost all vertical restraints from further consideration."' 2 5 The purpose of the Guidelines was announced by former Attorney General William French Smith: "By stating its policy as simply
and clearly as possible, the Department hopes to contribute to the orderly development of vertical restraints law, and thereby help reduce the
uncertainty associated with enforcement of the antitrust laws in this
area."' 2 6 This section will first outline the scope of the Guidelines and
the two-tiered test that the Department will apply to vertical restraints.
This section will conclude with an analysis of problems which the Guidelines raise, in light of the common law.
B.

Scope

The Department clearly states that it has limited the scope of the
Guidelines to the issue of permissible and impermissible non-price restraints. ' 27 However, according to the Guidelines, "if a supplier adopts a
bona fide distribution program embodying both non-price and price restrictions, the Department will analyze the entire program under the
rule of reason if the non-price restraints are plausibly designed to create
efficiencies and if the price restraint is merely ancillary to the non-price
restraints."' 128 The Supreme Court, though, has yet to hold that price
restrictions can be analyzed under the rule of reason.1 29 Nevertheless,
the Guidelines continue, stating that "if a supplier adopts a bona fide distribution program embodying non-price restraints, these Guidelines will
apply unless there is direct or circumstantial evidence (other than effects
on price) establishing an explicit agreement as to the specific prices at
which goods or services would be resold."' 3 0 Here again the Department goes further than the Supreme Court went in Monsanto when it
refused to address the issue of whether non-price effects on price can
invoke the per se rule.' 3' Thus, although the Guidelines will apply
predominantly to non-price restraints, including territorial and cus123. Department of Justice Announcement, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,1 50473 (lan.
23, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Announcement].
124. Id.
125. Id. at 56,187.
126. Id. at 56,186.
127,
128.
129.
130.
131.

Guidelines, supra note 121, at
Id.
See sipra notes 112-114 and
Guidelines, supra note 121, at
See supra notes 115-116 and

56,191.
accompanying text.
56,191.
accompanying text.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

V. 63:1
[Vol.

tomer restraints and exclusive dealing arrangements, 1 2 they will also
extend application of the rule of reason to situations which the Supreme
Court has not yet authorized.
After outlining this coverage, the Department limits the scope of
the Guidelines by requiring that one of two "minimal market structure
conditions" be present before a vertical non-price restriction may be
challenged.'3 3 The first possible anticompetition condition occurs when
the vertical restraint is used to facilitate collusion among dealers and
suppliers. 13 4 In order to establish a likelihood of collusion, three market conditions must exist. First, it must be shown that the market in
which the restraint occurs was highly concentrated, pior to the imposition of the restraint. Otherwise, coordinating and policing a competitor's conduct will be too costly absent a specific agreement among the
competitors.' 35 Next, unless relatively few dealers account for the majority of sales within the secondary market, according to the Department
the price fixing or restriction of output will not survive the price or output "undercutting" by the non-colluding secondary market competitors. 1 36 Finally, entry into the primary market must be difficult, for
otherwise new competitors will quickly enter the market and undercut
37
the attempted collusion.1
The second possible anticompetition condition is that of excluding
rivals.' 3 8 The Department acknowledges that a vertical restraint may
exclude rivals if the following market conditions are met: (1) the nonforeclosed market is concentrated and leading firms in the market use
the restraint; (2) the firms subject to the restraint control a large share of
the foreclosed market; and (3) entry into the foreclosed market is difficult. 13'
The key requirement is that the firms employing the restraint
must be able to collect a large enough return from the practice to offset
the increase in their costs caused by the restraint.' 40 Thus, in analyzing
scope, two Guideline functions are significant. First, the Guidelines expand
the application of the rule of reason beyond the present common law
132. Guidelines, supra note 121, at 56,188.
133. Id. at 56,192-93.
134. Id. For instance, if all the suppliers of a particular product awarded exclusive territories to dealers, several collusive activities could result. Price fixing could be easier due
to the limited number of dealers who must agree to set prices or restrict output, and conpetition could be stifled by strict adherence to the geographic exclusivity. Further, "suppliers could police the cartel by replacing uncooperative dealers." Id.
135. Id. at 56,193. The market which instigates the restraints is termed the "primary
market" by the Department (for example, suppliers who initiate exclusive dealer territories). See supra note 134. The "secondary market" would be the dealers who, upon obtaining an exclusive market, could begin to fix prices or restrict output. By a concentrated
primary market, the Department is referring to the geographical area which the colluding
suppliers service. If the area is very large, implementing the restraints and monitoring a
dealer's cooperation by both suppliers and other dealers will be difficult due to the distance between the parties. Guidelines. supra note 121, at 56,193.
136. Guidelines, supra note 121, at 56,193.

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 56,193-94.
Id.
Id.
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boundaries. At the same time, by requiring one of two market structure
conditions to be present in order for the Department to find a likelihood
of anticompetitive effects and thus proceed with examination of the restraints, the Guidelines severely limit the number of cases which will be
reviewed under the rule of reason. In effect, the Guidelines will apply to
more restraints. However, due to the actual tests and screens involved
in the Guideline's competitive analysis, out of this larger group of restraints fewer cases will ultimately be challenged. Part C will outline the
substantive factors which make up the Guideline's competitive analysis.
C.

Competitive Analysis: A Two- Tiered Test
1. Step One: Market Structure Screen

In order to more efficiently analyze vertical restraints, the Department developed two new methods of evaluation: the Vertical Restraint
Index (VRI) and the Coverage Ratio. The VRI is calculated by squaring
the market share of each firm involved in the restriction and then summing the resulting values. 141 The VRI numerically represents the distribution of market shares of the firms employing the restraint, along with
the extent to which the restraint is used in the relevant market. 142 The
Coverage Ratio is used to determine the percent of each market in43
volved in the restriction. '
Under the Guidelines, the Department intends to take a "quick look"
to screen out restrictions which it believes are unlikely to have anticompetitive effects. 144 This is accomplished by roughly defining the affected
market and then applying a simple "market structure screen"1 4 5 against
which firms using restraints are evaluated. According to the screen, if
firms using restraints have either small market shares, or use the restraints to a small degree, or use the restraints in markets too unconcentrated for the exercise of market power, they will not be subjected to
further scrutiny. 146 In order to apply the screen to specific situations,
141. For example:
[I]fonly two firms in a dealer market employ a restraint, one with a 5 percent and
one with a 20 percent market share, the dealer market VRI equals 5' + 202 = 25
+ 400 = 425. If four suppliers, each with a 25 percent market share employ a
restraint, the supplier market VRI equals 252 + 252 + 252 + 252 = 625 + 625 +

625 + 625 = 2,500.
The maximum possible value of the VRI is 10,000, achieved when there is only
one firm in a market and that firm employs a vertical restraint.
Id. at 56,195 n.25.
142. Id.
143. The coverage ratio is the percent of each market involved in a restraint. For
example, if 10 suppliers with 5 percent market shares each employ a restraint, the
coverage ratio equals 50 percent. The coverage ratio also would equal 50 percent
if two 25 percent suppliers (or one 50 percent supplier) used a restraint.
Id. at 56,195 n.26. Because the measurement of market shares on the basis of volume or
capacity would be "extremely dilficult," the Department will instead use the number of'
retail outlets owned or controlled by a firm "in the relevant geographical area as the basis
lor computing its market share." Id.
144. Id. at 56,194.
145. Id.

146. Id. at 56,194-95.
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the Department has come up with the following analysis:
The use of vertical restraints by a firm will not be challenged if:
(1) the firm employing the restraint has a share of the relevant
market of 10 percent or less [the small market share test];
or
(2) the VRI is under 1,200 and the coverage ratio is below 60
percent in the same (e.g. supplier or dealer) relevant market [the degree of restraint test]; or
(3) the VRI is under 1,200 in both relevant markets [another
measure of the degree of restraint]; or
(4) the coverage ratio is below 60 percent in both relevant
47
markets [the relatively unconcentrated market test].'
The Department will not challenge the use of the restriction at issue if
only one of the four tests is satisfied.14 8 However, if two or more of the
tests are met, the Department will deem the existing market conditions
to be at least susceptible to anticompetitive vertical restraints, thus re49
quiring closer Departmental scrutiny. 1
These tests in Step One were developed in an effort to enable firms
to determine if their actions, or contemplated actions, will be brought to
the attention of the Department. The Department's stated hoDe is to
"encourage the use of procompetitive restraints by making it as simple
as possible to decide whether a restraint will be subject to close Depart50
mental scrutiny."'
2.

Step Two: A Structured Rule of Reason Analysis

If a vertical restraint fails the Market Structure Screen of Step One,
Step Two applies a "structured rule-of-reason" analysis to determine
whether anticompetitive vertical restraints do in fact exist. The Step
Two analysis focuses exclusively on the observable effects on competition.151 The Department begins by carefully defining the markets and
examining entry conditions at both the supplier and dealer level. According to the Guidelines, entry must be difficult in at least one market
before the Department may find impermissible collusion or exclusion to
exist.1'5 2 Therefore, "if entry is easy in both markets, the Department
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 56,197. The Department describes the purpose of the tests in Step One as
follows:
Although those conditions are necessary, they are by no means sufficient; in
fact, their presence does not even imply that an anticompetitive effect is reasonably likely. Vertical restraints rarely have a significant anticompetitive effect....
In most cases, restraints not "screened out" in Step One will be found not to
have an anticompetitive effect through direct evidence of market performance or
other evidence indicating that the markets in which the restraint appear are functioning competitively.
Id.
150. Id. at 56,196-97.
151. "Having failed under Step One to exclude the possibility that a vertical restraint
might proniote collusion or the exclusion of rivals, the Department seeks to determine
whether the restraint on balance is anticompetitive.- Id. at 56,197.
152. Id.
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' 53
will conclude that the use of vertical restraints is lawful.'
Even if entry is difficult in one market, the Department will not find
a vertical restraint to have impermissible anticompetitive effects if: (1) it
is clear that exclusion is the only possible anticompetitive effect of the
restraint and entry is very easy in the foreclosed market, or (2) it is clear
that collusion is the only possible anticompetitive effect of the restraint
and entry is easy in the primary market. 154 In determining ease of entry,
the Department will look at the time it takes a firm to enter a particular
market and the size of the investment needed for production or distribu-

tion facilities. '

55

If, after the ease of entry analysis, it still appears that the restraint
may be anticompetitive, the Department will then look at several progressively more probing factors. The first three factors are merely more
refined applications of tests previously employed.1 5 6 Under the fourth
factor, however, the Department will attempt to determine the intent of
the parties in instituting the restraint.' 57 If the Department concludes
the intent is not anticompetitive, but is "merely an expression of excessive zeal on the part of low-level employees," or the action simply reflects "a purpose to prevail over competitors by lawful means," the
Department implies that intent to collude or exclude will not be
found.' 5 8 The Department will next look at the size of the firm employing the restraint. According to the Guidelines, "[i]f small firms use a restraint at their own initiative, the motivation is most likely to be the
pursuit of efficiency."' 15 9 Lastly, the Department will allow the firm using the restraint to demonstrate any pro-competitive efficiencies resulting from the restraint. 160 As the Guidelines put it, "[a]n ability to
demonstrate efficiencies that withstand scrutiny indicates that an anticompetitive explanation is less plausible than it would be in the ab6
sence of an efficiency justification." ' '
Thus, the Department's two step competitive analysis is essentially
an initial screen designed to isolate only those cases likely to adversely
impact competition, followed by a "structured rule-of-reason" approach
which actually consists of a series of more screens. Only after several
objective tests are applied will the Department move to more subjective
153. Id.
154. /d.
155. Id. at 56.197-98.
156. The factors arc: reapplications o" the VRI and Coverage Ratios in order to determine likelihood of anticompetitive effects: a second analysis of the extent to which conditions in the relevant markets are conducive to collusion: and a determination of a possible
exclusionary effect of the restraint. Id. at 56,198-99.
157. Id. at 56,199.
158. Id.
159. d.
160. Id.
161. Id. "For examl)le, an exclusive territorial arrangement justified on the ground
that it prevls dealers Itout ice riding is more likely to wiihstand scrtiny if suppliers cmi
)oint to prl!i
onal activities or other dcalcr-provided servictes ihat are hsitered 1. the
existcnce of exclusive territories." Id.
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tests such as intent or pro-competitive efficiencies, factors which are traditionally dealt with in judicial applications of the rule of reason.
D.

Analysis And Criticism

The Guidelines appear to be a meritorious attempt by the Justice Department to add strength and structure to the judicially created rule-ofreason analysis. However, the Guidelines have several serious drawbacks.
First, due to the sheer complexity of the tests involved, the Guidelines
may actually make it more, not less, difficult for companies to predict
whether their non-price restraints will be subject to Department scrutiny.' 62 For example, there exists a general feeling among experts in
the field that the Department's Vertical Restraints Index will not be effective because it is difficult to compute. Robert Pitofsky, former FTC
Commissioner and current Dean of the Georgetown University Law
Center, has described the Vertical Restraints Index as "awfully compli64
cated."' 163 Likewise, the attorney who represented GTE Sylvania'
before the Supreme Court, M. Laurence Popofsky, expressed "fear that
application of the VRI may prove too difficult in the absence of published industry data."!65
Second, perhaps in response to the Supreme Court's refusal to deal
with the Department's amicus brief in Monsanto,166 the net effect of the
Guidelines is to seriously limit application of the per se rule. While the
Guidelines specifically do not apply to resale price maintenance, 16 7 they
clearly attempt to limit the definition of price maintenance so as to eliminate per se analysis completely, in favor of using the rule of reason:
These Guidelines should eliminate the need to classify potentially anticompetitive vertical restraints as per se violations of
the antitrust laws because of a concern that it is so difficult,
time consuming, and costly to prove an antitrust violation
under the alternative-a cumbersome and unfocused rule of
reason. Thus, where there are doubts, characterization issues
involving vertical restraints should be resolved in favor of a determination that the rule of reason, rather than the per se rule,
applies. ' 68
Obviously, this is a step beyond the current state of the law as it existed
after Monsanto. Monsanto and Sylvania both recognized the continuing
legitimacy of the Dr. Miles proposition that per se analysis will be used by
the Court to determine cases involving vertical price restraints.I li-) In
addition, the Department's statement that non-price effects on price will
162. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
163. Vertical Restraints Guidelines Evoke Mixed Reartions l'ithin
Antitrust Bar, 48 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REI. (BNA) No. 1200, at 237 (Jan. 31, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Reactionsl.
164. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
165.

Reactions, supra note 163. at 237.

166. See sup/a note 114 and accompanying text.
167. See snpra note 127 and accompanying text.
168. Guidelines, supr note 12 1. at 56,189-90.
169. Mnhsanto, 465 U.S. at 761; Syvania, 433 U.S. at 58.
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be analyzed under the rule of reason rather than the per se test 170 goes
well beyond Monsanto's limited holding, taking a significant step into an
7
area where the Supreme Court has specifically refused to venture.' '
This extension has not gone unnoticed by Congress. Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, Representative Peter Rodino, voiced his
concern that "a unilateral announcement of a change in such fundamental interpretations of the Sherman Act reflects, at the very least, an insensitivity to the constitutional responsibility of the Congress in making
72
the law and overseeing its application."'
Finally, not only does the Department's two-tiered test modify existing rule-of-reason factors, it also permits the Department to justify
not challenging the significant majority of vertical restraints.17 3 In past
articulations of the rule-of-reason, courts have looked at the market
share of a company employing a vertical restraint; however this factor
was only one part of the entire rule-of-reason analysis used by the
courts. 174 Furthermore, the ten percent line drawn by the Department
is definitely arbitrary. 175 Thus, at every step of the Department's "structured rule-of-reason" analysis, the underlying presumptions seem to
lead to a finding of legality. Because of the tremendous factual burden
created by the Guidelines, it is unlikely the Government will challenge any
non-price restraints. Senator Howard Metzenbaum summarized this effect aptly, calling the Guidelines a "shocking refusal to enforce clearly es76
tablished Supreme Court antitrust decisions." 1
CONCLUSION

Under current case law the application of the per se rule to price
restraints and the rule-of-reason to non-price restraints seems to be outcome determinative. Both the current law and the Department's Guidelines, make it nearly impossible for a plaintiff to win a case in which the
rule-of-reason is applied. 177 On the other hand, at common law plaintiffs in vertical price restraint cases nearly always win because of the nature of the per se analysis. Critics of the per se analysis stress that vertical
price restraints are not always anticompetitive and argue for a more flexible rule-of-reason approach to displace per se enforcement. However,
the opposing view is that price agreements lead to higher, and usually
170. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
172. Reactions, supa note 163, at 237.
173. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
175. The Guidelines offer no explanation for the ten percent line drawn by the Department. The )epartment appears to have chosen the ten percent figure in an effort to enable themselves to challenge the fewest possible vertical restraints.
176. Reacrtios,. npa note 163. at 237.
177. lnterestingl,. former FTC Commissioner Pitofsky asserts that the I)epart ment

took Ihe position thai vertical price restraints are illegal only if unreasonable almost Ihree
years ago. and since then the Department has not challenged a single case of vertical price
fixing. I'itoisky, spra note 14. at 1495.
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uniform prices, eliminate price flexibility at the dealer level, and stabilize
higher prices at the manufacturer level.
Reaching a proper balance between the two rules is not simple.
Although the Department Guidelines are a response to valid criticisms of
the common law, if adopted by the courts, the Guidelines would so
strengthen the rule-of-reason that the per se rule would become impotent, causing plaintiffs to always lose their battle. It is clear the Department's Guidelines are not the answer, for they effectively ignore that
anticompetitive vertical restraints do exist, many of which are difficult to
prove. The answer to this quandry lies in the reconciliation of the principles set forth in Dr. Miles and Sylvania. The per se treatment given vertical price restraints in Dr. Miles must be weakened in direct proportion to
the amount the rule-of-reason is strengthened in its application to nonprice vertical restraints. Pitofsky's solution, "narrow, carefully defined
exceptions to a per se rule," although in need of specificity, seems to be
78
the most practical in terms of not sacrificing one rule for the other.'
He would allow minimum vertical price agreements in situations where
their competitive effect is clearly positive, but retain the per se rule for
instances where such effect is, or is highly likely to be, anticompetiive. 179 It Is this movement towards an integration of the two rules,
rather than total abandonment of one for the other, which will lead to a
more balanced determination of the legality of particular vertical
restraints.
Bradley A. Friedman

178. Pitofsky, supra notel4, at 1495.
179. Id.

FRONT PAY UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN

EMPLOYMENT ACT*
INTRODUCTION-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) I was enacted
in 1967 and amended in 1978 to ensure that employers would not dis2
criminate against employees between the ages of forty and seventy.
The ADEA draws its enforcement provisions from the Fair Labor Standards Act 3 (FLSA), which allows discriminatees to recover lost wages.
Under the ADEA, trial courts may also grant liquidated damages in cases
of willful violation, 4 and they have "jurisdiction to grant such legal or
equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this
chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion." '5 Even within individual circuits,
court interpretations of this language have varied widely. 6 The interpretations have been most varied in the area of "front pay"-awarding future damages in lieu of the specifically enumerated remedy of
7
reinstatement.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Michael Nosier and Laura
Wing of Rothgerber, Appel, Powers &Johnson, Denver, Colorado, in the preparation of
this article.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982); S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 504.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). In fact,
the ADEA language "unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation" (29
U.S.C. § 626(b)) is taken directly from the Fair Labor Standards Act and makes little sense
in the context of age discrimination. Any minimum wage or overtime violations are tangential to age discrimination claims. See Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc., 22 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). In contrast, the FLSA provides for liquidated damages
for all violations.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
6. See, e.g., Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir. 1984) ("the
AI)EA is limited to the damages specifically enumerated"); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say.
and Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984) ("When we read this section as a whole
and construe it liberally, as we must ....
we conclude that the legal and equitable remedies
available under the ADEA are not limited either to those specifically listed or to those
available under the FL.SA .. ") (citations omitted), cert. granted andjndgtent vacated on other
grounds, 105 S, Ct. 896, on remand and withdrawn in, 753 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985).
7. For opinions denying awards of front pay, see Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d
276 (3d Cir. 1980); Foit v. Suburban Bancorp, 549 F. Supp. 264 (D. Md. 1982); Jaffee v.
Plough Broadcasting Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1194 (D. Md. 1979); Mader v.
Control Data Corp.. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1192 (D. Md. 1978). Covey v. Robert
A. Johnston, Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188 (D. Md. 1977); Price %.Marvland
Casuahy Co.. 391 F. Stipp. 613 (S.D. Miss. 1975). aftd. 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977);
Monroe v. Penn-l)ixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971). For cases approving front pay awards, see Wildman v. Ierner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605 (lst Cir.
1985); Mlaxfield v. Sinclair International, 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1985); Whittlesev v. Union
Carbide, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984); l)avis v. Conibustion Eng'g Inc.. 742 F.2d 9 16 (6th
Cir. 1984): Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1982); Naton v. Bank
of Caliliinia, 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981): Boyce v. Davis Oil Co., No. 83-M-179 (1).
Colo. Oct. 9, 1984): \'entura v. Federal l~ile Ins. Co.. 571 F. Supp. 48 (N.I). Il. 1983):
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In age discrimination cases, the courts must deal with a new and
unique set of circumstances. Court ordered hiring, promotion or reinstatement is frequently impossible in age discrimination cases. Long periods of time usually lapse between the discriminatory act and the trial."
In the meantime, the employee discriminated against may have reached
retirement age, or economic changes may have forced the employer to
close plants, move or reduce staff.9 In addition, the stress of litigation
often heightens already acrimonious feelings, making reinstatement impossible. The more public contact an employee has, or the more the
employee supervises or makes company policy, the less likely that courts
will order reinstatement since a disgruntled employee can cause grave
damage in those positions.' 0 When reinstatement is impossible, an increasing number of courts are awarding front pay as an alternative to
traditional remedies.
This article will discuss the older court decisions rejecting front pay
as an element of damages and the more recent cases awarding front pay.
The majority of circuits now recognize that front pay awards are valid
under the ADEA, yet many trial courts have been careless both in awarding and measuring front pay damages. After examining the various factors courts have considered in awarding front pay, this article will
conclude by listing the factors a court should consider in order to keep
front pay awards from being too remote or speculative.
I.

THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR FRONT PAY AWARDS

The ADEA does not specifically include front pay as an element of
damages, and the legislative history of the statute contains no reference
to front pay. I I Courts derive the power to award front pay from their
O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 574 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ga. 1982), afi'd in part,
rev'd in part, 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984); Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp., 511 F. Supp.
352 (D.N.H. 1981). See also Annot., 74 A.L.R. FED. 745 (1984).
8. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (in which the discriminatory act occurred in 1971, yet the District Court did not render its decision until 1977 (and
the Supreme Court not until 1982). 11 years after the discriminatory act).
9. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1982). Mohawk closed its
plant because of declining demand for its tires and high production costs at the facility.
10. Whittlesey v. Union Carbide, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984) (reinstatement inappropriate where plaintiff was corporation's chief labor counsel); see also Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc., 758 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1985) (determination of whether
reinstatement more appropriate within the discretion of the trial court); Hoffman v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 511 F. Supp. 352 (D.N.H. 1981) (financial award appropriate in lieu of reinstatement); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (reinstatement inappropriate for television newscaster). But c.f Dickerson v. Deluxe Check
Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 281 (8th Cir. 1983) (ordering reinstatement unless the parties
show it would be inappropriate; "I tihe friction arising from the litigation process itself is
not alone sulficient to deny employment . . .").
I 1. lhe House and Senate Reports on the original ADEA contain io discussion of the
damage provisions beyond the language of the statute. H.R. REP. No. 805. 90th Cong..
Isi Sess., rep/inled in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N.;ws 2213, 2218. The Contference
agreenent fbr the 1978 amendment contains the following discussion of damages:
the FLSA
I[The ADEA[, which incorporates the remedial scheme of ...
"aiiounts owing" contemplates two elements: First, it includes items of pectniary or economic loss such as wages. fringe, and otIer job-rlated benefits. Second, it includes liquidated damages (calculated as an aiount ecqlual to tile
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traditional equitable and remedial powers'-2 to make plaintiffs whole in
employment discrimination cases,' 3 and the express language of the
statute stating that "the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal
or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of
this chapter, including, without limitation, judgments compelling
reinstatement."'14 The courts that have awarded front pay are not on
totally new ground; there is some precedent for front pay under title VII
of Civil Rights Act of 196415 and the FLSA. As early as 1962, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals encouraged front pay where reinstatement was
impossible in a FLSA case. 16 A number of title VII cases approved front
pay awards before front pay became a popular remedy under the
ADEA, 1 7 however, its effectiveness as a remedy has been limited because title VII cases seldom award large amounts of front pay. '8 ADEA
cases are substantially different than title VII or FLSA cases. Age discrimination cases are unique because elderly plaintiffs often have a limited amount of working years before their retirement. Older plaintiffs
are more seriously damaged because it is difficult for them to find replacement jobs with similar salaries and responsibilities. To compensate
for this, front pay awards under the ADEA are normally higher than
those under title VII and the FLSA. 19
A few courts, however, continue to reject front pay as an element of
damages. The reasons cited fall into three major categories. First, front
pecuniary loss) which compensate the aggrieved party for nonpecuniary losses
arising out of a willful violation of the ADEA ....
The ADEA as amended by this
act does not provide remedies of a punitive nature.... [Tihe Supreme Court has
made it clear that an award of liquidated damages under the FLSA is not a penalty
but rather is available in order to provide full compensatory relief for losses that
are "too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated
damages.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 504, 535 (quoting Overnight Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942)).
12. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1022 (Ist Cir. 1979).
13. See llhittlese., 742 F.2d at 727-28; Davis, 742 F.2d at 923; Koyen v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1982). Under title VII, a person claiming to be injured as a
result of discrimination in employment may sue the offending employer in federal district
court. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
16. Goldberg v. Bama Mfg., 302 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1962); see also Mitchell v. Dyess.
180 F. Supp. 852 (S.D. Ala. 1960).
17. E.g., Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 104 (4th Cir. 1979);James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 358 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034
(1978); White v. Caroline Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073, 1091 (4th Cir. 1977); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920
(1976); EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919,926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), ar/d.
559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977); Wirtz v. Atlas Roofing Mfg. Co.,
377 F.2d 112, 115 n.5 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976); EEOC v. Safeway Stores, 634 F.2d 1273, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 986 (1981); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945. 957 (10th Cir. 1980).
18. E.g., Fitzgerald, 624 F.2d at 956 (lost wages until employee reaches rightful place:
$20,478): Kallir, 420 F. Supp. at 927 (one year salary: $22,881); llirt-, 377 F.2d at 115 n.5
(parties agree to $100).
19. E.g., Whitlese', 742 F.2d at 729 (senior in-house labor attorney awarded four years
at full salary); Davis, 742 F.2d at 923 ($88,800 as front pay); IVenura, 571 F. Stipp. at 50-51
(six years salary as front pay).
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pay is speculative; it requires a court to consider factors such as the
plaintiff's projected life span, the future job market in the plaintiff's
profession, the likelihood of pay raises in the plaintiff's existing job, the
likelihood of pay raises in the plaintiff's substitute job, and the
probability that the defendant's business will close, move or reduce its
staff for legitimate purposes, resulting in a legal termination of the
plaintiff's job. 20 Second, if front pay is awarded, the defendant's huge
potential liability discourages plaintiffs from settling because the potential benefit comes at no additional risk. 2 1 Finally, some courts reason
that front pay is punitive because it is payment for services not rendered:
Congress provided for punitive and speculative damages in the liquidated damages section of the ADEA 2 2 and would have specifically included front pay in that section if it had so desired.
The first case to discuss front pay under the ADEA, Monroe v. PennDixie Cement Corporation,2 3 denied the plaintiff all benefits because he was
terminated before the ADEA was enacted. 24 In dictum, the court wrote
that any projection of damages beyond the date of trial would be too
speculative and that damages should be liquidated as of the date of trial.
It noted that courts are specifically empowered to reinstate plaintiffs and
a plaintiff who does not request reinstatement waives any right he may
have against his employer. 25 The court concluded by stating that
20. E.g., Foit v. Suburban Bancorp, 549 F. Supp. 264 (D. Md. 1982) (front pay too
speculative, often resulting in a prospective windfall for plaintiffs); Covey v. Robert A.
Johnston Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188 (D. Md. 1977) (front pay unprecedented, speculative, and would discourage courts from ordering reinstatement); seealso
Gibson, 695 F.2d at 1093 (plant closes, circuit remands for trial court to determine whether,
absent discrimination, company would have transferred plaintiff). But see Koyen. 560 F.
Supp. at 1161 (future damages not too difficult to calculate; wrongdoer should bear risk of
uncertainty).
21. Mader v. Control Data Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1192 (D. Md. 1978)
(awarding front pay discourages settlement by plaintiffs).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1023 (dictum) (front pay constitutes payment for services not rendered); Covey, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1192
(court does not want to discourage courts from denying reinstatement); Jaffee. 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1194 (citing with approval the Covey decision denying front pay).
23. 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 235. A number of courts refuse to grant front pay where the plaintiff does
not seek reinstatement. E.g., Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276; Ginsburg v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This ignores the possibility
that plant closings, reduction in work force, or defendants' discrimination may make reinstatement impossible. There is no reason to expect plaintiffs to request reinstatement
when all parties know it would be impossible. In Boyce v. Davis Oil Co., No. 83-M-179
(D.C. Colo. 1984), Judge Matsch found that there was "mutual dislike" and "animosity"
between the plaintiff, Boyce, and her former employer, Davis Oil Company. The oil company had offered Boyce reinstatement in an inferior position. Judge Matsch wrote that
Itlo require Margaret Boyce to return to Davis Oil Company under these circumstances would not only cause her difficulty; it would denigrate the purposes of the
Act by requiring an elderly woman to undergo the stress of working where she
isn't wanted. Accordingly, this is a case where the preferred remedy of reinstatement is inappropriate, and front pay should be awarded.
Boyce, 83-M-179, slip op. at 2. As long as there are sound reasons why reinstatement is
inappropriate, there is no need to demand that plaintiffs file frivolous claims for reinstatement.
A 1982 Supreme Court case may confuse this area. In a title VII case, Ford Motor Co.
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although plaintiffs lose some rights against their employers through
their inability to sue for front pay, defendants correspondingly cannot
show that plaintiffs obtained more lucrative positions in order to reduce
26
their liability for back pay.

The District of Maryland, following Monroe, denied front pay in
three cases: Covey v. Robert A. Johnson Co. ,27 Mader v. Control Data Corp.,21
and Jaffee v. Plough Broadcasting Co. 29 In each case, the court ruled that
the trial date is the cutoff point for measuring monetary losses to the
plaintiff, noting that it could find no authority for projecting lost income
beyond trial. The court also reasoned that the potential for immense
damages against an employer could discourage courts from ordering reinstatement and dissuade plaintiffs from settling cases.' °
II.

A.

COURT AWARDS OF FRONT PAY

Early Cases Discussing Front Pay

The first case to raise the possibility of front pay as a damage award
in lieu of reinstatement was Loeb v. Textron, Inc. 31 The plaintiff in Loeb
32
was hired in 1971 when he was fifty years old and fired four years later.
The trial court decided that reinstatement was inappropriate and
awarded Loeb $90,000 in front pay and vested pension rights.3 3 The
First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for a new trial based
on the jury instructions, but went ahead to discuss the damages issues
raised by the trial court. The court examined the legislative history of
the ADEA, finding that the award of pension benefits was "plainly authorized" under the statute, but left the actual reimbursement scheme
up to the discretion of the trial court.3 4 The court then discussed the
award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement, and determined that front
pay may be available in limited circumstances as an element of damages
under "the traditional equitable powers of the federal courts and the
v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982), the Court held that an offer of reinstatement terminated
former employees' backpay damages, even though plaintiffs would have lost their seniority
by accepting reinstatement (unless the), continued the lawsuit). Id. at 231. rhe Court
reaffirmed the rule that "the unemployed or underemployed claimant need not go into
another line of' work, accept a demotion, or take a demeaning position." Id. at 231-32.
rhe decision may be read to require plaintiffs to plead and accept reinstatement where
reinstatement cannot make them whole. However, in cases when reinstatement to a comparable position is impossible, front pay is essential to the "make whole" purposes of
employment discrimination law.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
sissippi

335 F. Supp. at 235.
19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188 (D. Md. 1977).
19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1192 (D. Md. 1978).
19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1194 (D. Md. 1979).
Covey. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1191-93. The Southern District of Misalso followed M11onroe in Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 391 F. Supp. 613 (S,).

Miss. 1975).

31. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
32. 1I. at 1007-08.
33. Id. at 1021.
34. Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950. 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 13. reprinledil 1978 U.S.
ConE CONG. & AD. NEws 528. 535) (pension benefits are part of the "items of pecuniary or
economic loss such as wages, fringe, and otherjob related benefits")).
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remedies available under the FLSA."' 3 5 The court limited its comments
by noting that front pay awards in title VII and FLSA cases had been
"relatively small" because front pay is both speculative and in return for
"services not rendered," writing that "we suspect that both continuing
payments and substantial awards calculated,
for example, on the basis of
'3 6
life expectancy would be inappropriate."
The first court to follow Loeb and award damages was the District of
New Hampshire in Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp.37 The court denied reinstatement to the plaintiff, stating that "to order the plaintiff reinstated
would be a harbinger of disaster and a catalyst to more litigation,"' 38 and
that "the defendant's conduct placed the plaintiff who was in advanced
middle age [fifty-three years old at the time of discharge and fifty-eight
years old at the time of the decision] in a precarious position in the available job market." 39 The court quoted Loeb at length and awarded the
plaintiff $20,000 damages in lieu of reinstatement. The court discussed
front pay, but the $20,000 figure was not derived from the plaintiff's
future potential income with the company. Instead, the damage award
reflected money he had spent starting up his own business when he
could not find a new job after he was wrongfully terminated. 40 The
court also ordered that the plaintiff be treated as a vested employee for
the pension plan. 4 1 Thus, the court approved the award of front pay in
lieu of reinstatement, but did not actually award front pay.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also followed Loeb in Cancellierv.
Federated Department Stores,4 2 when it approved the concept of damages in
lieu of reinstatement, but did not grant them because a large liquidated
damages award made the plaintiff whole. 4 3 In Cancellier, reinstatement
was inappropriate because of hostility between the parties as evidenced
by one corporate officer referring to the plaintiff as "a cancer."'4 4 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that the award of $2.3
million in damages to three plaintiffs made the plaintiffs whole without
45
any award of front pay.

B.

Cases Actually Awarding Front Pay

One of the first cases specifically awarding front pay was O'Donnell v.
Georgia Osteopathic Hospital.4 6 In that case, the trial court followed Hoffman and awarded the plaintiff, a hospital employee, front pay. However,
35. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1022.
36. Id. at 1023 (citing Wirtz, 377 F.2d at 115 n.5, and Goldbeig, 302 F.2d at 152).

37. 511 F. Supp. 352 (D.N.H. 1981).
38. Id. at 355.
39. Id. at 357.
40. Id. at 355, 357.
41. Id. at 357.
42. 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
43. Id. at 1319-20.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 574 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th
Cir. 1984).
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unlike Hoffman, in which the damage award reflected the cost of starting
up a business, O'Donnell based its future damage award on the potential
income of the plaintiff.4 7 The court used a three part calculation to de-

termine the amount of the damage award. First, the court projected the
plaintiff's wage at the date of termination through the date of her retirement, and allowed her an eight percent annual pay raise based on the
eight percent raise she received in the last year of her employment.
Next, the trial court deducted the plaintiff's expected earnings from the
date of trial through her projected retirement. It based this figure on
plaintiff's earning an average of $229.82 per month from the time she
left defendant's employ until the time of trial. The court did not factor
any pay raise into the figure it deducted. Finally, it discounted the front
pay award to its present value at an interest rate of five percent and
48
awarded the plaintiff a lump sum.

The trial court, however, did not explicitly find whether the hospital
made a legitimate offer of reinstatement. Due to the animosity between
the parties, it found that the defendant's offer was irrelevant, and that
the plaintiff would not have to accept reinstatement. The court wrote
that the plaintiff's desk was moved to face the wall, that she was given
nothing to do, and that she was "harassed and shunned" by her
supervisors .49
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed based
on the district court's findings on the reinstatement issue. 50 The employer had offered unrebutted testimony and affidavits that it made the
plaintiff an offer of reinstatement to a different department at the same
salary. The plaintiff testified that she would refuse any position at the
hospital. 5 1 The circuit court remanded for a finding as to whether the
plaintiff was justified in refusing the offer, writing that "the posture of
this case mandates that front pay may be awarded only after reinstate'52
ment is dismissed as a reasonable alternative."
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the front pay issue
53
in a more complicated situation in Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Company. There, the court was presented with a situation where the plaintiff's
plant had closed after he was fired. Unlike the previous cases, the court
found that the parties were not so hostile that the plaintiff would no
longer have been able to work for the defendant. Since the jury never
addressed the issue, the court remanded the case for a jury trial on the
issue of whether the defendant would have transferred the plaintiff to a
different plant were it not for the age discrimination. 5 4 In discussing the
47. Id. at 222.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 221.
50. 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 1551 n.9.
52. Id. at 1552. The holding was a narrow one, as the court reserved judgment on the
issue of whether reinstatement is the preferred remedy under the ADEA. Id. at 1551-52.
53. 695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1982).
54. Id. at I100.
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possibility that the plaintiff could have been transferred instead of terminated, the court noted that there was evidence on the record that
showed "competition in the tire industry for well-qualified managerial
personnel was intense." 55 The court did not, however, discuss how this
evidence would impact the plaintiff's duty to mitigate, using it only to
show that Mohawk might have transferred the plaintiff absent the discriminatory firing.
The Southern District of New York discussed the issue of front pay
at length in Koyen v. Consolidated Edison.56 Koyen was sixty-eight years
old, and the judge awarded him full front pay up to the date of his retirement at age seventy. The court discounted the award at the rate of
eleven percent and awarded Koyen a lump sum at trial. 5 7 The court
wrote that it was authorized under the ADEA to grant plaintiffs whatever
remedies were necessary to compensate them fully and restore them to
the economic position they would have occupied but for their employer's unlawful discrimination. 58 It dismissed the notion that front
pay awards are too speculative, writing that:
The problem is more imaginary than real. Courts and juries
are not without experience in assessing damages for future loss
of earnings in breach of employment contract and personal injury cases. Each can readily be decided upon its individual
facts. A discharged employee, however much he may be aggrieved by his alleged wrongful termination, cannot sit idly by.
He is under a duty to mitigate damages by making reasonable
efforts to obtain gainful employment in an available market. It
is not difficult to determine the availability of employment opportunities, the period in which one by reasonable efforts may
be re-employed, the employee's work and life expectancy, the
discount tables to determine the present value of future damages and other factors that are pertinent on prospective damage awards. The mere fact that damages may be difficult of
computation should not exonerate a wrongdoer from liability.
"The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy
require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created." Moreover, to restrict
the employee to losses sustained from the date of discharge to
the date of return of the verdict or entry of judgment would
encourage the employee to delay the judgment date as long as
possible. It would serve to encourage tactics of delay in order
to obtain the benefit of increased verdicts by the mere passage
of time.

59

The court, however, gave no reason why the plaintiff should not
have been reinstated, merely stating that the plaintiff withdrew his request for reinstatement and preferred an award of front pay. The plain55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
(194()).

Id. at 1098.
560 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1168-69 (quoting Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251. 265
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tiff's position did not require a great deal of public contact, and there
was little evidence on the record to show that there was any great animosity between the parties. 60 This decision demonstrates that a front
pay award may unduly punish the employer if the employee can elect
front pay regardless of an offer of reinstatement. Although reinstatement may have been appropriate, if front pay is awarded the defendant
employer is forced to pay the plaintiff and receive nothing in return. If
the plaintiff were reinstated, the corporation would have paid out the
same amount of money but would have received the plaintiff's labor in
return.
In contrast to the Koyen opinion, the Eighth Circuit in Dickerson v.
Deluxe Check Printers, Inc. rejected a trial court award of front pay when
the trial court did not discuss why reinstatement was inappropriate. 6 '
The court wrote that "a district court must carefully articulate its rationale for refusing to compel employment of a plaintiff who has suffered
discrimination." ' 62 The court also noted that "the friction arising from
the litigation process itself is not alone sufficient to deny em63
ployment."
The Second Circuit upheld an award of front pay in Whittlesey v.
Union CarbideCorp. ,64 awarding the chief labor counsel of Union Carbide
four years of front pay, covering the full period from the time of trial
until plaintiff reached the age of seventy. The court cited Koyen for the
proposition that future damages are not so speculative as to preclude
plaintiffs from recovering front pay. 6 5 The court added that the "defendant's increased inclination to compromise when faced with the possible liability of front pay" would reduce the risk that possible front pay
awards would discourage settlements by encouraging plaintiffs to hold
out for greater amounts of damages. 66 The court also noted the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages by seeking employment elsewhere as a
factor limiting the amount of front pay trial courts could award. 6 7 Unlike the court in Koyen, the Whittlesey court stressed that reinstatement at
Union Carbide was impossible because Whittlesey would probably be
"ostracized and excluded from the functions of giving counsel," because
the corporation had exhibited unjustified "hostility and outrage" toward
Whittlesey.6 8 The court also noted that Whittlesey was approaching retirement so the front pay would only cover a short period of time, and
that the plaintiff probably could not find comparable alternative
69
employment.
60. Id.
61. 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983).
62. Id.at 280 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1981)).
Accord Blim v.Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1984).
63. 703 F.2d at 281.
64. 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984).
65. Id. at 728.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 729.
69. Id.
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The Sixth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals in Davis v. Combus71
tion Engineering7 ° and EEOC v. Prudential Savings and Loan Association,
upheld front pay awards in decisions that were almost simultaneous with
Whittlesey. The Sixth Circuit in Davis wrote: "we hold that front pay is a
remedy available to the trial court for use, in its discretion, in fashioning
relief," and upheld a jury award of $88,800 in front pay. 7 2 The court
never articulated any reason why the plaintiff could not be reinstated. It
offered no justification for the $88,800 figure, and the court never discussed the district court's finding that, due to reductions in force at the
defendant's plant, it was possible that the plaintiff would be lawfully ter73
minated before his mandatory retirement date.
In Prudential,the Tenth Circuit approved future damage awards but
remanded the case because the trial judge did not say why reinstatement
was not appropriate. 74 The trial court had awarded the plaintiff $17,000
75
in lost retirement and pension benefits rather than reinstatement.
The court reiterated that reinstatement is always the preferred remedy
under the ADEA, but also noted that front pay is available as an alternative under the ADEA's equitable relief provisions when the plaintiff can
show that his employer has exhibited extreme hostility, making reinstatement impossible. 76 The plaintiff in Prudential argued that, due to
the defendant's attitude, reinstatement was "a virtual impossibility," but
the district court made no express statement on the issue. The Tenth
Circuit remanded for a finding as to why future damages were more appropriate than reinstatement. 77 The Tenth Circuit also stressed that
trial courts should consider a discharged employee's duty to mitigate
78
when calculating his future damages.
Since the Davis, Prudentialand Whittlesey decisions, two more circuits
have approved front pay awards. In Maxfield v. SinclairInternational,79 the
70. 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984).
71. 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court vacated Prudential and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 105 S.
Ct. 613 (1985). Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. EEOC, 105 S. Ct. 896 (1985). The
Tenth Circuit withdrew its opinion. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 753 F.2d

851 (10th Cir. 1985). This article will nonetheless discuss Prudentialbecause Thiiistopi only
addressed the issue of willful violations of the ADEA; it did not discuss front pay. Presumably, the Tenth Circuit's opinion concerning front pay will not change upon
reconsideration.
72. 742 F.2d at 923.
73.

Id. See also id. at 924 (Wellford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Front pay is a substitute for reinstatement under the ADEA. The ADEA states that reinstatement is an equitable remedy. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). Thus, although the underlying claim of discrimination is a legal question, Lontlard, 434 U.S. 575, the issue of front pay
is equitable. The question of front pay should be tried to the court after the jury has
determined liability and legal damages. See Ventura, 571 F. Supp. at 51. But see Brenemer
v. Great W. Sugar Co., 567 F. Supp. 218 (D. Colo. 1983).
74. Prudential, 741 F.2d at 1232.
75. Id. at 1233.
76. Id. (citing Blim v. Western Elec., 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. C.
233 (1984)).
77. 741 F.2d at 1233.
78. Id. at 1232.
79. 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1985).
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Third Circuit awarded front pay to a plaintiff who was fired at age sixtyfive from a position selling parts to papermills. The evidence included a
letter from the company to the plaintiff that said "You are beating a
dead horse. I'm sorry you can't let it go and retire with dignity....
Please accept the fact that it is time for a change." 80 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the jury's award of $7,500 front pay. 8' The
court noted that reinstatement is the preferred remedy, but the district
courts may determine that reinstatement is not feasible. 8 2 In cases
where reinstatement is not feasible, the court held that "an award for
future lost earnings is no more speculative than awards for lost earning
83
capability routinely made in personal injury and other types of cases."
Finally, in August 1985, the First Circuit resolved the conflict that it
had created with the Loeb opinion. In Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corporation,84 the First Circuit apologized for "swallowing the bullet for another
day, instead of biting it" in Loeb85 and approved a front pay award. The
court surveyed opinions from other circuits awarding front pay and
adopted a succinct rule for front pay awards:
Future damages should not be awarded unless reinstatement is
impractical or impossible; the district court, then, has discretion to award front pay. Because future damages are often
speculative, the district court, in exercising its discretion,
should consider the circumstances8 6 of the case, including the
availability of liquidated damages.

In this case, although reinstatement was inappropriate, the plaintiff
had been fully compensated by awards of compensatory damages, liquidated damages and damages under local anti-discrimination statutes, so
87
the First Circuit did not award front pay.

CONCLUSION

The cases cited above clearly demonstrate that most of the circuits
approve of front pay in ADEA cases, but the standards courts apply
when determining if front pay is appropriate are inconsistent. Front pay
is an appropriate remedy within the broad equitable powers granted to
courts under the ADEA to make plaintiffs whole for the discrimination
they have suffered. In awarding front pay, courts must be cognizant of
the punitive and speculative nature of future damages. Courts must
consider several factors before awarding front pay. Although almost
every circuit has now approved of front pay or has indicated a willingness to approve front pay, few if any trial courts have adequately considered all of the relevant factors in calculating front pay awards.
80. Id. at 790.
81. Id. at 795.
82. Id. at 796.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
771 F.2d 605 (Ist Cir. 1985).
Id. at 614 (citing .oc b . "lcxtron, 600 F.2d 1003 (Ist Cir. 1979)).
771 F.2d at 616.
87. Id. The plaintifl's damage award iotalled $348.518. Id.
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Before awarding front pay, courts must make the threshold determination that reinstatement is impossible.8 8 Since front pay is compensation for "services not rendered," 8 9 it is particularly punitive when a
plaintiff could return to his former position. If, however, a plaintiff
holds a supervisory position with a high degree of public contact, reinstatement may be inappropriate. If economic conditions have forced
plant closings or legitimate reductions-in-force, reinstatement may be
impossible.
The facts, however, are not always so clear. In many cases economic conditions force corporate "reorganizations" in which a disproportionate number of elderly employees are fired, often when their
pension rights are about to vest. 90 The elderly plaintiff's former job
may be divided between several employees. Courts are then in a gray
area where reinstatement may indeed be possible, depending upon the
facts of a particular case. One solution to this reinstatement dilemma
may be to give the employer a choice between creating an equivalent
position or paying future damages.
While many courts have denied front pay because it is too speculative, front pay is not too speculative if courts consider all of the relevant
factors. First, the courts must examine both the economic climate of the
industry in question, and the plaintiff's actual employment status at the
time of trial. In a strong economy, a plaintiff may be able to find an
equivalent or a better position with another firm. 9 1 In a poor economy,
legitimate reductions-in-force could eliminate a plaintiff's position. Future damages are appropriate only to the extent that a plaintiff actually
was damaged, and are inappropriate if a plaintiff can find a comparable
position. When, however, plaintiffs have few years left before retirement, it may be impracticable and cruel to expect them to find new
92
work.
After showing that reinstatement is inappropriate and that the
plaintiff was actually damaged by the termination, courts must calculate
the front pay award. The court should begin with the amount of money
the plaintiff would have earned absent the termination, then consider
the possibility that the plaintiff would then have received pay raises in
88. See Blim, 731 F.2d 1473; Dickerson, 703 F.2d 276; Boyce, No. 83-M-179 (D. Colo.
Oct. 9, 1984). Some courts, however, continue to refuse to consider whether reinstatement is possible. See, e.g., Davis, 742 F.2d 724; Koyen, 560 F. Supp. 1161.
89. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1023.
90. 600 F.2d 1003.
91. E.g., Kolb v. Goldring, 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982); Robb v. Chemetron Corp., 17
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1535 (S.D.Tex. 1978).
92, Royce, No. 83-M-179 (D. Colo. Oct. 9, 1984). Thejury found the defendant liable
two years before the plaintiffs retirement date. The plaintiff'had worked for )avis for over
14 years. In view of the size of plaintiff's former office and the animosity created by the
suit. Judge Matsch held that reinstatement would "denigrate the purposes of the Ao."
Boyce. 83-N- 179, slip. op. at 2. It is implicit that plaintiff would have becen unable to find an
equivalent position before her retirement, and judge Matsch awarded full front pay
through her retirement date. Id.
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his former job. 93 The courts should offset that amount by prospective
pay raises in his substitute job. Courts must then discount the award to
present value. Finally, judges should deduct any liquidated damage
awards that have made the plaintiff whole, thus reducing additional future damages to the extent that they are unnecessary.
Failure to consider all of these factors leads to confusion among
practitioners and sets weak precedent for future awards. If trial judges
carefully delineate their front pay calculations, they will encourage settlement by reducing uncertainty and more adequately assure both that
plaintiffs are fully compensated and that defendants are not unduly
punished.
Arnold C. Macdonald

93. E.g., O'Donnell, 574 F. Supp. 214. The author has found no cases that consider pay
raises in plaintiffs substitute job.

